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SUMMARY
This dissertation consists of three essays on finance, technology, and labor. In the first
essay, using an anonymized employer–employee matched payroll dataset of 70 million
workers, I examine the effect of venture capital (VC) investment flows on large local in-
cumbent firms. I find that a VC investment of $1,000 per capita nearly doubles the wage
growth for high-skilled workers in that region, while there is no effect for low-skilled work-
ers. This wage effect is particularly strong in regions with inelastic short-term labor supply,
and regions with lower enforceability of non-compete agreements. To mitigate concerns
about time-varying shocks at the industry-region level, I exploit within-industry-state and
within-firm variation, conduct occupation-level analysis, and utilize variation in VC fund-
ing. Further, I find that incumbent firms experience lower growth of high-skilled employ-
ment and a higher departure rate among patent inventors. Incumbent firms also cut R&D
and generate lower-quality innovation. Overall, my results highlight that VC investment
inflows, through competition for talent, can have distributional effects on workers and ad-
verse consequences for some local incumbent firms.
In the second essay, using an employer-employee payroll dataset for approximately 2.6
million retail workers, we find that the staggered rollout of a major e-commerce retailer’s
fulfillment centers (FCs) has a negative effect on the income of retail workers in geograph-
ically proximate counties. Wages of hourly workers, especially part-time hourly workers,
decrease significantly. There is a decrease in credit scores and an increase in delinquency
for retail workers with higher prior credit utilization. Evidence from 3.2 million retail stores
shows that geographically proximate stores experience a reduction in sales, number of em-
ployees and there is a decrease in entry and an increase in exit for small and young stores.
Our robustness tests show that prevailing local economic conditions are unlikely to drive
our results. Our results highlight the extent to which a dramatic increase in e-commerce
retail sales can have adverse consequences for some of the workers at traditional brick-and-
xiii
mortar stores.
In the third essay, we show that, between 2009 and 2013, Theflyonthewall.com (FLY)
leaks 58% of recommendation revisions with a median delay of 27 minutes relative to the
I/B/E/S announcement time. FLY improves price discovery, but leaked recommendations
hamper the ability of brokers to offer price improvement on trades routed through them.
Three major brokers sued FLY and using key court dates, we show significant wealth and
real effects to the brokerage industry. Overall, the speed with which analyst recommenda-
tions are disseminated has led to more rapid price discovery at the expense of a decline in
the scope of the sell-side research industry.
xiv
CHAPTER 1
IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL FLOWS ON INCUMBENT FIRMS:
EVIDENCE FROM 70 MILLION WORKERS
1.1 Introduction
The venture capital (VC) industry in the U.S. experienced massive growth since the 1980s,
with annual investment increasing from $610 million in 1980 to $84 billion in 2017.1 Dur-
ing this time, VC emerged as the dominant form of equity financing for young, privately
held, high-tech companies ([76]). An extensive literature documents that VC creates enor-
mous benefits for startups (e.g., spurring innovation, commercializing products, building
human capital).2 These startups compete with large incumbent firms in the product and
labor markets. But, there is sparse evidence on how VC flows affect incumbent firms. In
this paper, I examine how VC flows into a region affect wages and employment at local
incumbent firms.
While VC-backed startups and incumbent firms may compete in multiple markets (e.g.,
product market, labor market), I focus on competition for talent because human capital is
increasingly becoming a crucial asset for firms ([109]). As [86] points out, the potential loss
of specific human capital has important implications for firms. Venture capitalists play a
vital role in building the human capital of startups ([60, 40]). The expansion of VC-backed
startups’ workforce creates additional demand for talent. In a frictionless labor market,
worker supply and quality can fully adjust to demand shocks. Therefore, the increased
demand for talent caused by VC flows may not have a significant impact on wages at local
1https://nvca.org/pressreleases/record-unicorn-financings-drove-2017-total-venture-capital-investments-
84-billion-largest-amount-since-dot-com-era/. This $84 billion is about 0.43% of the U.S. GDP ($19.49
trillion according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis), and it is 240% more than the U.S. aggregate IPO
proceeds ($24.53 billion according to Jay Ritter’s website) in 2017.
2See [39] for a complete survey.
1
incumbent firms. However, in the presence of labor market frictions, VC flows may pose a
labor turnover risk for incumbent firms and affect their wages. First, if the new local labor
supply is limited, the additional labor demand creates more pressure for talent at incumbent
firms. Second, in a world where labor mobility is imperfect, larger VC investments can
result in higher wage growth ([90]). Third, workers have more bargaining power due to the
increased outside opportunities only if they can move freely across firms.
There are two primary challenges in identifying the effect of VC flows into a region
on wages and employment at local incumbent firms. The first challenge is that publicly
available wages and employment data are at the aggregate level and do not differenti-
ate startups from incumbent firms. To overcome this challenge, I obtain an anonymized
employer–employee matched payroll dataset for approximately 70 million workers of in-
cumbent firms. This dataset includes over 70% of the Fortune 500 companies and covers
a significant portion of the U.S. workforce. It provides detailed information on workers’
wages, education level, occupation, location, and tenure. Also, this dataset allows me to
observe establishments belonging to the same firm but in different regions.
The second challenge is that VC investment flows are unlikely to be random. The esti-
mated effect can be biased if unobservable factors at the local area correlate with both VC
investment flows into the region and the wage growth at local incumbent establishments.
For example, venture capitalists may choose to invest in startups in a good industry and
in a good region at a particular time. But, the granularity of the payroll data allows me
to compare establishments in the same industry and in the same state in a given year (i.e.,
industry × state × year fixed effects) to control for time-varying shocks at the industry and
region level. I can also compare establishments belonging to the same firm but having dif-
ferent exposures to VC flows (i.e., firm × year fixed effects) to control for a time-varying,
firm-specific productivity increase or a technology adoption. However, it is still possible
that time-varying omitted variables that are specific to a particular industry and a particular
CZ drive the results. Because the inclusion of industry × CZ × year fixed effects would
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completely absorb the variation in VC flows, I exploit heterogeneous wage effects within
an establishment based on workers’ occupation and exploit plausibly exogenous variation
in VC funding.
Following [89], in fixed effects models, I include establishment, industry × year, state
× year, and industry × state × year fixed effects. The inclusion of granular fixed effects
should absorb most of the unobserved heterogeneity. I find that VC investments in a com-
muting zone (CZ) have distributional effects on wages. There is a positive effect on the
wage growth of high-skilled workers who have at least a bachelor’s degree. This effect
results in a level increase in wages. The effect is insignificant for low-skilled workers who
have only a high school diploma. Among high-skilled workers, higher-wage workers ben-
efit more. In particular, a VC investment of $1,000 per capita in a CZ is associated with
an increase of $849–$1,218 in the 90th percentile of high-skilled workers’ wages, nearly
doubling the unconditional average wage growth. The results hold after including firm ×
year fixed effects.
The main heterogeneity that is not potentially controlled for in the fixed effects mod-
els that I have estimated so far is the possibility of time-varying omitted variables that are
specific to an industry in a particular CZ. One example would be a technological shock in
the IT industry of Atlanta in 2014 that boosts the wages in the local IT industry and, at
the same time, attracts more VC investments in the local IT industry. I leverage the rich
occupation data to examine the impact of one industry’s VC investments on high-skilled
workers in other industries. The cross-industry analysis mitigates some of the concerns
that a time-varying industry × CZ level unobservable drives the results that I document so
far. Specifically, I analyze the effect of VC investments in the information technology (IT)
industry on talented computer workers (90th percentile) in non-IT industries. I use skilled
non-computer workers as a control group, and I include establishment × year and occupa-
tion × year fixed effects to absorb any time-varying establishment-level and occupation-
level shocks. I find that, compared to non-computer workers in the same incumbent estab-
3
lishments, computer workers have higher wage growth when VC investments in local IT
startups are greater.
Also, I utilize plausibly exogenous variation in VC funding to further establish causal-
ity. VC investments are determined by the availability of VC funding and the decisions of
venture capitalists to invest. While the former is less of a concern, the latter is endogenous.
VC investments in 2014 are almost double the investments in 2013. One dominant expla-
nation is the low-interest-rate environment, which is likely uncorrelated with investment
opportunities. Similar to [16], I exploit this funding shock and construct ex ante exposure
to national VC investments for each CZ. A difference-in-differences estimation indicates
that high-skilled workers in CZs with higher ex ante exposure have higher wage growth
after 2014. Also, following [96], and [53], I use endowment returns and inflows into buy-
out funds as instrumental variables for VC investment flows. The results hold in these
instrumental variable (IV) estimations. Another potential endogeneity concern is reverse
causality. Namely, startups seek VC investments when local competition for talent is high.
An analysis of the dynamic effects of VC flows reveals that wage growth is uncorrelated
with future VC investments. Therefore, reverse causality does not appear to be a major
issue.
My results can potentially be explained by several alternative hypotheses that can be
non-mutually exclusive. I attempt to rule out these alternative hypotheses. First, I show
that my results are not driven by other financial activities that have been shown to have
an impact on labor outcomes and may be correlated with VC investments, including ini-
tial public offerings (IPOs), private equity investments, and horizontal mergers and ac-
quisitions. Second, it is likely that VC investments are correlated with entrepreneurship
activities. Therefore, I control for entrepreneurship activities by including CZ-level estab-
lishment growth. Third, the results are also robust to controlling for general local economic
conditions, such as wage growth and employment growth. Fourth, because the employment
growth of incumbent establishments decreases, on average, my results are unlikely to be
4
driven by competition among incumbent establishments. Also, the results are not driven by
any VC-intensive region (e.g., California, Massachusetts).
While it is always challenging to establish causality, the totality of evidence from (a)
the inclusion of fine-grained fixed effects; (b) the cross-industry, occupation-level analysis;
(c) the exploitation of plausibly exogenous variation in VC funding; (d) the lack of reverse
causality; and (e) ruling out multiple alternative hypotheses gives me confidence that VC
flows have a causal effect on wages at incumbent establishments.
Next, I examine the impact of VC investments on employment at incumbent establish-
ments. It appears that, for incumbent establishments, the employment growth of high-
skilled workers decreases, while the employment growth of low-skilled workers stays
mostly unaffected when local VC investments are large. Further, I demonstrate that the
establishment-level employment growth of high-skilled workers also responds to VC in-
vestments in other regions where the firm operates. Specifically, larger VC investments in
other areas where the firm operates results in an increase in the establishment-level em-
ployment growth of high-skilled workers. The results suggest that incumbent firms may
have made strategic labor decisions when facing competition for talent. The results also
highlight the potential bright side of geographic diversification.
I discuss four non-mutually exclusive mechanisms through which VC flows affect
wages and employment at incumbent establishments. The first hypothesized mechanism
is competition for talent. VC investment flows increase local competition for talent, and
therefore incumbent establishments must raise wages to hire or retain talent. One of the
critical assumptions for this channel is that startups hire more upon receiving VC funding.
To validate this assumption, I match VC deal data to labor condition application (LCA)
data and conduct event panel studies. I find that startups increase hiring by 4.7% after re-
ceiving VC funding compared to firms in the same CZ and the same industry. The effect is
more pronounced, at 15.1%, for deals involving at least $100 million.
Competition for talent is consistent with the findings that both the wage increases and
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the employment decreases are confined to high-skilled workers. The competition for talent
hypothesis also predicts that the effect should be stronger in areas with constrained local
talent supply, areas that are less appealing to high-skilled workers, as well as areas with
stronger labor mobility. I find supporting evidence that the impact on high-skilled workers’
wages is more pronounced in regions that lack top-level engineering schools, regions that
have fewer pleasant days according to weather data, and regions that have lower enforce-
ability of non-compete agreements.
The second hypothesized mechanism is voluntary departure for entrepreneurship. In
this scenario, rather than joining VC-backed startups, workers at incumbent establishments
leave their jobs to become entrepreneurs after sensing the opportunities provided by VC.
However, the main results are robust to controlling for establishment growth, which is a
proxy for entrepreneurship activities. The third mechanism is the creation of new skills.
Following VC investments in startups, incumbent establishments create new jobs that re-
quire new skills, resulting in a shift in the composition of workers. But, I find that ex-
isting workers also experience higher wage growth. The fourth mechanism is knowledge
spillovers. VC investments generate knowledge spillovers, and wage growth reflects pro-
ductivity growth. However, this mechanism cannot fully explain the reduction in employ-
ment growth and lower-quality innovation that I document. Overall, while it is possible
that other mechanisms may also play a role, I find that the competition for talent channel
best explains all the results that I document in the paper.
What is the impact of competition for talent caused by VC flows on incumbent firms?
Hypothetically, if firms can reallocate workers from high-VC CZs to low-VC CZs to min-
imize the impact of competition, the effect on firm-level outcomes is muted. However,
the firm-level analysis shows that firms that are headquartered in CZs that have larger VC
investments experience higher labor costs and a reduction in employment growth. The
evidence indicates that firms may not be able to reallocate workers to completely avoid
competition for talent due to VC-backed startups.
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The increased labor costs may negatively affect firms’ cash flow. At the same time,
competition for talent may also tighten labor constraints for some incumbent firms. There-
fore, VC flows could affect firms’ investment policies. I find that VC flows have a negative
effect on the R&D of incumbent firms, while there is no effect on capital expenditure.
These results show that firms cut R&D, the input of innovation (See [30]). Next, I examine
the output of innovation. I find that while incumbent firms produce more patents, the total
adjusted citations do not increase. Consequently, the average adjusted citations decrease,
suggesting incumbent firms generate lower-quality innovation. Moreover, I show that in-
vestors are more likely to leave incumbent firms, which could partially explain the decrease
in innovation quality of incumbent firms. Overall, these results suggest that competition
for talent due to VC investment flows may have a long-term impact on incumbent firms.
This paper contributes to the literature on the real effects of VC. VC creates enormous
benefits for VC-backed startups.3 They generate knowledge spillovers across firms ([54]
and [97]). VC investments also boost local economic growth ([96]). I document a new
channel–competition for talent, through which regional VC flows have distributional effects
on workers at local incumbent establishments. This competition creates additional costs
for incumbent firms and has implications for firms’ innovation input and output. While
the benefits of VC are well documented in the literature, the costs of VC are not as well
understood ([39]). The results that I document in this paper shed light on this underexplored
area.
My paper also contributes to the recent research on local labor market competition and
wages. [19] and [13] document that wages are lower in regions with higher employer con-
centration. They attribute their findings to the monopsony power of employers. I contribute
to this literature by focusing on an increase in labor market competition driven by VC in-
3Spurring innovation: [76]; Commercializing products: [59]; Building human capital: [60] find that ven-
ture capitalists help startups with professionalization of human capital. [40] document a positive relationship
between VC funding and employment growth of startups. [32] show that VC increases firm productivity.
[95] find that VC-backed firms account for 4% to 5.5% of total employment from 1980 to 2005. [4] provide
evidence that venture capitalists who are on the board help recruit managers and board members.
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vestment flows. More importantly, I analyze the differential impact on high-skilled and
low-skilled workers.
My paper also broadly relates to the emerging literature on labor and finance (see [86]
for a survey). In particular, my paper relates to the research on the distributional effects of
financial activities and technological innovation on workers (e.g., [31, 75, 78, 83]) and the
implications of labor mobility risk for firms (e.g., [49, 71, 74]).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the empirical design
and identification challenges. Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 presents the main
empirical results. Section 1.5 discusses several potential mechanisms. Section 1.6 shows
the implications for firms. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Design and Identification Challenges
This paper aims to estimate the impact of VC investment flows on wages at local incumbent
establishments. An ideal experiment would be to assume there are two identical regions and
venture capitalists randomly invest in startups in one of the two regions. The effect can be
quantified by comparing the wage growth of incumbent establishments in the two regions.
However, in practice, identifying the causal effect is challenging because VC investments
are not random. The major endogeneity problem is the presence of omitted variables that
affect the wages of incumbent establishments and are correlated with VC investment flows.
For instance, a technological shock in a region boosts wages and attracts more VC invest-
ments. A minor identification concern is reverse causality. In this section, I discuss my
baseline empirical model, potential concerns, and how I use multiple approaches to tackle
identification challenges: fine-grained fixed effects models, occupation-level analysis, and
exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in VC funding.
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1.2.1 Fixed Effects Models
To quantify the wage effect of VC investment flows on local incumbent establishments, I
start with a baseline regression specification at the establishment-year level,
∆Ye,c,t = βV CPerCapitac,t + ηe + γt + εe,c,t, (1.1)
where ∆Ye,c,t is the dollar change in a given percentile of high-skilled workers’ wages
(e.g., ∆P90 HighSkilled) or the dollar change in a given percentile of low-skilled work-
ers’ wages (e.g., ∆P10 LowSkilled) in establishment e, commuting zone (CZ) c, and year
t.4 The variable V CPerCapitac,t is the dollar value of VC investments (in thousands of
dollars) in CZ c, in year y, divided by the CZ population in 2000.5 I include establishment
fixed effects (ηe) and year fixed effects (γt) to control for time-invariant establishment-
specific characteristics and transitory common shocks, respectively. The error term is εe,c,t.
Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level to account for correlations within a CZ. CZs
that have received VC investments may differ from CZs that have never received VC in-
vestments in terms of, e.g., economic environment, regulatory environment, or industry
composition. To mitigate this concern, I include in the main analysis CZs that have re-
ceived VC investments during the sample period.6
One of the challenges is classifying workers into high-skilled and low-skilled workers,
because skills are difficult to measure and there is no consensus on the optimal method. [46]
argues that a proxy for skills should capture education, training, learning from coworkers,
and the ability to adapt to changes. Among these factors, education attainment is directly
observed and widely used. Following [73] and [6], I define high-skilled workers as those
4In this paper, a local area is defined as a CZ, which is proposed by [103]. A CZ is a group of counties with
strong commuting ties. They represent the local economy better than a county. U.S. counties are uniquely
grouped into one of the 709 CZs. See https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commuting-zones-and-labor-
market-areas/ for the mapping between counties and CZs.
5Scaling considers the fact that a $1 billion investment in a CZ with a large population generates a smaller
effect than the same amount of investment in a CZ with a small population. The results remain similar if I
scale VC investments by the lagged employment.
6The results remain similar if I include all CZs.
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who have at least a bachelor’s degree, and I define low-skilled workers as those who have
only a high school diploma.
Equation 1.1 exploits the geographic and temporal variation in VC investment flows.
However, VC may select good CZs or good industries to invest in. The inclusion of estab-
lishment fixed effects controls for permanent heterogeneity at the plant, CZ, and industry
level. The coefficient of interest β represents the contemporaneous wage effect of VC in-
vestments, namely, the change in wages (in dollars) for VC investment of $1,000 per capita.
The estimation is unbiased only if V CPerCapitac,t is orthogonal to the error term εe,c,t. A
positive correlation between VC investments and omitted unobservables may overestimate
β.
The major endogeneity problem with the baseline regression is omitted variables. It is
possible that time-varying, skill-based technological shocks at the industry or location level
result in higher wage growth because productivity increases, while technological shocks
attract more VC investments. The granularity of the establishment-level panel data allows
me to include industry × year, state × year, and industry × state × year fixed effects
(γj,s,t).7 The identification is achieved by comparing two establishments that are within the
same state and industry but face different VC investments in the same year:
∆Ye,c,t = βV CPerCapitac,t + ηe + γj,s,t + εe,c,t. (1.2)
Moreover, I can include firm × year fixed effects to control for time-varying, firm-
specific heterogeneity (e.g., firm-level productivity increase, technology adoption), and I
identify the coefficient of interest by comparing wage changes in areas with high VC in-
vestments to wage changes in areas with low VC investments within the same firm in the
same year. Technological shocks are likely to affect all establishments belonging to the
same firm, as it is unlikely that a firm, especially one that operates in a single industry,
adopts a new technology only at some of its establishments. The inclusion of firm × year
7Industries are defined based on 3-digit NAICS codes.
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fixed effects (γi,t) should mostly mitigate the concern that unobserved technological shocks
are driving the results:
∆Ye,c,t = βV CPerCapitac,t + ηe + γi,t + εe,c,t. (1.3)
Similar to the empirical framework of [89], after controlling for fine-grained fixed ef-
fects (industry × state × year fixed effects or firm × year fixed effects), the identifying
assumption is that VC investments are uncorrelated with omitted unobservables. It is still
likely that VC investments are correlated with time-varying industry × CZ unobserved fac-
tors. However, it is impossible to add industry × CZ × year fixed effects in Equation 1.1
because these fixed effects can completely absorb variation in VC investments. I use two
alternative approaches to alleviate this concern in Section 1.2.2 and 1.2.3.
A minor endogeneity concern is reverse causality. Specifically, startups seek VC in-
vestments when competition for talent is high and wage growth is high. To mitigate the
concern of reverse causality, I include the lead and lag VC investments in Equation 1.4:
∆Ye,c,t = β1V CPerCapitac,t+1+β2V CPerCapitac,t+β3V CPerCapitac,t−1+ηe+γj,s,t+εe,c,t.
(1.4)
The key coefficient for this test is β1. An insignificant estimation of β1 suggests there
is no significant relationship between the wage growth in year t and VC investments in
year t + 1, and reverse causality is not an issue. The coefficients β2 and β3 estimate the
contemporaneous and lagged effects of VC investments.
1.2.2 Occupation-Level Analysis
The main unobserved heterogeneity not controlled for in fixed effects models is omitted
variables at the industry × CZ × year level. For example, a technological shock in the IT
industry of Atlanta in 2014 boosts wages in the local IT industry. At the same time, this
shock attracts more VC investments in the local IT industry, resulting in higher total VC
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investments. Because the shock is industry-CZ specific, by definition, it should not directly
affect wages in other industries. However, it can affect wages of related workers in other
industries whose skills are demanded by the IT industry (e.g., programmers in the financial
industry), through the competition for talent channel.
The richness of the worker-level data allows me to observe the occupations of workers.
Motivated by the example discussed above, I analyze the impact of VC investments in the
IT industry on talented computer and mathematical workers in non-IT industries.8 The
computer and mathematical occupation is one of the high-skilled occupations, with a mean
annual wage of $89,810 in 2017, 9 and the occupation is highly demanded by IT startups.
For each major occupation in an establishment, I compute the 90th percentile of wages.
There are 22 major occupations defined by OES. To quantify the effect of VC investments
in IT industries on talented computer workers in non-IT industries, I estimate the following
regression,
∆Ye,o,c,t = βIT V CPerCapitac,t × Computero + ηe,o + γe,t + θo,t + εe,o,c,t, (1.5)
where ∆Ye,o,c,t is the dollar change in the 90th percentile of wages (∆P90 EstOcc) for
occupation o in establishment e, in CZ c, and year t. The variable IT V CPerCapitac,t
is the dollar value of VC investments in the IT industry of CZ c in year y divided by the
CZ population in 2000. The variable Computero is equal to 1 if occupation o is computer
and mathematical (BLS OES Occupation Code: 15-0000) and 0 otherwise. The inclusion
of establishment × year (γe,t) and occupation × year (θo,t) fixed effects absorbs any time-
varying unobservables at the establishment and occupation level. Talented non-computer
workers within the same establishment serve as a control group. A positive β would suggest
that VC investments in the IT industry have a positive effect on the wages of talented com-
8Top two 2-digit NAICS industries based on the employment of computer and mathematical workers are




puter workers in the non-IT industries. This both mitigates the concern about time-varying,
industry-CZ specific shocks and also supports the competition for talent hypothesis.
1.2.3 Exploiting Variation in VC Funding
VC investments are determined by both VC supply and venture capitalists’ decision to
invest. The former may be less of a concern, but the latter is subject to a selection issue.
That’s why I exploit a VC supply boom around 2014. Also, I construct two instrumental
variables for VC investments.
As shown in Figure 1.3, VC investments jump from $30 billion in 2013 to $51 billion
in 2014, then remain at the same level afterward. One explanation is that large institutional
investors (e.g., mutual funds, hedge funds, private equities, corporations) invest in the VC
market to reach for yields as a result of the low-interest rate environment.10 This explana-
tion is consistent with the finding in [34] that mutual fund holdings of unicorns increase
from less than $1 billion in 2013 to about $8 billion 2015.
I exploit different exposures to the VC boom. Similar to the idea of the Bartik in-
strument ([16]), I compute the share of national VC investments in the pre-boom period
(1990-2006) for all CZs.11 I argue that CZs with a higher pre-boom VC share are more
likely to be affected by the VC supply shock than CZs with a lower VC share. One concern
with this approach is that the pre-boom VC share may not fully capture the actual exposure
to the VC supply shock. If anything, the estimation based on the VC share should be the
lower bound of the effect.
Specifically, I apply a difference-in-differences estimation to quantify the wage effect
of the VC supply shock:
∆Ye,c,t = βPostt ∗ V CShare Boomc + ηe + γt + εe,c,t. (1.6)
10See https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/the-supply-demand-economics-behind-the-current-vc-boom-
and-crunch.
11To avoid the financial crisis period, the pre-boom period ends in 2006.
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I include 4-year data from 2012 to 2015 for CZs with nonzero VC share. The variable Postt
is equal to 1 for 2014 and 2015, and 0 for other years. The variable V CShare Boomc is
equal to 1 if CZ c is among the top 20% CZs based on VC share, and 0 otherwise.
I also construct two instrumental variables for VC investments, which are used in the lit-
erature. The first instrumental variable represents the distance-weighted portfolio returns of
limited partners ([96]). The second instrumental variable represents the distance-weighted
inflows into buyout funds ([53]). As argued in these papers, these two instrumental vari-
ables are uncorrelated with the investment opportunity sets of venture capitalists. There-
fore, they should not be directly correlated with wage growth in the local area.
Although VC investments are not random, the inclusion of establishment, industry ×
state × year, and firm × year fixed effects absorbs most of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Moreover, the evidence from occupation-level analysis and from exploiting plausibly ex-
ogenous variation in VC funding gives credence to the argument that there is a causal effect
of VC investments on the wages of local incumbent establishments.
1.3 Data
I use five main datasets for the empirical analysis: a) anonymized employer–employee
matched payroll data and demographics data from Equifax Inc., b) venture capital in-
vestments data from Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert database, c) disclosure data of
the labor condition application (LCA) program from the Department of Labor (DOL), d)
Metropolitan statistical area (MSA) occupation-level employment and wage estimates from
the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), e) firm-level financial information from Standard & Poor’s Compustat
database. I describe each dataset and data construction in this section.
14
1.3.1 Worker Data
I obtain a comprehensive anonymized consumer dataset from Equifax Inc., one of the three
major credit bureaus. The data contain detailed employment information, including com-
pany name, 3-digit NAICS code, the date an employee was most recently hired for the
current position, and job title. I standardize approximately one million raw job titles in the
data and match each raw job title to one of the 22 major occupations defined by the OES
using crosswalks provided by O*NET.12 for occupation classifications. The data also pro-
vide rich payroll information that includes the payment structure by which payments are
made to the employee (e.g., hourly, weekly, bi-weekly, semi-monthly, monthly, annually)
and the wage rate, which are used to compute annual wages. All wage data are converted to
December 2017 dollars using the seasonally adjusted consumer price index (CPI) for all ur-
ban consumers from the BLS. I match income and employment data to demographics data
that include the ZIP code of residence and education level. I link a worker’s ZIP code of
residence to a CZ, and I use the ZIP code as a proxy for the CZ of the worker’s workplace.
[106] computes that 92.5% of U.S. workers live in the CZ where they work. Therefore, the
proxy is acceptable.
The dataset contains 285 million anonymized employer–employee matched annual records
composed of 70 million workers of 2,402 employers from 2008 to 2017. It is one of the
first comprehensive dataset in the U.S. that matches employers, employees, education level,
and occupation. Figure 1.1 compares the wage distribution of the sample to the wage dis-
tribution of the BLS OES data. The 90th percentile in the sample is $94,351, which is close
to the 90th percentile in the OES data, $96,150. It appears that wage data for high-skilled
workers, the focus of this paper, are representative. For other percentiles, wages are slightly
lower in the dataset compared with the OES data. Figure A.1 and A.2 plot the occupation
distribution and industry distribution of the sample.
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Figure 1.1: Wage Distribution
The figure presents the wage distribution of the work-level data in the sample and the wage
distribution of all occupations in the 2017 BLS OES data.
workers. Education data indicate the highest level of education attained by any member of
the household (e.g., some high school or less, high school, some college, college, graduate
school). In this dataset, 40 million workers have at least a high school diploma. Figure 1.2
compares the educational attainment in the sample and the 2017 Census survey for people
with at least a high school diploma. The distribution appears to be similar. One caveat
for the education data is that they record highest education attained by any member of a
household, so a worker’s education may be overstated. In this paper, workers with at least
a bachelor’s degree are defined as high-skilled workers, while workers with only a high
school diploma are defined as low-skilled workers.
I define an establishment as an employer in a CZ. To have enough observations to
compute wage percentiles, I focus on establishments that have at least 50 employees in a
year and have both high-skilled and low-skilled workers. I calculate percentiles for high-
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Figure 1.2: Education Distribution
The figure presents the education distribution in the sample and the education distribution
in the 2017 Census survey for people who have at least a high school diploma.
in wage percentiles. For any major occupation in an establishment, I also calculate the
percentiles of wages and the changes in these percentiles.
The granularity of the employer–employee–education–occupation matched dataset al-
lows me to measure skills in multiple dimensions. I can define skills based on education and
exploit heterogeneous effects based on wage percentiles within the same level of education.
Also, I can exploit the worker heterogeneity in occupations within the same establishment.
Finally, the data allow me to include fine-grained fixed effects to better control for unob-
servables at the industry, state, firm, and CZ level, and better estimate the coefficient of
interest in Equation 1.1.
1.3.2 VC Data
I obtain VC investments data from Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert database, one of the
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Figure 1.3: Aggregate VC Investments from 2009 to 2017
The figure presents aggregate VC investments (in billions of dollars) in the U.S. from 2009
to 2017.
with U.S. portfolio companies labeled as Startup/Seed, Early Stage, Expansion, or Later
Stage. I do not restrict investors to VC funds because non-VC funds also invested as venture
capitalists.13 In each deal, I observe round date, round number, round amount disclosed,
company name, company address, company SIC code, and information on VC firm and
VC fund.
Figure 1.3 plots the aggregate VC investments in the U.S. from 2009 to 2017. The
total investments in 2009 are about $20 billion and peak in 2017, approaching $65 billion.
The correlations between the time series of annual total VC investments in my sample and
the time series in industry reports (e.g., National Venture Capital Association, PwC/CB
Insights quarterly MoneyTree Report) are more than 0.99, indicating that my dataset fully
captures the aggregate patterns.
The main goal is to quantify the effect VC investments in a CZ on local incumbent
13As the most valuable startups in the U.S., Uber’s investors include not only VC funds (e.g., Benchmark,









Figure 1.4: CZ-Level VC Investments from 2009 to 2017
The figure presents CZ-level total VC investments (in millions of dollars) from 2009 to
2017.
establishments; therefore, I match startup companies’ ZIP codes to a CZ. 32,955 deals that
provide information on the round amount disclosed can be matched to a CZ. For each CZ
in each year, I compute the dollar value of total VC investments, which is converted to
December 2017 dollars using CPI. Out of 709 CZs, 226 received VC investments over the
sample period. These CZs account for approximately 82% of the U.S. population in 2000.
Figure 1.4 plots the total CZ-level VC investments from 2009 to 2017 on a map. I scale
the total annual investments by CZ population in 2000 to construct the main independent
variable V CPerCapita in Equation 1.1. CZs that received any VC investments from 2009
to 2017 are used for the main analysis.
Also, I acquire information on initial public offerings (IPOs), private equity (PE) in-
vestments, and horizontal mergers and acquisitions from Thomson Financial. These data
are used to construct control variables.
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1.3.3 LCA Data
To validate whether startups hire more and pay more upon receiving VC funding, I obtain
labor condition application (LCA) data from 2010 to 2017 from the Department of Labor
(DOL).14 An LCA is a form employers must file with the DOL on behalf of employees who
apply for an immigration H-1B work visa. Workers who apply for an H-1B work visa are
mostly high-skilled workers. According to the DOL, the H-1B program allows employers
to temporarily employ foreign workers in the U.S. on a nonimmigrant basis in specialty
occupations.
Each LCA case contains detailed information on the submission date, employer name,
employer address, employer NAICS code, number of foreign workers requested in the case,
job title, and wage.15 I drop employers who file LCAs for fewer than 10 worker from 2010
to 2017. For each employer in each month, I compute the total number of workers requested
and the average wage.
1.3.4 Other Data
The Occupation Employment Statistics (OES) program is a semiannual survey conducted
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).16 The OES provides annual employment and
wage estimates for more than 800 occupations at the national, geographic, and industry
level. More than 800 occupations are also grouped into 22 major occupations. I obtain data
at the MSA-major occupation level. Each year, for each major occupation in a MSA, the
data provide information on total employment and wage percentiles (i.e., 10th percentile,
25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th percentile, 90th percentile, the average wage). I obtain
firms’ financial data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database, and I compute relevant
firm-level outcomes. Firms’ ZIP codes are used to match firms to a CZ. Table 1.1 reports
14The sample starts in 2010 because the DOL changed the filing system. In the old system, no information
on industry code is provided, which is important for creating the control group.
15Data can be downloaded from the DOL website: https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm.
16Data can be downloaded from the BLS website: https://www.bls.gov/oes/.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for key variables. Panel A presents summary
statistics for variables at the establishment level. Panel B presents summary statistics for
variables at the establishment-occupation level. Panel C presents summary statistics for
variables at the CZ level.
N Mean Std Dev
Panel A: Establishment-Level Data
P90 HighSkilled 337,032 92,537 67,626
∆P90 HighSkilled 337,032 1,055 31,184
P10 LowSkilled 337,032 25,553 14,583
∆P10 LowSkilled 337,032 628 6,039
∆Emp HighSkilled 337,032 -1.05 28.9
∆Emp LowSkilled 337,032 -0.5 27.6
Panel B: Establishment-Occupation-Level Data
P90 EscOCC 2,310,136 79,233 56,048
∆P90 EscOCC 2,310,136 616 21,718
Panel C: CZ-Level Data
VCPerCapita 2,034 0.060 0.265
the summary statistics for key variables used in this paper.
1.4 Main Results
I present the main empirical results in this section. First, I demonstrate the effect of VC
investments on wages at local incumbent establishments. I use three different approaches
to establish causality. Second, I test several alternative hypotheses and conduct multiple ro-
bustness checks. Third, I exploit heterogeneity. Fourth, I show the effect of VC investments
on establishment-level employment.
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1.4.1 Do VC Investments Affect Wages of Incumbent Establishments?
Baseline Results
The main empirical objective is to quantify the effect of VC investments on the wages of
incumbent establishments. It is likely that VC investments create more competition for the
best high-skilled workers than competition for other high-skilled workers. Therefore, I fo-
cus on the top-end: the 90th of high-skilled workers’ wages. Table 1.2, Column (1) reports
results estimating the effect on dollar change in the 90th percentile of high-skilled work-
ers’ wages (∆P90 HighSkilled) using Equation 1.1. VC investment of $1,000 per capita is
associated with $1,218 (t-stat: 6.66) increase in the 90th percentile of high-skilled work-
ers’ wages. Given that the unconditional mean of ∆P90 HighSkilled in the data is $1,055,
VC investment of $1,000 per capita increases wage growth by 115% of its unconditional
average.
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, to control for time-varying unobservables at the industry
and state level, I include industry × year, state × year, and industry × state × year fixed
effects in Column (2) to Column (4), respectively. The results are robust to the inclusion of
these fixed effects. In Column (4), where industry × state × year fixed effects are included,
the estimated effect is $849 (t-stat: 4.27). It appears that industry-specific and state-specific
shocks do not drive the results.
The establishment-level data also allow me to include firm × year fixed effects, which
control for firm-level productivity increases or technological adoptions. The identification
is achieved by comparing an establishment in a high-VC CZ to an establishment of the same
firm in a low-VC CZ. The result in Column (5) suggests that VC investment of $1,000 per
capita implies a $605 (t-stat: 3.06) increase in the 90th percentile of high-skilled workers’
wages. Note that the inclusion of firm × year fixed effects may underestimate the actual
effect due to the wage convergence within firms documented by [99].
Further, I examine the effects of VC investments on other high-skilled workers by es-
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Table 1.2: Effect of VC Investments on Wages of High-Skilled Workers at Incumbent
Establishments
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the effect
of VC investments on wages of high-skilled workers at incumbent establishments using
Equations 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. The dependent variable is the dollar change in the 90th
percentile of high-skilled workers’ wages. VCPerCapita (in thousands of dollars) is
the dollar value of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000. The
regressions include establishments in CZs that received any VC investments from 2009
to 2017. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆P90 HighSkilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCPerCapita 1,218*** 929*** 1,086*** 849*** 605***
(183) (199) (239) (199) (198)
Establishment FE X X X X X
Year FE X
Industry × Year FE X
State × Year FE X
Industry × State × Year FE X
Firm × Year FE X
Observations 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032
R-squared 0.107 0.151 0.108 0.217 0.507
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timating Equation 1.2 using the dollar change in the 10th, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile
of high-skilled workers’ wages as dependent variables. Figure 1.5, Panel A plots the co-
efficient estimates along with the 95% confidence intervals from five separate regressions.
The figure indicates distributional effects among high-skilled workers. Namely, there is no
effect on the 10th and 25th wage percentile, a modest positive effect on the 50th and 75th
wage percentile, and a strong positive effect on the 90th wage percentile. These distribu-
tional effects are consistent with the hypothesis that VC investments create more demand
for the best high-skilled workers. Figure A.3 shows similar distribution effects when using
log changes in wage percentiles as dependent variables. Distributional effects, to some ex-
tent, suggest that the results are less likely to be driven by time-varying shocks at the CZ
level.
Ex ante, it is not clear how VC investments affect the wages of low-skilled workers.
On the one hand, VC investments may not create significant direct demand for low-skilled
workers, but on the other hand, the wages of low-skilled workers may increase because
VC investments can generate positive spillovers to the local economy. Table 1.3 presents
results assessing the effect of VC investments on the dollar change in the 10th percentile
of low-skilled workers’ wages (∆P10 LowSkilled). In Column (1), the coefficient esti-
mate is 196 (t-stat: 3.10). In Column (4), where industry × state × year fixed effects are
included, the coefficient estimate becomes -61.7 (t-stat: -1.06). The results suggest that
there is no significant effect on the 10th percentile of low-skilled workers’ wages at in-
cumbent establishments. I also examine distributional effects among low-skilled workers.
Figure 1.5, Panel B shows that there is a marginally positive effect on the 90th percentile
of low-skilled workers’ wages, while there is no impact on other percentiles of low-skilled
workers’ wages.
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, reverse causality is another endogeneity concern. Namely,
startups in regions with high wage growth seek VC funding. To mitigate this concern, I esti-
mate the dynamic effect using Equation 1.4. Figure 1.6 plots the coefficient estimates along
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Figure 1.5: Distributional Effects of VC Investments on Wages of Incumbent Establish-
ments
The figure presents distribution effects of VC investments on wages of incumbent estab-
lishments using Equation 1.2.
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Table 1.3: Effect of VC Investments on Wages of Low-Skilled Workers at Incumbent Es-
tablishments
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the effect of
VC investments on wages of low-skilled workers at incumbent establishments using Equa-
tions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. The dependent variable is the dollar change in the 10th percentile
of low-skilled workers’ wages. VCPerCapita (in thousands of dollars) is the dollar value
of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000. The regressions include
establishments in CZs that received any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard
errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆P10 LowSkilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCPerCapita 196*** 127** -22.4 -61.7 56.4
(63.2) (54.6) (56.3) (58.1) (47.1)
Establishment FE X X X X X
Year FE X
Industry × Year FE X
State × Year FE X
Industry × State × Year FE X
Firm × Year FE X
Observations 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032
R-squared 0.164 0.194 0.165 0.260 0.437
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with the 95% confidence intervals for two separate regressions for ∆P90 HighSkilled and
∆P10 LowSkilled. Panel A shows a significant contemporaneous effect of VC investments
on the wages of high-skilled workers. The coefficient estimate on the VC investments in
the next year is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that reverse causality is not
a concern. There is a small reversal in wage growth one year after large VC investments.
Panel B confirms this muted effect on the wages of low-skilled workers.
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 indicate that VC investments have positive effects on the wages
of high-skilled workers, but no impact on the wages of low-skilled workers. This asym-
metric effect implies that the wage dispersion within an establishment would increase. I
find evidence in Table A.1 supporting this hypothesis. VC investment of $1,000 per capita
increases the gap between the 90th percentile of high-skilled workers’ wages and the 10th
percentile of low-skilled workers’ wages by $492–$859.
Do Time-Varying Unobservables at the Industry-CZ Level Drive the Results: Evidence from
Occupation-Level Analysis
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the major unobservables that have not been controlled for in
fixed effects models of Section 1.4.1 are the time-varying unobservables at the industry ×
CZ level. To alleviate this concern, I examine the impact of VC investments in an industry
on related talented workers in other industries. Specifically, I analyze the effect of VC
investments in the IT industry on talented computer workers in non-IT industries.
Table 1.4, Column (1) reports results from estimating Equation 1.5. It implies that VC
investment of $1,000 per capita in the IT industry results in an $857 increase in the wages of
talented computer workers compared to other talented workers in the same establishment of
non-IT industries, supporting the competition for talent hypothesis. In unreported results,
I find similar evidence that VC investments in the IT industry have an impact on the wages
of computer workers using BLS OES data. Column (2) suggests that VC investments in
non-IT industries do no generate the same effect. The explanation is that VC investments
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Figure 1.6: Dynamic Effect of VC Investments on Wages of Incumbent Establishments
The figure presents the dynamic effect of VC investments on wages of incumbent estab-
lishments using Equation 1.4.
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Table 1.4: Effect of VC Investments in the IT Industry on Wages of Talented Computer
Workers in Non-IT Industries
This table presents results of establishment-occupation-level panel regressions assessing
the effect of VC investments in the IT industry on wages of talented computer workers
in non-IT industries using Equation 1.5. The dependent variable is the dollar change
in the 90th percentile of wages for an occupation in an establishment. IT VCPerCapita
(Other VCPerCapita) is the dollar value of VC investments in the IT industry (non-IT
industries) in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000. Computer is equal to 1 if the
occupation is computer and mathematical, and 0 otherwise. The regressions include
establishments in CZs that received any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard
errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆P90 EstOcc
All All High Tech Low Tech
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IT VCPerCapita × Computer 857** 1,596** 324
(413) (737) (697)
Other VCPerCapita × Computer 159
(319)
Establishment × Occupation FE X X X X
Establishment × Year FE X X X X
Occupation × Year FE X X X X
Observations 2,310,136 2,310,136 696,039 1,614,097
R-squared 0.375 0.375 0.393 0.367
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in non-IT industries may create demand for talented computer workers as well as talented
workers in other occupations. The effect due to competition for talent should be stronger
for talented computer workers whose skills are more transferable to IT startups. It is likely
that talented computer workers in high-tech industries have more transferable skills than
talented computer workers in low-tech industries. Therefore, the effect should be stronger
for talented workers in non-IT high-tech industries.17 Columns (3) and (4) find consistent
results.
Do Time-Varying Unobservables at the Industry-CZ Level Drive the Results: Evidence from
Exploiting Variation in VC Funding
VC investments are determined by a) VC supply; b) venture capitalists’ decision to invest.
The latter is subject to a selection issue, whereas the former is less of an issue. I exploit
plausibly exogenous variation in VC funding as discussed in Section 1.2.3.
Table 1.5 presents results from estimating Equation 1.6. Column (1) indicates that high-
skilled workers in boom counties, which are ex ante more exposed to VC investments,
have $2,352 higher wage growth. The results are robust to the inclusion of industry ×
year, state × year, and industry × state × year fixed effects. I plot the dynamic effect in
Figure A.4. The difference in wage growth between boom CZs and non-boom CZs in 2012
is not significantly different from the difference in 2013. It appears that there is no pre-
trend in the data, and the parallel trends assumption is valid. Compared to the difference in
2013, the difference increases to more than $3,000 in 2014 and remains at a similar level
in 2015.
Table A.2 reports results from IV regressions. Columns (1) and (2) use the distance-
weighted portfolio returns of limited partners as an instrumental variable. Columns (3)
and (4) use the distance-weighted inflows into buyout funds as an instrumental variable.
Both results are consistent with the OLS results that VC investments result in higher wage
17The classification of high-tech industries follows [95]. I match 4-digit SIC codes used in their paper to
3-digit NAICS codes.
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Table 1.5: Difference-in-Differences Estimation around 2014 VC Boom
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences estimation assessing the effect
of the 2014 VC boom on wages of high-skilled workers at incumbent establishments
using Equation 1.6. The dependent variable is the dollar change in the 90th percentile
of high-skilled workers’ wages. Post is equal to 1 for 2014 and 2015, and 0 otherwise.
VCShare Boom is equal to 1 if the CZ is among the top 20% CZs based on VC share. Es-
tablishments in CZs that have positive VC share are included in the regressions. Standard
errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆P90 HighSkilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × VCShare Boom 2,352*** 1,043*** 2,178*** 917**
(382) (365) (412) (387)
Establishment FE X X X X
Year FE X
Industry × Year FE X
State × Year FE X
Industry × State × Year FE X
Observations 174,684 174,684 174,684 174,684
R-squared 0.171 0.216 0.172 0.275
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growth for high-skilled workers at local incumbent establishments.
1.4.2 Alternative Hypotheses and Robustness Checks
Are VC Investments Related to Other Financial Activities that Affect Wages?
CZs that receive more VC investments may also have more IPOs. [22] show that firms
have higher employment growth after IPOs. [14] find that IPOs have a positive effect on
new firm creation. Further, [29] and [37] document that IPOs have an impact on local labor
markets. To control for this potential IPO effect, I compute the per capita IPO proceeds
(IPOPerCapita) for each CZ in each year. I include IPOPerCapita in Equation 1.2.
VC is one type of private equity (PE). Another primary PE are buyouts. VC investments
may be correlated with buyout investments. [2] find that workers of firms acquired by PE
investors have higher wages after the investment. Also, firms in my sample may be subject
to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). [83] and [78] document that M&A has distributional
effects on the wages of workers at target firms. To control for potential PE and M&A ef-
fects, I compute PE investments per capita (PEPerCapita) and M&A transaction values per
capita (MAPerCapita) in each CZ each year, and I include these variables in Equation 1.2.
Conceptually, VC investments are different from these financial activities for two rea-
sons. First, VC investments are concentrated on high-tech, high-growth startups. VC-
backed startups are more likely to hire more high-skilled workers and create competition
for talent. However, it is less likely that these financial activities affect labor outcomes
through competition for talent. Second, the real effect of M&A and PE is likely to be a
slow process, while the VC impact is contemporaneous. Empirically, Table 1.6 shows that
coefficient estimates for VCPerCapita remain stable after controlling for IPOPerCapita,
PEPerCapita, and MAPerCapita.
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Table 1.6: Testing Alternative Hypotheses
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the effect
of VC investments on wages of high-skilled workers at incumbent establishments to test
alternative hypotheses using Equation 1.2. The dependent variable is the dollar change
in the 90th percentile of high-skilled workers’ wages. VCPerCapita, IPOPerCapita,
PEPerCapita, and MAPerCapita (in thousands of dollars) are the dollar value of VC
investments, IPO proceeds, PE investments, and M&A transactions, respectively, in a
CZ scaled by the population in 2000. EmpGrowth, WageGrowth, and EstGrowth are the
CZ-level employment growth, wage growth, and establishment growth, respectively. The
regressions include establishments in CZs that received any VC investments from 2009
to 2017. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆P90 HighSkilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCPerCapita 769*** 838*** 853*** 788*** 847***













Observations 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032
R-squared 0.217 0.217 0.217 0.217 0.217
Establishment FE X X X X X
Industry × State × Year FE X X X X X
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Are Results Driven by General Local Economic Conditions?
Are the results simply driven by good local labor markets? The asymmetric effect between
high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers suggests that this may be not the case. To
further alleviate this concern, I control for CZ-level wage growth and employment growth
computed from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data. Table 1.6,
Column (4) shows that the coefficient estimate changes very little.
Further, it is likely that VC selects startups. Even without VC, startups can still grow
and hire. The effect could be driven by the presence of more startups in the local area rather
than VC investment flows. To control for the impact of local entrepreneurship activities,
I construct CZ-level establishment growth from QECW. The coefficient estimate remains
similar in Column (5). One caveat with this approach is that CZ-level establishment growth
may not fully capture startup activities in high-tech industries.
Are Results Driven by Competition among Incumbent Establishments?
It is possible that incumbent establishments compete with each other for talent. Work-
ers move from one incumbent establishment to another establishment and receive higher
compensation. If VC investments are correlated with the intensity of competition for tal-
ent among incumbent establishments, the main results may be overestimated. But, the
employment growth of high-skilled workers in incumbents should not change if workers
move within incumbent establishments. Table 1.8 and Table 1.13 show that the employ-
ment growth of high-skilled workers decreases for establishments and firms headquartered
in high-VC CZs. These results suggest it is unlikely that competition for talent among
incumbent establishments explains the main results.
Additional Robustness Checks
To ensure that the effect of VC investments on the wages of high-skilled workers at in-
cumbent establishments is robust, I conduct multiple robustness checks by varying the
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dependent variable, independent variable, clustering, and the sample, and I report results in
Table 1.7. The results hold when I use the 90th percentile, the log change in the 90th per-
centile, or the dollar change in the average of high-skilled workers’ wages as a dependent
variable. The results are robust to adjusting VC investments by lagged CZ-level employ-
ment, clustering standard errors at the state–year level, including establishments from all
CZs, and removing establishments from non-tradable sectors.18
As shown in Figure 1.4, some CZs receive more VC investments than other CZs. To
mitigate the concern that a particular VC-heavy region drives the results in Table 1.2, I
reestimate Equation 1.2 by removing one of the nine census divisions from the sample,
and I plot the coefficient estimates along with the 95% confidence intervals from the nine
separate regressions. Figure 1.7 shows that all coefficient estimates are statistically signifi-
cant and the magnitudes are stable. The figure suggests that no particular region, including
California, drives my results.
Also, I reestimate Equation 1.2 by interacting VCPerCapita with three size dummies
(Small, Medium, Large). Small establishments are those with fewer than 250 employees.
Medium establishments are those with at least 250 but fewer than 1,000 employees. Large
establishments are those with at least 1,000 employees. Figure 1.8 shows that the coeffi-
cient estimates are positive and significant across all three establishment size groups.
Although VC investments are not random, it is reasonable to conclude that VC flows
likely have a causal effect on wages at incumbent establishments, given (a) the inclusion
of fine-grained fixed effects; (b) the cross-industry, occupation-level analysis; (c) the ex-
ploitation of plausibly exogenous variation in VC funding; (d) the lack of reverse causality;
and (e) ruling out multiple alternative hypotheses.
18A non-tradable sector is defined based on [88]. It includes 3-digit NAICS industries 441, 442, 443, 445,
446, 447, 448, 451, 452, 453, and 722.
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Table 1.7: Robustness Checks
This table presents robustness checks for establishment-level panel regressions assessing
the effect of VC investments on wages of high-skilled workers at incumbent establishments
using Equation 1.2 by varying the dependence variable, independent variable, clustering
standard errors, and the sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***






Log change in the 90th percentile 0.006***
(0.002)
Dollar change in the average 265***
(62.9)
Adjust VC investments by lagged employment 431***
(96.3)
Cluster standard errors by state-year 849**
(420)
Include all CZs 886***
(195)
Remove non-tradable sector 977***
(168)
Establishment FE X



















































































Figure 1.7: Coefficient Estimates after Excluding a Census Division
The figure presents coefficient estimates after excluding one of the nine census divisions
using Equation 1.2.
1.4.3 Heterogeneity in Industry and VC
I first exploit heterogeneous effects based on the industry of incumbent establishments.
High-tech industries receive almost two-thirds of VC financing ([95]). Also, high-skilled
workers from high-tech incumbent establishments are more likely to join startups than
high-skilled workers from low-tech incumbents because of skill transferability. Therefore,
VC investments may have a larger impact on the wages of high-skilled workers in high-
tech industries. To test this hypothesis, I interact VCPerCapita with a HighTech dummy
and a LowTech dummy separately. HighTech (LowTech) is equal to 1 if the incumbent
establishment is in high-tech (low-tech) industry based on its 3-digit NAICS code, and
zero otherwise. Table A.3 shows results consistent with the hypothesis. Across all four

































Figure 1.8: Coefficient Estimates by Establishment Size
The figure presents the coefficient estimates by establishment size (employment) using
Equation 1.2.
In the main analysis, I aggregate all VC deals in the same CZ and the same year to
compute VCPerCapita. It would be interesting to see which type of VC investments mat-
ters more. It is expected that VC investments in high-tech startups create more demand
for talent. Therefore, I aggregate VC deals in high-tech industries and compute VC invest-
ments per capita (Hightech VCPerCapita). Similarly, I construct Lowtech VCPerCapita.
It is possible that late-stage startups are more likely to expand the workforce because early-
stage startups are more likely to focus on developing products. Also, late-stage startups
are larger regarding the workforce; therefore, they should create a larger demand for talent
upon receiving VC funding. I calculate per capita VC investments in early-stage star-
tups (Early VCPerCapita) and late-stage startups (Late VCPerCapita). Consistent with the
hypothesis, Table A.4 shows that VC investments in high-tech industries and late-stage
startups have a more significant impact.
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1.4.4 Do VC Investments Affect Establishment-Level Employment?
So far, I show that VC investments have positive effects on wages at incumbent establish-
ments. The increase in wage prices due to VC investments could have a negative impact
on establishment-level employment for two reasons. First, firms strategically reduce their
employment of high-skilled workers in areas where competition for talent is high. Sec-
ond, workers leave companies for VC-backed startups due to higher compensation, and
incumbent establishments struggle to find workers to fill these vacant positions.
To test this hypothesis, for each establishment, I compute the annual change in the
number of high-skilled workers (∆Emp HighSkilled) and the annual change in the num-
ber of low-skilled workers (∆Emp LowSkilled). I estimate Equation 1.1, and 1.2 by us-
ing ∆Emp HighSkilled or ∆Emp LowSkilled as a dependent variable. Table 1.8, Panel
A reports results on ∆Emp HighSkilled. In all four models, with various fixed effects,
the coefficient estimates are negative and significant. VC investment of $1,000 implies a
decrease in high-skilled employment growth by 2.39–3.03 employees per establishment.
Panel B reports results on ∆Emp LowSkilled. None of the coefficient estimates are signif-
icant. These results are consistent with the results in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3, which show
that VC investments create competition for high-skilled workers rather than for low-skilled
workers.
Table 1.8 provides evidence that VC investments have a direct effect on the employment
growth of high-skilled workers. For an establishment belonging to a multi-establishment
firm, there might be an indirect effect in addition to the direct impact. Specifically, the em-
ployment growth of high-skilled workers may also be related to VC investments in other
CZs where the firm operates. If firms make strategic decisions on hiring to avoid com-
petition for talent from VC-backed startups, establishment-level employment growth of
high-skilled workers may increase when VC investments are large in other CZs where the
firm operates.
I construct an indirect exposure to VC investments to test the indirect effect for each es-
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Table 1.8: Effect of VC Investments on Employment at Incumbent Establishments
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the effect of
VC investments on the employment of incumbent establishments using Equations 1.1 and
1.2. The dependent variable in Panel A is the change in the employment of high-skilled
workers. The dependent variable in Panel B is the change in the employment of low-skilled
workers. VCPerCapita (in thousands of dollars) is the dollar value of VC investments in
a CZ scaled by the population in 2000. The regressions include establishments in CZs
that received any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by CZ are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: ∆Emp HighSkilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VCPerCapita -3.030*** -2.630*** -2.690*** -2.390***
(0.807) (0.727) (0.758) (0.797)
Observations 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032
R-squared 0.214 0.261 0.216 0.309
Panel B: ∆Emp LowSkilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VCPerCapita -0.262 -0.255 -0.514 -0.614
(0.338) (0.338) (0.501) (0.572)
Observations 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032
R-squared 0.180 0.238 0.182 0.294
Establishment FE X X X X
Year FE X
Industry × Year FE X
State × Year FE X
Industry × State × Year FE X
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tablishment, following [51]. The measure is employment-weighted VCPerCapita (VCPer-
Capita Other), using the employment of all other establishments belonging to the same
firm and the VC investments in the corresponding CZs.
The results in Table 1.9 support the hypothesis. Column (1) indicates that the establishment-
level employment growth of high-skilled workers is negatively related to its direct exposure
to VC investments, but positively related to its indirect exposure to VC investments through
the firm’s internal network. In Column (2), I include industry × CZ × year fixed effects,
which absorb VCPerCapita. These fixed effects also completely absorb any time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity at the industry × CZ level. The identification comes by compar-
ing establishments in the same CZ and in the same industry, but they have different indirect
exposures to VC investments due to differences in firms’ operating networks. The result
still holds. For the non-tradable sector, VCPerCapita Other may not capture competition
for talent in other establishments because most workers are low-skilled workers. Columns
(3) and (4) show that the indirect effect is concentrated on incumbent establishments in the
tradable sector.
1.5 Discussion of the Mechanism
Section 1.4 establishes causal effects of VC investment flows on the wages of incumbent
establishments. Specifically, the wages of high-skilled workers at incumbent establish-
ments experience higher wage growth when VC investments in the CZ are higher. I also
document that the employment growth of high-skilled workers at incumbent establishments
decreases. This section discusses four non-mutually exclusive mechanisms through which
VC investments affect the wages and employment of high-skilled workers at incumbent
establishments.
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Table 1.9: Firm’s Internal Network and Effect of VC Investments on Employment
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the indirect
effect of VC investments on the employment of high-skilled workers at incumbent
establishments spread through a firm’s internal network. The dependent variable is the
change in the employment of high-skilled workers. VCPerCapita (in thousands of dollars)
is the dollar value of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000. For an
establishment, VCPerCapita Other is the employment-weighted VCPerCapita using the
employment of all other establishments belonging to the same firm and the VCPerCapita
in the corresponding CZs. The regressions include establishments in CZs that received
any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆Emp HighSkilled
All All Tradable Non-tradable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VCPerCapita -3.040***
(0.806)
VCPerCapita Other 4.410*** 10.600*** 12.700*** -0.314
(1.570) (2.650) (3.050) (3.200)
Establishment FE X X X X
Year FE X
Industry × CZ × Year FE X X X
Observations 335,868 335,868 216,776 119,092
R-squared 0.215 0.369 0.388 0.319
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1.5.1 Competition for Talent
The first potential mechanism is competition for talent. Especially, startups hire more and
pay more upon receiving VC funding, which creates local competition for talent. If there is
a shortage of talent supply in the local area, incumbent establishments must increase wages
to hire or retain talent. In this section, I first validate the critical assumption that startups
hire more and pay more upon receiving VC funding. Then, I exploit several labor market
frictions which amplify the competition effect.
It is challenging to validate this assumption because hiring data for VC-backed startups
are not publicly available. [40] document that VC funding is positively associated with
employment growth using a proprietary headcount dataset of startups that are mostly in
Silicon Valley. I complement their study by using publicly available LCA data to shed
more light on the hiring of VC-backed startups. Any employer in the U.S. that seeks to
hire foreign high-skilled workers using H-1B visas must file an LCA with the DOL. H-1B
data has been used to measure firms’ dependence on high-skilled workers and show the
importance of high-skilled workers on innovation, firm value, and investments ([5], [98],
[105]). One caveat of this dataset is that it does not provide information on the hiring of
domestic high-skilled workers.
I identify all VC deals for startups that have received at least $100 million in VC funding
from 2010 to 2017. A VC deal is an event. I conduct event studies by including windows 3
(6) months before and 3 (6) months after the events. To form a control group for a startup in
an event, I identify all firms in the LCA dataset that are in the same 6-digit NAICS industry
and the same CZ as the startup receiving the VC funding.19 To quantify the impact of VC
funding on startups’ hiring, I estimate the following regression specification:
Ye,i,t = βPoste,t ∗ Treatede,i + ηe,i + γe,t + εe,i,t, (1.7)
19To reduce noise, firms must have filed an LCA for at least 10 workers from 2010 to 2017.
43
where Ye,i,t is the logarithm of 1 plus the total number of foreign workers being requested
by LCA from firm i in month t. The variable e stands for an event. The variable Post
is equal to 1 after the VC deal, and 0 otherwise. The variable Treated is equal to 1 if
the startup receives funding in event e, and 0 otherwise. I include event × firm fixed
effects (ηe,i) and event × month fixed effects (γe,t). Standard errors are clustered at the CZ
level. The formation of the control group and the inclusion of event × month fixed effects
control for time-varying unobservables at the CZ–industry level, which are correlated with
employment growth.
Table 1.10 reports the results. Column (1) shows the results on hiring using a 6-month
window around the events. VC-backed startups hire 2.6% more employees after receiving
VC funding. The effect is stronger using the 12-month window around the events. The
magnitude increases to 4.7%, as shown in Column (2). The effect is more pronounced
for large VC deals in which the amount invested is at least $100 million. Large deals
result in a 15.1% increase in hiring. I estimate the wage effect in Table A.5. Conditional
on hiring, startups increase the average wage for new employees by 0.9% after receiving
VC funding. Given that the average wage in the data is approximately $90,000, a 0.9%
increase is equivalent to $810. These results suggest that startups hire more after receiving
VC funding, which could lead to an increase in local competition for talent.
The increase in wage growth and the decrease in employment growth of high-skilled
workers are consistent with the competition for talent channel. Several labor market fric-
tions may play an important role in the wage effect. First, if there is enough local talent
supply (e.g., new graduates), which absorbs the demand by VC-backed startups, the wage
effect on incumbent establishments should be negligible. Therefore, the effect should be
stronger in regions with limited talent supply. I test this hypothesis by analyzing the dif-
ferential effect on states with top-ten U.S. engineering universities and states without.20
20States with top-ten engineering universities include Massachusetts, California, Michigan, Pennsylvania,
Indiana, Georgia, Illinois. See https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-engineering-schools/eng-
rankings.
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Table 1.10: Effect of VC Funding on Startup Hiring
This table presents results of event studies assessing the effect of VC funding on startup
hiring using Equation 1.7. A VC deal is an event. The dependent variable is the logarithm
of 1 plus the total number of foreign workers being requested by LCA. Post is equal to
1 after the VC deal, and 0 otherwise. Treated is equal to 1 for startups receiving funding
in the VC deal, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) includes windows 3 months before and
3 months after the events. Columns (2) to (4) include windows 6 months before and 6
months after the events. Columns (1) and (2) include all VC deals. Column (3) includes
VC deals with amount invested at least $100 million. Column (4) includes VC deals with
amount invested less than $100 million. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
ln(1 + Hiring)
Window [-3,3] [-6,6] [-6,6] [-6,6]
VC Deals All All >= 100 M < 100 M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × Treated 0.026*** 0.047*** 0.151*** 0.033***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.027) (0.008)
Event × Firm FE X X X X
Event × Month FE X X X X
Observations 1,055,332 2,087,905 293,956 1,793,949
R-squared 0.669 0.617 0.615 0.617
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Table 1.11, Column (1) shows that VC investment of $1,000 per capita results in $727 in-
crease for high-skilled workers in states with top engineering schools, while the effect is
$1,823 in states without top engineering schools.
Even though there is limited local talent supply, VC investment flows should not gener-
ate regional differences in wage growth if cross-region labor mobility is perfect according
to the spatial equilibrium model of [90]. However, cross-region labor mobility may be im-
perfect, and specific regions are less attractive to high-skilled workers. It is likely that the
same amount of VC investment flows generate more wage pressure for incumbent estab-
lishments in CZs that are less appealing to high-skilled workers. Following [42], I construct
a proxy for a city’s appeal to high-skilled workers using weather days. I count the number
of pleasant days for each CZ and assign CZs to two groups based on the median value. CZs
with more pleasant days are more attractive to high-skilled workers. A day is considered
a pleasant day if: a) a maximum temperature no higher than 85 degrees F; b) a minimum
temperature no lower than 45 degrees F; c) a mean temperature between 55 and 75 degrees
F; d) no measurable precipitation.21 Table 1.11, Column (2) indicates that the wage ef-
fect of VC investment flows in less attractive CZs nearly doubles the wage effect in more
attractive CZs.
Moreover, the demand for talent by VC-backed startups increases the bargaining power
of skilled workers. The bargaining power is especially strong when talented workers can
move across companies freely. [49] and [71] document that stronger enforceability of non-
compete agreements (NC) results in lower labor mobility. Therefore, workers in states that
have low enforceability of NC should have more bargaining power and higher wage growth
when competition for talent is higher. I obtain measures for the strength of enforcing NC
from [21]. I group states into low-enforceability and high-enforceability states based on the
median value. Table 1.11, Column (3) finds evidence supporting the hypothesis. The wage
effect is only significant in states with lower enforceability of non-compete agreements.
21I acknowledge Kelly Norton for sharing the code in GitHub. See
https://kellegous.com/j/2014/02/03/pleasant-places/ for visualization of the measure.
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Table 1.11: Labor Market Frictions and Wage Effect
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the role of
labor market frictions in the effect of VC investments on wages of high-skilled workers
at incumbent establishments using Equation 1.2. The dependent variable is the dollar
change in the 90th percentile of high-skilled workers’ wages. VCPerCapita (in thousands
of dollars) is the dollar value of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000.
Top10Eng (NonTop10Eng) is a dummy variable indicating the establishment is in a state
with (without) top-ten engineering universities. LowPleasant (HighPleasant) is a dummy
variable indicating the establishment is in a CZ with a low (high) number of pleasant
days based on the median value. LowNC (HighNC) is a dummy variable indicating
the establishment is in a state with low (high) enforceability of non-compete agreement
based on the median value. The regressions include establishments in CZs that received
any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆P90 HighSkilled
(1) (2) (3)
VCPerCapita × NonTop10Eng 1,823**
(748)
VCPerCapita × Top10Eng 727***
(242)
VCPerCapita × LowPleasant 1,741**
(871)
VCPerCapita × HighPleasant 785***
(224)
VCPerCapita × LowNC 866***
(202)
VCPerCapita × HighNC 479
(968)
Observations 337,032 304,075 337,032
R-squared 0.217 0.214 0.217
Establishment FE X X X
Industry × State × Year FE X X X
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Overall, these results highlight that labor market frictions play an important role in the
wage effect and further support competition for talent hypothesis.
1.5.2 Voluntary Departure for Entrepreneurship
It is plausible that some workers at incumbent establishments observe the opportunities
provided by VC and decide to leave their jobs and become entrepreneurs. Voluntary depar-
ture can result in a reduction in the employment growth of established firms. Firms must
increase wages to retain existing workers and hire new workers. However, in Table 1.6,
the results are robust to the inclusion of CZ-level establishment growth. CZ-level estab-
lishment growth captures entrepreneurship activities, including new startups founded by
workers who voluntarily leave incumbent establishments. One caveat for this approach is
CZ-level establishment growth may not accurately capture the entrepreneurship activities
of high-skilled workers. It also reflects the growth in low-tech industries.
1.5.3 Creation of New Skills
Many VC-backed startups are innovative and create technologies that require new skills.
Local incumbent establishments may follow this innovation and create new jobs that require
new skills. Since these skills are new and scarce in the labor market, new hires for these
jobs are of better quality and are well paid. On the other hand, it is hard for existing workers
to adopt these new skills in the short run. The creation of new skills channel predicts that
there is a change in the composition of workers, and VC investments should have an impact
on the wages of new high-skilled workers rather than existing workers.
To test this hypothesis, I separate workers into new workers and existing workers. New
workers are those who join the establishment in the current calendar year. Existing work-
ers are those who have joined the establishment at least one calendar year earlier. I com-
pute the dollar changes in the 90th percentile of wages of existing high-skilled workers
(∆P90 HighSkilled Exisiting) and the dollar changes in the 90th percentile of wages of
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Table 1.12: Effect of VC on Wages of Existing and New High-Skilled Workers at Incum-
bent Establishments
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the
effect of VC investments on the wages of existing high-skilled workers and the
wages of new high-skilled workers at incumbent establishments using Equation 1.1.
∆90 HighSkilled Existing is the dollar change in the 90th percentile of existing high-
skilled workers’ wages. ∆P90 LowSkilled New is the dollar change in the 90th percentile
of new high-skilled workers’ wages. VCPerCapita (in thousand $) is the dollar value
of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000. The regressions include
establishments in CZs that received any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard
errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.






Establishment FE X X
Industry × State × Year FE X X
new high-skilled workers (∆P90 HighSkilled New). To ensure there are enough obser-
vations to compute ∆P90 HighSkilled New, in this study, I focus on medium and large
establishments, which have no fewer than 250 workers. I estimate Equation 1.2 to analyze
the possible differential effect. Table 1.12 shows that $1,000 per capita VC investments
increase the 90th percentile of existing high-skilled workers’ wages by $823 and increase
the 90th percentile of new high-skilled workers’ wages by $1,456. The results indicate that
VC investments have an impact on both existing and new high-skilled workers. Therefore,
the creation of new skills channel cannot completely explain the findings.
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1.5.4 Knowledge Spillovers
[97] document that VC-backed startups generate knowledge spillovers. Higher wage growth
for high-skilled workers in CZ that have more VC investments may represent productivity
increases due to knowledge spillovers. However, the prediction of the knowledge spillovers
channel on employment is mixed. On the one hand, a wage increase reflects higher pro-
ductivity. Firms have no incentive to reduce employment. On the other hand, since pro-
ductivity increases, firms demand less labor to maintain their output. Further, this channel
cannot explain the small reversal in wage growth, the reductions in R&D and patent quality
documented in Section 1.6.
Overall, these four mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each one may play a
role in explaining the results. However, the competition for talent channel can best explain
the results. To further disentangle the channels, data on productivity and entrepreneurship
are required.
1.6 Implications for Firms
1.6.1 Firm-Level Labor Costs and Employment
Section 1.4.4 suggests that firms may strategically make hiring decisions. However, it is
unclear whether firms can reallocate workers from high-VC CZs to low-VC CZs to com-
pletely avoid the competition for talent by VC-backed startups, so that the impact on firms
would be muted. If they cannot completely avoid this, competition for talent by VC-backed
startups may result in higher labor costs and lower employment at incumbent firms. I use
Compustat data to test this hypothesis. Ideally, for each firm, I can compute the exposure
to VC investments using the locations of all the establishments. However, these data are
not available for all Compustat firms. Instead, I use VC investments in the CZ where the
firm is headquartered as a proxy for the firm’s exposure to VC investments. I estimate the
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Table 1.13: Effect of VC Investments on Firm-Level Outcomes
This table presents results of firm-level panel regressions assessing the effect of VC
investments on firm-level outcomes. SGA/Sale is selling, general and administrative
expense (XSGA) divided by sales (SALE). Emp G is employment growth. Inv/AT is
capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by lagged total assets (AT). RD/AT is research
and development expense (XRD) divided by lagged total assets (AT). VCPerCapita (in
thousands of dollars) is the dollar value of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population
in 2000. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
SGA/Sale Emp G Inv/AT RD/AT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VCPerCapita 0.016** -0.014*** -0.000 -0.008***
(2.08) (-2.89) (-0.11) (-3.26)
Firm FE X X X X
Industry × Year FE X X X X
State × Year FE X X X X
Observations 29,864 27,743 29,137 15,051
R-squared 0.853 0.375 0.802 0.871
following firm-level panel regression:
Yi,j,c,s,t = βV CPerCapitac,t + ηi + γj,t + θs,t + εi,j,c,s,t, (1.8)
where Yi,j,c,s,t are firm-level outcomes of firm i in industry j, headquartered in CZ c and state
s, in year t. Labor cost (SGA/Sale) is selling, general and administrative expense (XSGA)
divided by sales (SALE). Employment growth (Emp G) is the current employment (EMP)
divided by the lagged employment minus 1. I include firm fixed effects (ηi), industry × year
fixed effects (γj,t), and state × year fixed effects (θs,t) to control for time-invariant, firm-
specific characteristics and time-varying industry-level and state-level shocks. Standard
errors are clustered at the CZ level.
Table 1.13, Columns (1) and (2) show that VC investments in CZs where incumbent
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firms are headquartered imply an increase in labor costs and a decrease in employment
growth for incumbent firms. These results are consistent with the establishment-level re-
sults, and they suggest that firms cannot completely avoid competition from VC-backed
startups.
1.6.2 Innovation
Next, I examine the implications for firms’ investment policies. Competition for talent
could affect incumbents’ investments through two channels. First, the increased labor costs
negatively affect firms’ cash flows. Second, competition for talent tighten labor constraints
for some incumbent firms. I examine two investment outcomes. Investment (CAPX/AT) is
capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by lagged total assets (AT). R&D (RD/AT) represents
research and development expenses (XRD) divided by lagged total assets (AT). Columns
(3) and (4) suggest that firms reduce their R&D, but there is no change in capital expen-
diture. These results are broadly consistent with [5] and [105], who demonstrate that the
reduction in skilled labor supply negatively affects firm investments in the setting of immi-
grants.
Last, I examine the innovation output. Following [91], I examine both the quantity
and the quality of innovation by incumbent firms.22 Since innovation is a slow process, I
also include lagged VCPerCapita in Equation 1.8. Table 1.14 reports the results. Column
(1) shows that incumbent firms file more patents. These results are consistent with [76]
and [97], who show that VC spurs innovation. Surprisingly, Column (2) and Column (3)
demonstrate that incumbent firms are more likely to file patents that are in the bottom 10%
of the citation distribution than patents that are in the top 10% of the citation distribution.
This indicates that the quality of new patents is not very high. Column (4) shows that the
total adjusted citations do not increase. Column (5) indicates that average adjusted citations
decrease. This evidence suggests incumbent firms generate lower-quality innovation after
22I greatly appreciate Manpreet Singh for generously sharing their data. The sample period is from 1990
to 2006.
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Table 1.14: Effect of VC Investments on Firm Innovation
This table presents results of firm-level panel regressions assessing the effect of VC
investments on firm innovation. ln(1 + patents) is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of
patents filed by a firm in a year. ln(patents bot10) is the logarithm of the number of patents
that are in the bottom 10% of the citation distribution. ln(patents top10) is the logarithm of
the number of patents that are in the top 10% of the citation distribution. ln(1 + cites) is the
logarithm of 1 plus the total adjusted citations. ln(1 + avg cites) is the logarithm of 1 plus
the average adjusted citations. VCPerCapita (in thousands of dollars) is the dollar value
of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000. Lag VCPerCapita is lagged
VCPerCapita. ln(AT) is the logarithm of lagged total assets. Standard errors clustered by
CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
ln(1 + patents) ln(patents bot10) ln(patents top10) ln(1 + cites) ln(1 + avg cites)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCPerCapita 0.019*** 0.032*** 0.002 0.030 0.007
(3.07) (2.73) (0.35) (1.45) (0.45)
Lag VCPerCapita 0.027*** 0.039*** 0.019*** -0.016 -0.037***
(3.67) (5.86) (2.61) (-1.33) (-5.44)
ln(AT) 0.106*** 0.187*** 0.110*** 0.118*** 0.038**
(5.61) (9.29) (5.07) (3.84) (2.31)
Firm FE X X X X X
Industry × Year FE X X X X X
State × Year FE X X X X X
Observations 42,902 14,330 14,330 42,902 42,902
R-squared 0.817 0.826 0.829 0.729 0.616
higher VC investment flows. Both the increase in the patent filing and the decrease in patent
quality may be explained by the patent thicket that incumbent firms use to defend against
competitors ([108]).
1.6.3 Patent Inventors Turnover
So far, I show both the input and output of innovation at incumbent firms decrease in
regions with greater VC flows. Next, I examine the impact of VC flows on patent inventors
turnover at incumbent firms, because investors are critical in generating innovation. If VC
flows create competition for talent, it is likely that patent inventors leave incumbent firms
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to join VC-backed startups and it is difficult for incumbent to fill the vacant positions.
In Table 1.15, I find that incumbent firms in regions with greater VC flows have higher
departure rate of patent inventors. Although hey also hire at a higher rate, the magnitude is
smaller than the departure rate. It results in a net leave of patent inventors. These results
are consistent with the finding that employment growth declines, and they can also partly
explain the decline in innovation quality.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the impact of VC investment flows in a region on wages, employment,
and innovation at large local incumbent firms that do not receive VC funding. I document
that VC investments affect local competition for talent, resulting in higher (insignificant)
wage growth for high-skilled (low-skilled) workers at incumbent establishments. Among
high-skilled workers, there is a distributional effect, with higher-wage workers benefiting
more. It is always challenging to establish causality. However, multiple tests, including
exploiting within-industry-state variation and within-firm variation, occupation-level anal-
ysis, difference-in-differences estimation using the 2014 VC boom, and IV estimation all
suggest that the effect is likely to be causal. I also find that labor market frictions, including
imperfect labor mobility, amplify the wage effect. This result highlights the importance of
reducing labor market frictions.
Further, I show that employment growth at incumbent firms declines, and patent in-
ventors are more likely to leave. Subsequently, incumbent firms cut R&D and generate
low-quality innovation. The evidence suggests that VC may relax labor and finance con-
straints for startups while tightening labor constraints for incumbent firms. This result
highlights that labor constraints may cause some adverse consequences for some of the
local incumbent firms.
My results should not be interpreted as suggesting that VC investments do not ben-
efit the recipients or the local area. Indeed, as shown extensively in the literature, VC
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Table 1.15: Effect of VC Investments on Patent Inventors Turnover
This table presents results of firm-level panel regressions assessing the effect of VC invest-
ments on patent inventors turnover. Leavers is the number of inventors who have produced
a patent at the sample firm within one past year or a year before but produce at least one
patent at a different firm, including inventors who produce their last patent in the sample
firm. Hires is the number of inventors who produce at least one patent at the sample firm
after producing a patent at a different firm within 1 year and a year after, including inven-
tors who file their first patent with the sample firm. Net leavers is the difference between
leavers and hires. VCPerCapita (in thousands of dollars) is the dollar value of VC invest-
ments in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000. Lag VCPerCapita is lagged VCPerCapita.
ln(AT) is the logarithm of lagged total assets. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
ln(1 + leavers) ln(1 + hires) ln(1 + net leavers)
(1) (2) (3)
VCPerCapita 0.021*** 0.006* 0.016***
(6.96) (1.88) (7.26)
Lag VCPerCapita 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.015***
(5.20) (4.29) (5.05)
ln(AT) 0.057*** 0.030*** 0.043***
(5.06) (4.42) (4.76)
Firm FE X X X
Industry × Year FE X X X
State × Year FE X X X
Observations 42,902 42,902 42,211
R-squared 0.668 0.619 0.605
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investments create massive benefits for society. However, the costs of VC remain relatively
unknown. This paper sheds light on the costs borne by some of local incumbent firms in
the short run. In doing so, I am able to provide some evidence to quantify the aggregate
effect. The results may have implications for regions that are aggressively trying to attract
VC flows for startups ([76]).
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CHAPTER 2
THE DARK SIDE OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS? IMPACT OF
E-COMMERCE ON EMPLOYEES AT BRICK-AND-MORTAR RETAILERS
2.1 Introduction
Technological advances can create enormous economic benefits for society. But, techno-
logical progress and automation can also reshape and transform some labor markets. They
can change the way some tasks are conducted, and these changes can augment the pro-
ductivity of some workers but replace other workers entirely.1 In this paper, we study the
impact of e-commerce, which is one manifestation of technological advances in the retail
sector. In particular, we study the effect of e-commerce on the employees of traditional
brick-and-mortar retail stores.
The retail sector is a major employer in the U.S., employing approximately 16 million
workers, or 13% of private sector employment, at the end of 2016 (Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics). The retail industry landscape has changed dramatically in the last few decades. In the
earlier decades, the disruption was mainly driven by the expansion of major retail chains
such as Walmart and by the rise of discount retailers ([72, 62, 17, 93]). The recent disrup-
tion in the retail sector, including closures of thousands of stores, is attributed to the rise
of technology led by e-commerce.2 Yet, e-commerce retail, despite experiencing tremen-
dous growth over the last few years, still accounts for only 9.1% of total U.S. retail sales in
2018Q3.3 The effect of e-commerce on workers is ambiguous as on the one hand, brick-
and-mortar retailers may focus on increased customer service as a result of an increase in
1See [92, 1, 12, 26, 27, 7, 9].
2See https://on.wsj.com/2poCwtG. Further, some online retailers have highly automated warehouses that
use robots to bring items for a retail order from their storage shelves. The world’s largest e-commerce retailer




competition from e-commerce retailers and consequently rely more heavily on employees.
On the other hand, facing lower sales, affected stores may not only cut wages but also
adjust both their employment composition and levels. As such, the retail sector provides
an economically important setting for studying the impact of technological progress, as
represented by e-commerce, on the large labor force of the traditional retail sector.
Identifying the causal impact of e-commerce on the employees of traditional brick-and-
mortar retailers is challenging, since we cannot observe the counterfactual, i.e., what would
the income and employment of brick-and-mortar retailer employees be in the absence of
e-commerce? We address this identification challenge by using the staggered rollout of
the fulfillment centers (FCs) of a major e-commerce retailer across U.S. from 1997 to
2016. We use this rollout as a proxy for the presence of local e-commerce. Our empirical
strategy estimates the causal impact of the establishment of a new FC on the income and
employment of retailer workers in that county and in neighboring counties.
We use a matched employer-employee payroll dataset for 57 major retail firms that
employ a total of approximately 2.6 million retail workers. This comprises 18% of total
U.S. retail employment in the first quarter of 2010. Our rich payroll information from a
major credit bureau allows us to group workers into hourly workers and non-hourly work-
ers (referred to as salaried workers). These data include total compensation, wage/salary,
overtime, bonuses, commissions, and wage/salary rate.
We analyze this matched employer-employee dataset, and we use a difference-in-differences
setting to exploit the staggered introduction of the FCs. We find that the labor income of
retail workers in counties with FCs, on average, decreases by 2.4% after the establishment
of FCs. This negative effect is also significant for workers within 50 or 100 miles of FCs.
These results are confined to hourly workers, who experience a decrease in labor income
by 2.5%, which is equivalent to an $825 decrease in annual income. Most of the effect
derives from a reduction in the number of hours worked. Among hourly workers, we find
a particularly strong negative impact on part-time hourly workers and, both young and old
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workers experiencing a sharper drop in labor income. Further, among the affected workers,
those who have a prior higher credit card utilization and those who are otherwise more fi-
nancially vulnerable experience higher credit card delinquencies and a subsequent decline
in their credit score.
One potential concern with our identification strategy and our results may be whether
(and why) the e-commerce retailer’s FCs matter for traditional brick-and-mortar store sales.
At the beginning of 2000, the e-commerce retailer had only three FCs, but the staggered
introduction of FCs across different counties resulted in the retailer having more than 90
FCs by the end of 2016 (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). Optimizing and expanding the FC
network is an important strategy used by the e-commerce retailer to meet customer demand
and save costs. The establishment of FCs allows the e-commerce retailer to optimize and
distribute their inventory placement (even for third party sellers). This in turn allows the e-
commerce retailer to reduce its shipping costs and shipping times. The e-commerce retailer
can offer same-day or 2-day shipping for a longer time during the shopping day, making a
purchase from the online retailer attractive.4
Moreover, the e-commerce retailer does not collect local sales taxes and has only re-
cently begun to collect state sales tax on sales from its inventory ([18]). However, it does
not yet collect state sales tax from most of its third party sellers (that account for more
than 60% of the retailer’s sales). This could lead to a price advantage over the traditional
retailers. The establishment of an FC is meant to avoid long-zone shipping, and therefore
is likely to have a more significant effect on geographically nearby areas, a fact that we
exploit in our identification strategy.
Consistent with aforementioned arguments, we find that the establishment of the e-
commerce retailer’s FCs impact the sales of geographically proximate traditional brick-
and-mortar retail stores. Using sales data from the National Establishment Time Series
(NETS), we find that after the establishment of the e-commerce retailer’s FC, the annual
4[64] analyze the various trade-offs the e-commerce retailer faces in establishing an FC.
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sales of stores decrease by $63,639 per store, i.e., 2.8% of the total annual sales of the
average store in our sample. We find that the annual sales of stores in the top tercile, based
on sales one year before the FC, decrease by $200,389.
A second potential concern regarding our identification strategy and our results is that
the decision of establishing an FC in a county is probably not random. The decision may in
fact be correlated with local economic conditions. As the goal is to better serve customers
in surrounding areas, FCs are more likely to be built close to, or in, areas with high retail
sales and population density. Our fixed effect methodology can control for these level
differences. However, it is possible that the e-commerce retailer may choose to locate its
FCs in areas with decreasing competition from brick-and-mortar retail stores, i.e., areas
where the retail sales of brick-and-mortar stores are declining.
We formally test this hypothesis using differences in the demographics and retail sales
data computed from 2000 and 2010 county-level census data. We find that the change
in population density is the only change that is significantly and positively related to an
FC establishment, while growth in the unemployment rate, median household income, and
age distribution do not correlate with the location choice of FCs. Further, the positive
coefficient on retail sales growth gives us confidence that our estimation may not be driven
by a downward trend in the traditional retail sector. We also find a lack of pre-trends before
the establishment of the FCs, lending credence to our identification strategy.
The inclusion of state-year-quarter fixed effects mitigates potential concerns about un-
observable local economic conditions being the driver of our results. We further add more
granular county-year-quarter fixed effects to control for local economic conditions by using
the data available for workers of non-retail firms as a control group. Moreover, the opening
of FCs has no impact on the sales of full-service restaurants in the county, supporting the
view that our results are not due to negative local economic conditions.
Another potential concern is that there may be an omitted firm-specific shock to the
traditional retailers that is contemporaneous with the establishment of the e-commerce re-
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tailer’s FC in that county. For example, some firms may have concentrated operations in
certain areas, and they may face firm-specific negative shocks (e.g., the failure of a major
lender, the bankruptcy of a supplying firm) at the same time the e-commerce retailer builds
an FC in that county. To address this concern, we include firm×year-quarter fixed effects
in our regressions and our results remain similar.
Due to the increased competition from the e-commerce retailer, the affected stores may
focus on customer service and rely more on employees. Alternately, facing lower sales,
affected stores may not only cut wages but also adjust their overall employment level. We
find that for all stores, employment decreases by 2.4%, equivalent to 41 fewer workers
per 100 stores for a store with an average of 22 employees. For large stores, employment
decreases by 1 worker per store for a store with an average of 40 employees.
Using NETS data, we find that store closure rate increases by 3%. The average exit rate
in our sample is 13.6%. Small stores and young stores are more likely to exit than large
stores and older stores. After the establishment of FCs in a county, the entry rate for small
stores reduces significantly by 11.8%. This low entry rate is not just limited to counties
with FCs, but also exists for counties in 50 or 100 miles of FCs.
Finally, using publicly available Quarterly Census of Employment & Wages (QCEW)
provided by BLS, we find that the establishment of an FC has a negative effect on the
employment growth in the retail sector. We find a 2.9% decline in employment growth
which implies a loss of 938 jobs per county per quarter. While, on the other hand, the
establishment of FCs do create 256 jobs in transportation and warehousing sector. Further,
we find a mildly significant positive spillover effect in restaurants, which leads to 143 more
jobs per county per quarter.5 Further, we find that counties within 50/100 miles of FCs, the
positive effect on transportation and warehousing sector and restaurants disappears while
the negative effect on the retail sector diminishes but remains negative and statistically
5During 2010-2016, an average county with fulfillment center employs 32,373 workers in the retail sec-
tor, about 12,155 workers in transportation and warehousing, and nearly 28,589 workers in restaurants and
accommodation.
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significant. We find similar results for aggregate wage growth.
Our paper is related to the literature that documents the effect of technological changes
on labor market ([77, 11, 1, 12, 7, 9]). We add to the literature on the income and em-
ployment effect of competition in the context of expansion of large chain stores ([17, 93])
and import competition ([8, 10]). The rise of e-commerce and the consequent increase in
competition for brick-and-mortar retail stores is an important technological change for the
retail sector. We analyze the impact on the income and employment of affected retail stores
using the establishment of a major e-commerce retailer’s FCs as a proxy for an increase in
the local competition.
Our paper also relates to research on the causes and consequences of disruption in the
retail sector. Existing research focuses on the disruption that results from the rollout of large
chains. [62] estimates the benefits and costs for the rollout of Walmart store openings. [72]
quantifies the effect of the expansion of retail chain stores on other retailers. [17] and [93]
estimate the employment and earnings effect as a result of Walmart store openings. We
contribute to this literature by investigating the disruption attributed to e-commerce.
Compared to brick-and-mortar retailers, e-commerce provides consumers a lower price
([28]), and increased product variety ([25, 50]). The introduction of e-commerce by a firm
increases its market value and revenue ([102, 94]). We add to this literature by analyzing the
labor market consequences of a major e-commerce retailer’s expansion of its FC network.
However, our results are limited to documenting only one facet of the impact of the tech-
nological innovation in the retail sector. There are many positive benefits of e-commerce
for consumers, including potentially lower prices, more choices, convenience in shopping,
gains from competition, and lower effort (e.g., no driving). Moreover, the establishment
of the FC may have positive spillovers in the local community and could increase em-
ployment. However, the scope of our paper is limited to the impact on the workers in the
geographically proximate traditional retail stores.
In the absence of labor market frictions (i.e., workers can easily switch jobs and their
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skills are completely transferable), the short-term displacement of some traditional retail
store workers may not matter for the workers or to the local economy. However, in the
presence of labor market frictions, the short-term impact can be negative. Moreover, to the
extent that the scope of work differs between traditional retail stores and FCs, at least some
workers can be worse off. For example, there is no need for cashiers at an FC, and skills
may not be completely transferable.
In the long run, some of the affected workers may find alternate employment in their
same field, or they may acquire new skills to find employment in another field. The scope
of our paper is limited, and we focus only the short-term impact of the establishment of
the FCs of the e-commerce retailer. Our results highlight one negative consequence of
technological progress in the retail sector: the short-term negative impact on the wages and
employment of some traditional brick-and-mortar retail store employees.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss our empirical methodology and
identification threats in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we describe our data and summary
statistics. Our empirical results are presented in Section 2.4. We conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Empirical Design and Identification Challenges
2.2.1 Empirical Design
In this study, we seek to examine the impact of technological progress, in the form of the
expansion of e-commerce, on traditional brick-and-mortal retail establishments and their
workers. In order to isolate the effects of the establishment of fulfillment centers (FCs)
from other regional, sectoral, and macro-level shocks, we exploit the staggered rollout of
FCs to capture the increase in the presence of local e-commerce. While the location that the
major e-commerce retailer chooses for its FCs is certainly not random, we present evidence
demonstrating that the timing of an FC establishment is plausibly orthogonal to unobserved
factors that may impact local retail establishment performance. Specifically, our empirical
strategy estimates the impact of the establishment of an FC in a county on retail workers in
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the same county and in neighboring counties.6
Why do FCs matter? First, the optimization and expansion of the FC network is im-
portant to the e-commerce retailer to meet customer demand and reduce costs. The e-
commerce retailer built its first FC in 1997 and the number of FCs increased to over 90
by the end of 2016 (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). Second, the establishment of a new FC is
meant to avoid long-zone shipping – the FC is established to reduce the costs associated
with shipping as well as the time required for customers to receive their packages. This
is reflected in FCs being primarily located on the east and west coasts, where population
density is highest.7 Third, as discussed in [64], customers may value the convenience effect
due to faster delivery, so that the establishment of an FC would induce customers nearby to
be more willing to shop through the major e-commerce retailer rather than shop at a local
brick-and-mortar store.
E-commerce retailing in principal allows for the ability to serve all potential customers
on a national scale. However, in practice, the establishment of an FC will have a larger
effect on areas surrounding the FC. As such, this increase in the value to local consumers of
shopping from the major e-commerce retailer may reduce the attractiveness of local brick-
and-mortar retail and thus negatively affect the income and employment of the employees
in these brick-and-mortar stores.
Our empirical objective is to evaluate the local effect of the establishment of a new FC.8
We do so by focusing on three definitions of local: 1) the focal county (i.e., the county
where the FC opened) 2) all counties within 50 miles of the FC (excluding the focal county
where the FC is located) and 3) all counties within 100 miles of the FC (again excluding
6A complete list of fulfillment centers of the e-commerce retailer is available at http://www.mwpvl.com/.
7The 2016 annual report of the e-commerce retailer states “If we do not adequately predict customer
demand or otherwise optimize and operate our fulfillment network and data centers successfully, it could
result in excess or insufficient fulfillment or data center capacity, or result in increased costs, impairment
charges, or both, or harm our business in other ways.”...“In addition, a failure to optimize inventory in our
fulfillment network will increase our net shipping cost by requiring long-zone or partial shipments.”. New
FCs would be close to large cities, allowing for the possibility of next-day or same-day delivery and the wider
rollout of its grocery business ([101]).
8We follow [64] and remove FCs that are established in a county with an existing FC or within about 20
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Figure 2.1: Number of E-Commerce Retailer’s Fulfillment Centers
The figure plots the number of the major e-commerce retailer’s fulfillment centers over
time.
Figure 2.2: Major E-Commerce Retailer’s FC Network
The map highlights the locations of the major e-commerce retailer’s fulfillment centers.
The dark regions highlight the counties with fulfillment centers, while the light regions
highlight the neighboring counties.
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the focal county where the FC is located).
We treat each county as treated in the first quarter in which an FC opens in one of the
three definitions of a local county. For example, for the analysis that focuses on the focal
county level, the indicator for Fulton County, GA, turns on in the first quarter of 2015 since
an FC was opened in Union City, GA, (Fulton County) in February of 2015. In our 50-mile
analysis, Cobb County, GA, (a county that abuts Fulton County, GA) is treated in the first
quarter of 2015 from the opening of the same FC in Union City, GA. Yet, in our 100-mile
level analysis, Cobb County, GA, is treated in the third quarter of 2011 due to the opening
of an FC in Hamilton County, TN, in September of 2011. As our data start in 2010, our
study focuses on the 39 FCs established after 2010.9
A standard approach for evaluating the impact of the opening of an FC would be to
compare differences in brick-and-mortar establishment performance before and after the
FC opening in treated and in untreated counties. For this difference-in-differences specifi-
cation to yield unbiased estimates, parallel trends between the treated and control counties
must be present. However, Table B.1 indicates that focal and surrounding counties where
FCs open are very different not only in levels but also in trends from the rest of the U.S. in
terms of demographics and local economic variables, such as population, population den-
sity, retail sales, retail sales per capita, household income, and unemployment rate. There-
fore, these untreated counties may not serve as appropriate counterfactuals for our analysis.
As a result, to ensure that both treated and control counties are on the common empirical
support, we only include counties that were classified as treated at any time by the opening
of an FC in our analysis, and we exploit the variation in the timing of the establishment of
FCs, using FCs that will be treated but are not yet as de facto controls.
In our baseline analysis, we apply a difference-in-differences estimation to quantify the
impact of the establishment of an FC on the income of workers in brick-and-mortar stores
9Our results remain robust to the inclusion of all 50 FCs (which includes FCs established before 2010)
and is reported in Table 2.8.
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by estimating the following:
ln(Total Incomei,c,t) = α + βPostFCc,t + ηi + θt + εi,c,t, (2.1)
where each quarterly observation is the income of worker i working in county c at time t.
PostFC is an indicator that equals 1 in the quarter an FC is established in county c or within
50 or 100 miles of county c, and it remains 1 for all subsequent quarters. Time-invariant
worker-specific characteristics and year-quarter shocks are controlled for with the inclusion
of worker (ηi) and year-quarter (θt) fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at the county level. The variable β estimates the percentage change in income attributed to
the establishment of an FC.
2.2.2 Identification Challenges
In order for β from Equation 2.1 to represent an unbiased estimate of the impact of the
establishment on an FC on the income of local brick-and-mortar retail workers, we must
assume that PostFC is orthogonal to any unobservables contained within ε. Yet, because
the location of FCs is not randomly decided by the major e-commerce retailer, dealing with
this endogenous selection represents our main econometric challenge.
A primary concern in our analysis is that the decision to establish an FC in a specific
county will naturally be a function of local economic conditions. Since one of the primary
objectives of establishing FCs is to improve the ability to serve local customers, FCs may
be more likely to be built in areas with high retail sales and high population density. To test
this, on a cross-section consisting of all counties in the U.S., we regress the likelihood of
establishing an FC in county c on county-level long differences (between 2000 and 2010) of
retail sales, population density, unemployment rate, household income, and the percentage
of the population between the ages of 18 and 65 (Table 2.1).
We observe that FCs are more likely to be located in counties with faster growing pop-
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Table 2.1: Determinants of FC Locations: OLS
This table presents the results for determinants of fulfillment centers’ location. The depen-
dent variable is whether the county has an FC in the post-2010 period. The independent
variables are long differences computed from 2000 and 2010 county-level census data.
FC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Log(Retail Sales) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Log(Population Density (per sq mile)) 0.114∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Log Median household income -0.008 -0.008
(0.019) (0.019)
∆ Perc. age b/w 18 and 65 0.000
(0.001)
Constant 0.013∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 3128 3109 3109 3109 3109
R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
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ulation densities; but, importantly, not those that have experienced more growth in retail
sales. While our county-level fixed effects will absorb all time-invariant level effects of
county-specific characteristics, our estimates will be biased downward insofar as coun-
ties that experience high population density increases are also more likely to engage in
e-commerce transactions that substitute for local retail purchases. However, if this were
true, we could also observe downward trends in retail sales and income of retail workers in
the periods before the FC’s establishment, which we do not (Figure 2.3).
A second concern surrounds the ability for the major e-commerce retailer to negotiate
with the state and local government about the location of the FC in exchange for tax benefits
or other incentives. It is plausible that governments may want the FC to be built in an area
with weak economic conditions to boost the local employment and economy. As a result,
FC county selection may be negatively correlated with local economic conditions; and,
in particular, negatively correlated with the economic fortunes of brick-and-mortar retail
stores, thus potentially biasing our estimates downward.
However, as shown in Table 2.1, Columns (3) and (4), the establishment of an FC does
not relate to the ex ante change in the local unemployment rate and median household
income, which lessens this concern. Furthermore, we deepen our analysis by conducting a
placebo test on sales in another non-tradeable sector: full-service restaurants. As reported
in Section 2.4.2, we do not find any effect on their sales with the establishment of FCs
in the local area. Nonetheless, we control for any state-level time-varying unobservables,
such as tax incentives, using state-year-quarter fixed effects.
Lastly, we may be concerned that the arrival of an FC in a county changes the com-
position of firms. In this case, higher performing firms or firms with greater options in
managing their geographically-varied portfolio of stores choose to exit those counties. Or
conversely, better performing retailers choose not to enter the treated counties. While this
would lead to the appearance of a drop in retail performance, the effect would be entirely
attributable to a compositional effect whereby the firm-quality distribution experiences a
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leftward shift. To deal with this, we focus solely on the intensive margin of competition
by including only firms that are present before and after the arrival of an FC. In addition,
we include establishment-level fixed effects to control for establishment-level quality and
other time-invariant covariates of the establishment.
In summary, while establishing a causal relationship between FC openings and brick-
and-mortar retail performance is not without its challenges, our confidence in interpreting
our PostFC coefficient as causal is increased by the inclusion of fine-grained establishment,
worker, industry-year, state-year, and year-quarter fixed effects. In addition, our confidence
is further amplified by our ability to rule out the strongest threats to identification – reverse
causality and selection on trends – by the lack of any discernible pre-trends in our regres-
sion and through the implementation of our full-service restaurants placebo test.
2.3 Data
Our empirical analysis makes use of data at three levels of analysis: 1) individual worker-
level data that we obtain from a major credit bureau, 2) establishment-level data that we
obtain from the National Establishments Time Series Database, and 3) county-level data
that we obtain from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We describe each dataset and its con-
struction in this section.
2.3.1 Worker Data
Our novel comprehensive consumer data are provided by a major credit bureau. The data
contain detailed employment information, including company name, 3-digit NAICS, the
date an employee was most recently hired for the current position, an indicator of whether
an employee is presently active, and rich payroll information that includes the payment
structure by which payments are made to the employee, total compensation, wage/salary,
overtime, bonuses, commissions, and wage/salary rate. We group workers into hourly
workers and non-hourly workers (referred to as salaried workers) based on their payment
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structure.
We obtain income and employment data of active employees at the end of each quarter
from the retail firms, which consistently supply data from 2010 to 2016.10 The data are
matched to credit files through tokenized Social Security Numbers (SSNs), which provide
demographic information such as the individual’s ZIP code of residence, age, and gender.
We use the workers’ county of residence to determine their location when examining the
impact of the arrival of an FC.11 Our sample consists of all workers employed in the first
quarter of 2010, and the sample follows them until they exit. Our sample is thus unbalanced
and does not allow for worker entry. In addition, we use the workers’ residency in 2010Q1
to determine their location (county) for all empirical analysis. We drop workers who have
multiple employers at any time during our sample period. If a worker switches employers
during the sample period, we keep our observations for the first job. All dollar values are
converted to December 2016 dollars using the seasonally adjusted consumer price index
for all urban consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Our sample contains 2.6 million workers from 57 retail firms, which accounts for 18%
of the 14.42 million total U.S. retail employment in the first quarter of 2010. The median
firm has more than 14,000 workers in the sample, which suggests that we cover mostly
large firms. Table 2.2, Panel A presents summary statistics for worker-level payroll data.
The mean quarterly income of hourly workers is $7,326. Annualized income is $29,304,
which is slightly higher than the mean income of 8.79 million retail sales workers ($25,250)
and slightly higher than the mean income of 4.53 million retail salespersons ($27,180),
as estimated by the BLS in May 2016. The mean number of hours worked is 30.9 per
10We identify firms in 3-digit NAICS industries that are most likely to compete with the major e-commerce
retailer’s product catalog. The 3-digit NAICS codes that we classify as retail includes 442 (furniture and
home furnishing stores), 443 (electronic and appliance stores), 444 (building material and garden equipment
and supplies dealers), 448 (clothing and clothing accessories stores), 451 (sporting goods, hobby, book, and
music stores), 452 (general merchandise stores), and 453 (miscellaneous store retailers). In robustness tests,
we use workers from all non-retail firms as a control group.
11We do not observe the county of the workers’ workplace. However, more than 90% of workers in our
sample are hourly workers who are less likely to spend time and money on commuting to work. While we
believe that a workers’ residence does an adequate job of proxying for their workplace, we recognize that this
will be measured with some error.
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week, with an average wage rate of $14.9 per hour. For retail workers in our sample, wage
income contributes to about 87% of their total income. The remaining income derives from
overtime/bonuses/commissions (referred to as a bonus). In our sample, salaried workers
earn $86,016 annually, on average.
The granularity of our worker-level data helps us answer questions that cannot be ad-
dressed solely from aggregate data. Given the fine-grained nature of these data, we can
examine deeper worker-level heterogeneity and analyze which workers are more vulnera-
ble to the establishment of an e-commerce FC. For example, are full-time workers more
affected than part-time workers? Further, does a worker’s gender and age insulate or exac-
erbate these effects? The detailed composition of the worker’s compensation also allows us
to understand the channels through which workers are affected. Do firms reduce workers
wages or bonuses? Do firms cut wage rates or the number of hours worked? Lastly, these
granular data allow us to improve the identification of our regression parameters through
the inclusion of fine-grained fixed effects within a panel regression environment.
2.3.2 Establishment Data
In addition to worker-level data, we make use of establishment-level data for the retail sec-
tor from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) Database (Walls & Associates,
2014).12 This database provides an annual record for a large part of the U.S. economy
that includes establishment job creation and destruction, sales growth performance, sur-
vivability of business startups, mobility patterns, changes in primary markets, corporate
affiliations that highlight M&A, and historical D&B credit and payment ratings. At the
beginning of our sample year, 2010, the database covers 3,287,183 active establishments
employing 27,404,989 workers with total sales of $2.9 trillion. These data are available
until 2014.
Similar to how we defined retail firms with our worker-level dataset, we select estab-
12Walls & Associates converts Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) archival establishment data into a time-series
database of establishment information.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the full sample and for counties with fulfill-
ment centers. Panel A presents statistics for the quarterly worker-level data between 2010
and 2016 for retail workers. Panel B provides statistics for the annual sales and employ-
ment data at the establishment level for retail stores between 2010 and 2014. Panel C shows
statistics for the quarterly county-industry level (2-digit NAICS) employment data between
2010 and 2016 for all industries. All dollar values are converted to December 2016 dollars
using CPI from BLS.
Full Sample FC Counties
N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
Panel A: Worker-Level Data
Hourly Workers
Total Income ($ per quarter) 34,806,676 7,326 4,197 1,881,184 8,248 4,363
Wage Income ($ per quarter) 34,689,666 6,362 3,553 1,875,176 7,162 3,693
Bonus ($ per quarter) 32,510,284 1,030 1,105 1,764,173 1,151 1,195
Hours Worked (per week) 34,489,187 30.9 10.1 1,866,683 32.7 9.65
Wage Rate ($ per hour) 34,489,187 14.9 4.54 1,866,683 16 4.69
Salaried Workers
Total Income ($ per quarter) 5,438,083 21,504 18,271 293,960 22,710 18,335
Panel B: Establishment-Level Data
Sales ($ 000s per year)
All Stores 13,902,516 1,494.2 8,708.3 186,400 2,272.8 10,747.7
Small Stores 4,855,755 205.1 65.6 64,208 260.9 331.3
Medium Stores 4,413,654 461.8 102.9 59,372 617.4 677.8
Large Stores 4,633,087 3,828.8 14,800.0 62,820 5,893.8 17,954.7
Employment (workers per year)
All Stores 13,902,516 12.3 63.0 186,400 17.0 68.8
Small Stores 4,855,755 3.7 3.8 64,208 4.0 7.5
Medium Stores 4,413,654 5.5 3.2 59,372 6.7 4.3
Large Stores 4,633,087 27.9 107.4 62,820 40.1 114.8
Panel C: County-Industry Level Data
Employment (Avg. All Sectors) 1,837,920 1,692.6 8724.1 26,000 12,072.1 23,555.3
Retail Trade (NAICS 44-45) 91,896 4,664.297 14,836.41 1,400 32,373.0 37,766.3
Transportation & Warehousing & (NAICS 48-49) 91,896 1,212.8 5,471.0 1,400 12,155.6 14,117.1
Restaurants & Accommodation (NAICS 72) 91,896 3,695.5 13,805.2 1,400 28,589.6 43,897.2
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lishments in 6-digit NAICS industries that are more likely to be affected based on the
e-commerce retailer’s product catalog. Table B.2 provides a complete list of industries se-
lected. To reduce noise from very small retail stores, we keep retail stores with more than
two employees before the establishment of the fulfillment center. Table 2.2, Panel B reports
summary statistics for our sample. It shows that the average retail store in our sample has
annual sales of approximately $1.5 million and 12 employees.
2.3.3 County Employment Data
For county-level analysis, we use publicly available Quarterly Census of Employment &
Wages (QCEW) provided by BLS. The data provides county-level data on employment and
total wages in each 2-digit NAICS industries for each quarter. Here, we keep all industries
and counties to understand the aggregate effect on retail, warehouse/transportation and
restaurants. We use quarterly data beginning first quarter of 2010 and ending fourth quarter
of 2016 and report summary statistics in Table 2.2, Panel C. Note that in the counties
with fulfillment centers, about 32,373 workers have employment in the retail sector while
transportation and warehousing account for 12,155 workers per county.
2.4 Results
In this section, we describe our main empirical results. We first describe our baseline
results using worker-level data. We then describe the robustness tests that we conduct
to rule out competing interpretations of our results and to strengthen the identification of
our parameters. Next, we describe results using NETS establishment data that allow us
to analyze the impact of FC entry on the entry and exit of establishments in the local
retail sector. Finally, we present the impact of FC establishments on the aggregate county-
industry level employment using QCEW data from BLS.
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2.4.1 How Do FCs Affect Local Brick-and-Mortar Stores? Evidence from Worker-level
Data
Baseline Results
In Table 2.3, we report the impact of the establishment of FCs on the income of retail
workers in counties with FCs or neighboring counties using the difference-in-differences
specification shown in Equation 2.1. We include worker fixed effects and year-quarter
fixed effects in all regressions in order to absorb as much variation as possible arising from
worker-specific time-invariant characteristics and temporal trends. Since we define the
arrival of an FC at the county level, we cluster all standard errors at the county level.
As shown in Panel A, Column (1), the total income of retail workers in counties with
FCs decreases by 2.4%, on average, after the establishment of an FC. Moving to workers
in counties within 50 or 100 miles of the focal county where an FC was established, we
continue to observe a strong negative effect on total income (Panel B). Since the arrival of
an FC may differentially impact hourly and salaried workers, we run separate regressions
for those two types of workers.
Results in Column (2) show that the income of hourly workers decreases by 2.5%,
equivalent to an $825 cut in annual income. As shown in Column (3), salaried workers
mostly have muted responses to the establishment of FCs. These muted responses may
be attributed partly to the infrequent adjustment of salaries or the inflexibility of firms in
adjusting the incomes of salaried employees in the short term. We focus on hourly workers
thoughout the rest of our analysis as they account for more than 90% of our sample and are
the ones who experience the largest negative effects.
Our identification strategy, which relies on the staggered temporal rollout (shocks) of
FCs across different counties, assumes that workers in counties that have yet to be treated
by the establishment of an FC serve as an appropriate control group. This assumption
would be violated if FCs are established in counties or regions that are experiencing upward
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Table 2.3: Effect of FCs on Income of Retail Workers
This table presents results of worker-level panel regressions assessing the effect of FCs on
income using Equation 2.1. Panel A includes retail workers in counties with FCs. Panel
B (C) includes retail workers in counties within 50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties
with FCs. Column (1), (2), (3) includes all workers, hourly workers, and salaried workers,
respectively. All regressions include worker and year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
Log(Total Income)
All Workers Hourly Workers Salaried Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC −0.024∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 2,175,144 1,881,184 293,960
Adjusted R2 0.845 0.809 0.849
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC −0.020∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Observations 5,643,934 4,744,111 899,823
Adjusted R2 0.865 0.828 0.856
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC −0.023∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.007∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 11,141,092 9,549,880 1,591,212
Adjusted R2 0.858 0.821 0.863
Worker FE X X X
YearQtr FE X X X
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trends in online shopping and downward trends in sales at traditional brick-and-mortar re-
tailers. In this case, the negative income effect may be driving the FC establishment and not
vice versa. As such, our difference-in-differences assumption is only valid if treatment and
control groups follow parallel trends before the shock. To test this, we directly examine the
dynamic temporal effects by including leading and lagging indicators of FC establishment
by estimating the following:








To increase the power of our estimates, PreFC and PostFC dummies are defined at half-
year intervals. The variable PreFCc,t(-j) (PostFCc,t(j)) is a dummy that takes a value 1 if
it is j half-years before (after) the establishment of FCs. Also, PreFC(-4) equals 1 if it is
two or more years before the establishment of FCs, and PostFC (+4) equals 1 if it is two
or more years after the establishment of FCs. The variable PreFC(-1) is dropped from the
estimation so that all coefficient estimates can be treated as percentage changes relative to
the income workers received six months before the establishment of FCs.
In Figure 2.3, Panel A, we show the dynamic effect of FCs on income for counties
with FCs by plotting the coefficients from the specification in Equation 2.2. The shaded
area around the coefficients represent 95% confidence intervals. Coefficients on PreFC(-
4), PreFC(-3), and PreFC(-2) are all statistically insignificant from the income of workers
in PreFC(-1) (the omitted category). That suggests that there is no pre-trend in the data,
thus supporting the validity of our parallel trends assumption. Within six months of the
establishment of an FC, the income of hourly workers decreases by 2.1% relative to the
half-year shortly before the FC’s establishment. The negative effect further increases to
-4.1% two years after the FC’s establishment. We find a similar pattern in Panels B and
C of Figure 2.3, where we focus our analysis on counties within 50 miles of the county in
which an FC opened and within 100 miles, respectively.
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Figure 2.3: Dynamic Effect of FCs on Income
These figures present the dynamic effect of FCs on the income of hourly retail workers.
We estimate Equation 2.2 and plot the estimated coefficients from PreFC (j=-4 to j=-
2) and PostFC (j=0 to j=4) dummies which are defined at the semiannual frequency.
PreFC(−1) is dropped from the estimation so that all coefficient estimates can be treated
as percentage changes relative to the income within two quarters before the establishment
of FCs. The shaded area around the coefficients represents 5% confidence intervals. Panel
A includes workers in counties with FCs. Panel B (C) includes workers in counties within
50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs.
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Can Unobservable Firm-Specific Variables or Local Economic Conditions Be Driving the
Results?
Our results so far suggest a robust and negative relationship between the arrival of an FC
and a worker’s income. However, absent truly exogenous variation in both the geographic
location and temporal timing of FC establishment, we may still be concerned that the arrival
of an FC is correlated with unobservables present in the error term of Equation 2.1. These
unobservables may include firm-specific characteristics or local economic conditions that
jointly affect both the likelihood of an FC arriving in the county and the income of workers
in local brick-and-mortar establishments.
For example, if a major lender or supplier to a brick-and-mortar retailer files for bankruptcy
and this attracts the e-commerce retailer to establish an FC in the county as a result, then
this negative correlation between our error term and the FC establishment amplifies our
negative effect sizes. To address this concern, we include firm-year-quarter fixed effects
to absorb all time-specific characteristics of our sample firms and identify our parameter
of interest by exploiting varition within-firm-time across counties. As such, we can only
estimate our PostFC variable from firms that operate in more than one county.
We see in Column (1) that when we include these firm-year-quarter fixed effects, the
establishment of FCs in the county results in lower total income for retail hourly workers
in the brick-and-mortar stores. We find that the magnitude diminishes from the baseline
magnitude (2.5%) to 2.1% for counties with FCs. When we extend our analysis to focus
on counties within 50 and 100 miles of the county in which the FC was established, we
continue to see precisely estimated negative effects.
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, local economic conditions may also play an important
role in the establishment of FCs by the e-commerce retailer. States with and without FCs
may have different economic and regulatory environments, which could correlate with the
establishment of an FC. For example, regions with suppressed economic activity (which
would negatively impact retail sales) may be more inclined to offer sizable incentives for
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e-commerce retailers to establish an FC in their region. To control for time-varying unob-
servables at the state level, we include state-year-quarter fixed effects and report the results
in Table 2.4, Column (2). The estimated effect for counties with FCs drops from -2.5% to
-0.8%, but the result remains statistically significant from 0. Further, the results are strong
both economically and statistically for workers within 50 or 100 miles of FCs. Our results
remain robust when we combine firm-year-quarter and state-year-quarter fixed effects in
Column (3).
While the state-year-quarter fixed effects may control for state-level heterogeneity, they
may be insufficient to fully absorb any time-varying heterogeneity that arises at the county
level. For example, it may be that the e-commerce retailer decides to build an FC in a
county at the same time that an unexpected negative economic shock occurs in that county
(or possibly even because of such a shock). Thus, it is possible that our baseline estimates
may be driven by unexpected local economic shocks rather than by competition from e-
commerce. To control for county-specific time-varying shocks, we expand our sample
threefold to include data on hourly workers at non-retail firms. In doing so, we can employ a
triple difference (difference-in-difference-in-differences) methodology whereby we exploit
within county-year-quarter variation across industry type (retail versus non-retail). In doing
so, we can carefully control for county-time specific shocks and identify our parameter of
interest by comparing retail workers to non-retail workers in FC-treated counties.
If FCs are being established in regions that experience economic hardship, then we
should observe no difference in incomes between retail and non-retail workers. In Column
(4), we interact the PostFC dummy with a Retail dummy set to 1 if the focal worker works
in a retail industry and 0 otherwise. We find that the income of retail hourly workers in
counties with FCs is reduced by 4.4% compared to all other hourly workers within the
same county, after controlling for county-level time-varying unobservables. As a result, it
seems unlikely that a local negative shock that solely affects a county’s retail firms, but not
its non-retail firms, is driving our results.
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Table 2.4: Firm-Specific Unobservables and Local Economic Conditions
This table presents results of worker-level panel regressions assessing the effect of FCs
on the income of hourly workers after controlling for firm-specific unobservables and lo-
cal economic conditions. All columns include worker fixed effects. We replace year-
quarter fixed effects in Equation 2.1 with firm-year-quarter, state-year-quarter, and firm-
year-quarter and state-year-quarter fixed effects in Column (1), (2), (3), respectively. In
Column (4), we include all hourly workers in other industries in addition to retail workers.
We interact PostFC with Retail, where Retail identifies retail workers, and we control for
county-year-quarter fixed effects. Panel A includes workers in counties with FCs. Panel
B (C) includes workers in counties within 50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with
FCs. Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Log(Total Income)
Hourly Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Counties with FCs




Observations 1,881,184 1,881,184 1,881,184 5,596,632
Adjusted R2 0.841 0.811 0.842 0.850
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs




Observations 4,744,111 4,744,111 4,744,111 14,247,756
Adjusted R2 0.862 0.830 0.863 0.852
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs




Observations 9,549,880 9,549,880 9,549,880 26,914,902
Adjusted R2 0.853 0.824 0.854 0.856
Worker FE X X X X
Firm-YearQtr FE X X
State-YearQtr FE X X
County-YearQtr FE X
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Overall, the results presented in this subsection reduce our concerns that our results are
being driven by firm-specific unobservable variables or some other omitted local economic
conditions that coincide with the staggered establishment of FCs.
Decomposing the Impact of FC Establishment on Wages
Our detailed payroll data on workers allows us to decompose their total income into wage
income and bonus income. We can further decompose wage income into hours worked and
wage rate. We run Equation 2.1 using different components of total income as our depen-
dent variables. Table 2.5, Column (1) reports results for wage income as the dependent
variable. All regressions include worker, firm-year-quarter, and state-year-quarter fixed
effects. We continue to use this tighter specification for all our worker-level regression
estimates.13 We find a significant negative impact on wage income across all three panels.
The economic magnitude ranges from -0.7% to -1.4%. In Column (2), we find that bonuses
decline by 0.3% to 2.6%. To further investigate the source of this wage reduction, we de-
compose wage income into hours worked and wage rate. In Column (3), we report results
for hours worked and find that the estimated coefficients are almost the same as those in
Column (1). We do not find economically significant changes in the wage rate (Column
(4)).
The results documented in Table 2.5 suggest that the negative impact of FC estab-
lishment on local retail workers is mainly driven by the reduction in hours they work. As
previously documented, the negative impact is concentrated in hourly workers. At the same
time, the wages of many of the hourly retail workers are bound by the applicable minimum
wage. So, our results suggest that in the presence of this wage floor, firms cut down on the
number of hours demanded from their part-time, hourly workers.
13Note that our results are robust and in fact are stronger for our baseline model with only worker and
year-quarter fixed effects.
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Table 2.5: Decomposition of Income Effect for Hourly Workers
This table presents results of worker-level panel regressions assessing the effect of FCs on
the wage income, bonus, hours worked, and wage rate of hourly retail workers using Equa-
tion 2.1. Panel A includes workers in counties with FCs. Panel B (C) includes workers in
counties within 50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs. All regressions include
worker, firm-year-quarter, and state-year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by
county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level.
Log(Wage Income) Log(Bonus) Log(Hours Worked) Log(Wage Rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC -0.007*** -0.012 -0.007*** 0.001***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.000)
Observations 1,875,176 1,764,173 1,866,683 1,866,683
Adjusted R2 0.842 0.740 0.731 0.970
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.014*** -0.026*** -0.014*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 4,730,532 4,414,584 4,711,647 4,711,647
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.744 0.761 0.968
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.012*** -0.003 -0.011*** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 9,521,947 8,921,138 9,476,710 9,476,710
Adjusted R2 0.849 0.746 0.744 0.969
Worker FE X X X X
Firm-YearQtr FE X X X X
State-YearQtr FE X X X X
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Are All Retail Workers Affected Equally by the Establishment of FCs?
Our rich worker-level data allow us to analyze which workers are more impacted by the
negative wage shock due to the establishment of the FCs. This rich demographic informa-
tion allows us to consider heterogeneity along worker dimensions such as age, gender, and
worker status (part-time versus full-time).
We start by exploring worker heterogeneity by age. We split the retail workers in our
sample into six age groups. Results from running Equation 2.1 over these six age groups
are reported in Table 2.6. We find evidence for a stronger negative impact on the total
income of young and old workers. We observe that for young workers under the age of
25 within 50 miles of FCs, total income decreases by 2.7%. The negative effect is lower
for age group of 25-34 years (-1.8%). We find that this negative effect increases with age.
For age groups 35-44 years, 45-54 years, and 54-64 years, the effect is -1.2%, -1.6%, and
-2.0%, respectively. For the oldest group, i.e., workers older than 64 years of age, the
negative income effect is as high as -3.5%. These results appear similar for focal counties
and those within 100 miles of FCs.
These results suggest that a worker’s age has a large moderating impact on the arrival
of new technologies. One explanation for this result may be that a worker’s age proxies for
their productivity and accumulated firm-specific human capital. On the one hand, young
workers may be more productive, but firms may not have invested much in enhancing
their firm-specific human capital. On the other hand, old workers may have accumulated
firm-specific human capital but may be less productive compared to younger workers. Ex-
plaining how age plays a prominent role is outside the scope of our paper; however, our
results suggest that both younger and older workers shoulder a disproportionate share of
the negative impact of FC establishment as opposed to middle-age workers.
Next, we test how the negative income effect varies across worker’s working status, i.e.,
part-time workers versus full-time workers. Similar to age, a worker’s working status may
reflect his or her underlying level of firm-specific human capital accumulation. Firms may
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneous Income Effect: Worker Age
This table presents results of worker-level panel regressions assessing the heterogeneous
effect of FCs on the income of hourly retail workers based on the age of workers using
Equation 2.1. Panel A includes workers in counties with FCs. Panel B (C) includes work-
ers in counties within 50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs. All regressions
include worker, firm-year-quarter, and state-year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clus-
tered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
Log(Total Income)
Age (in years) <25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 > 64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.018*** -0.044***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 168,518 382,786 420,745 493,286 299,402 95,063
Adjusted R2 0.782 0.815 0.858 0.851 0.846 0.860
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.027*** -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.035***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 381,232 900,078 998,542 1,289,569 858,504 262,581
Adjusted R2 0.786 0.834 0.879 0.885 0.865 0.864
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.021*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.026***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 834,541 1,883,249 2,035,922 2,532,303 1,644,437 508,696
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.828 0.871 0.874 0.853 0.853
Worker FE X X X X X X
Firm-YearQtr FE X X X X X X
State-YearQtr FE X X X X X X
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invest more in the human capital development of full-time workers than part-time workers.
We define a worker as a part-time worker if the hours worked is less than 32 hours per week,
otherwise the worker is considered a full-time worker. We define the worker’s employment
status in a time-invariant fashion by categorizing each worker by their work status at the
beginning of our sample period, i.e., in 2010Q1. Table 2.7, Panel A reports the differential
effect on part-time and full-time workers. In line with the hour reduction results previously
reported, we find that the negative effect is stronger for part-time workers, i.e., the impact
on part-time workers is about -1% more.
It is possible that the negative impact of FCs varies by gender, given the significant
fraction of female retail employees. We test whether there is any differential effect of FCs
on male versus female workers. Table 2.7, Panel B suggests that there is no difference in
the effect based on worker gender.
In summary, the heterogeneity in the negative impact of establishment of FCs may be
relevant for designing remedial responses to the negative impact of establishment of FCs
on local retail employees. We find that young and old workers (as opposed to middle-aged
workers) and part-time workers (as opposed to full-time workers) experience dispropor-
tionately more negative effects from the establishment of FCs in their focal and proximate
counties.
Additional Robustness Tests
We further conduct additional tests to ensure the robustness of the results reported so far. In
our main analysis (i.e., results from estimating Equation 2.1), we focus on post-2010 FCs,
since our sample starts with 2010. We include all FCs in Table 2.8, Panel A as a robustness
test. The income effect is about -1% and is still significant in Column (2) and Column (3).
The lower magnitudes can be attributed to the non-availability of pre-treatment worker data
for FCs established before 2010.
In our baseline tests, we assigned FC treatment to workers based on the the ZIP code
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Table 2.7: Heterogeneous Income Effect: Hours Worked and Gender
This table presents results of worker-level panel regressions assessing the heterogeneous
effect of FCs on the income of hourly workers based on hours worked and gender of work-
ers using Equation 2.1. Panel A compares part-time workers (less than 32 hours per week)
and full-time workers (equal to or more than 32 hours per week). Panel B compares fe-
male workers and male workers. All regressions include worker, group-specific firm-year-
quarter, and group-specific state-year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by
county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level.
Log(Total Income)
Counties Counties within Counties within
with FCs 50 Miles of FCs 100 Miles of FCs
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Part-time vs. Full-time
PostFC*Part-time (1) -0.016*** -0.028*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
PostFC*Full-time (2) -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Difference ((1)-(2)) -0.005 -0.014*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 1,872,894 4,725,658 9,505,116
Adjusted R2 0.843 0.864 0.854
Worker FE X X X
PartTime-Firm-YearQtr FE X X X
PartTime-State-YearQtr FE X X X
Panel B: Female vs. Male
PostFC*Female (3) -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
PostFC*Male (4) -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Difference ((3)-(4)) 0.008* 0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Observations 644,483 1,910,447 3,367,008
Adjusted R2 0.850 0.853 0.849
Worker FE X X X
Female-Firm-YearQtr FE X X X
Female-State-YearQtr FE X X X
87
Table 2.8: Robustness Check
This table presents robustness checks for the effect of FCs on the income of hourly retail
workers using Equation 2.1. Panel A uses all FCs including those established before 2010.
Panel B excludes migrants whose first and last ZIP codes in the data are different. Panel C
uses the modeled annualized income as an alternative measure of income. All regressions
include worker, firm-year-quarter, and state-year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clus-
tered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
Log(Total Income)
Counties Counties within Counties within
with FCs 50 Miles of FCs 100 Miles of FCs
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: All FCs
PostFC -0.006* -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 2,789,307 6,703,938 13,858,442
Adjusted R2 0.852 0.870 0.863
Panel B: Excluding Migrants
PostFC -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 1,632,007 4,041,405 8,208,699
Adjusted R2 0.848 0.869 0.860
Panel C: Alternative Measure of Income
PostFC -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 1,885,938 4,753,073 9,570,559
Adjusted R2 0.911 0.918 0.914
Worker FE X X X
Firm-YearQtr FE X X X
State-YearQtr FE X X X
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of their residence in 2010Q1. It is possible that some workers move to avoid the negative
income shocks caused by FCs. Therefore, as a further robustness test, we remove migrants
whose last observed ZIP code in the data is different from the first observed ZIP code. Re-
sults documented in Panel B of Table 2.8 indicate that our main results remain unaffected.
In our analysis so far, we have used quarterly income computed from raw payroll data
under the assumption that it is a timely reflection of the impact of FCs. But, it is possible
that quarterly income is subject to seasonal variation. Since income is the key outcome
measure in our analysis, we show robustness to our dependent variable by using an alterna-
tive income measure that is based on the projected annual income of a worker every month
as computed by the credit bureau. We rerun our analysis with this projected annual income
instead of the quarterly income we have used so far. Results documented in Panel C of
Table 2.8 show a significant negative effect, suggesting that our analysis is robust to this
measure of income.
Credit Outcomes
Our results so far indicate that the establishment of FCs by a major online retailer has a
negative impact on the wages of workers at traditional brick-and-mortar retail stores in
the focal county and geographically proximate counties. The effects are predominantly
borne by young and old workers as opposed to middle-aged workers, part-time workers as
opposed to full-time workers, and hourly workers as opposed to salaried employees.
However, to the extent that labor markets are frictionless (i.e., workers can easily switch
jobs, and skills are completely transferable) the short-term displacement of some traditional
retail store workers that we document may not matter for the workers or the local economy.
However, in the presence of labor market frictions, the short-term impact on the workers
and local economy can be negative. Moreover, to the extent that the scope of work differs
between traditional retail stores and warehouses, at least some workers can be worse off.
Our data prevent us from identifying any other source of income for the affected work-
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ers, specifically part-time and hourly workers, except income from their primary employer
in the credit bureau payroll database. So, we are unable to directly verify whether the
affected workers offset the reduced hours with brick-and-mortar retail stores by picking
up additional working hours with another employer (who may not be part of the payroll
database that we use).
We test for this possibility indirectly by considering the credit outcomes of the work-
ers. If workers can easily substitute their sources of income, then it should have no effect
on their credit outcomes. Otherwise, the declines in income may lead to worse credit out-
comes, especially for the workers who are already living at the margin (i.e., workers with
high bank card utilization). We use credit score as a measure of the credit outcomes for the
affected workers. We assign a worker to the high utilization group if her bank card utiliza-
tion is higher than the median utilization ratio, and we assign workers to the low utilization
group if their bank card utilization is lower than the median.
We report our results in Table 2.9. We find that the credit score for workers with high
utilization of bank credit cards declines significantly. In counties with FCs, the decreases in
credit scores of workers in the high utilization group are 3 points more than that of workers
in the low utilization group. It seems that the decline in credit scores is driven by a higher
bank credit card delinquency among the affected workers.
Overall, the evidence suggests that technological change, as manifested by an e-commerce
retailer establishing an FC, leads to a decline in wages for workers in traditional brick-and-
mortar stores. Among the affected workers, those who have a prior higher credit card uti-
lization and those who are otherwise more financially vulnerable experience higher credit
card delinquencies and a subsequent decline in their credit score. These results suggest
that some of the affected retail workers experience some frictions in the labor market that
preclude them from mitigating the extent to which the establishment of e-commerce FCs
in their county depresses their wage income and subsequently their credit scores.
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Table 2.9: Heterogeneous Effect on Credit Scores: Bank Card Utilization
This table presents results of worker-level panel regressions assessing the heterogeneous
effect of FCs on credit scores and bank card 90+ day delinquency of hourly workers based
on bank card utilization using Equation 2.1. All regressions include worker, group-specific
firm-year-quarter, and group-specific state-year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clus-
tered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
Counties Counties within Counties within
with FCs 50 Miles of FCs 100 Miles of FCs
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Credit Scores
PostFC*Low (1) 0.593 0.004 0.110
(0.786) (0.433) (0.325)
PostFC*High (2) -2.500*** -0.835* -0.495*
(0.220) (0.506) (0.282)
Difference ((2)-(1)) -3.089*** -0.849 -0.605*
(0.735) (0.609) (0.367)
Observations 1,210,611 3,191,674 6,441,603
Adjusted R2 0.812 0.826 0.822
Worker FE X X X
Low-Firm-YearQtr FE X X X
Low-State-YearQtr FE X X X
Panel B: Bank Card 90+ Day Delinquency
PostFC*Low (3) -0.001* -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
PostFC*High (4) 0.006*** 0.002** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Difference ((4)-(3)) 0.007*** 0.003*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,081,133 2,879,747 5,778,895
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.111 0.112
Worker FE X X X
Low-Firm-YearQtr FE X X X
Low-State-YearQtr FE X X X
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2.4.2 How Do FCs Affect Local Brick-and-Mortar Retail Stores? Evidence from NETS
Data
So far, we have used detailed worker level data and the staggered establishment of FCs
of the e-commerce retailer to understand the impact on the wages of the workers at tra-
ditional brick-and-mortar retail stores in the focal county and geographically proximate
counties. We next use NETS establishment-level data in order to understand the impact
of the establishment of FCs on traditional brick-and-mortar retail stores themselves. This
analysis examines the aggregate implications of the negative income effects that workers
suffer when they work fewer hours.
Effect on Retail Store Sales
In Table 2.10, we use NETS data to understand the effect of FCs on the sales of local brick-
and-mortar stores. Column (1) reports difference-in-differences estimates for all stores in
the counties with FCs. In all the specifications, we include establishment fixed effects, 6-
digit NAICS-year fixed effects, and state-year fixed effects. We find that the annual sales
of local brick-and-mortar retail stores decrease by 2.8% (equivalent to $63,639 per store)
after the establishment of an FC of an e-commerce retailer.
In the next three columns, we partition the incumbent establishment/store sample into
terciles based on sales one year before the establishment of FCs in the county. We find
that for the bottom tercile (Small), the annual sales decrease by 2.9%, which is equivalent
to $7,565 per store. For the medium group (Medium), we find that sales decrease by 2%,
which is equivalent to $12,348 per store. For the top group (Large), sales decrease by 3.4%,
which is equivalent to $200,389 per store. These results suggest that the establishment of
FCs negatively affects the sales of local brick-and-mortar stores, especially large retail
stores. The effect is diminished in counties that are 50 or 100 miles from FCs.
These results also suggest that after the staggered establishment of the e-commerce
firm’s FCs, sales decline significantly in the focal county of the FC. This decline in sales
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Table 2.10: Effect of FCs on Sales of Retail Stores
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the heteroge-
neous effect of FCs on the sales of retail establishments/stores based on the size of stores.
Panel A includes establishments in counties with FCs. Panel B (C) includes establishments
in counties within 50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs. Column (1) re-
ports results for all stores, while Column (2)-Column (4) report results for terciles based
on sales one year before the establishment of FCs in the county or neighboring county.
All regressions include establishment, industry-year and state-year fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Log(1+Sales)
All Small Medium Large
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC -0.028∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Observations 184,829 63,636 58,799 62,394
Adjusted R2 0.959 0.808 0.728 0.918
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.009 0.010 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018)
Observations 509,182 172,954 164,848 171,362
Adjusted R2 0.956 0.801 0.744 0.914
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.011∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011)
Observations 1,073,929 364,588 348,315 361,015
Adjusted R2 0.958 0.800 0.765 0.921
Establishment FE X X X X
Ind-Year FE X X X X
State-Year FE X X X X
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may result in financial stress on the store, or it may motivate the parent company to focus
on improving the operational performance of the store. One consequence of the decline in
sales may be a reduction in the number of hours of work assigned to part-time and hourly
workers.
Effect on Retail Store Employment
So far, we find that the establishment of FCs negatively affects the income of retail workers
and the sales of local brick-and-mortar stores. Thus, it is instructive to understand how
stores respond to lower sales after the increase in competition due to the establishment of
the e-commerce retailer’s FCs. Do they also adjust overall employment levels in addition
to reducing the number of hours of part-time and hourly workers?
Table 2.11 reports results for the effect of FCs on local establishment-level employment.
The results appear similar to sales. Column (1) reports difference-in-differences estimates
for all stores in counties with FCs. We find that for all stores, employment decreases by
2.4%, which is equivalent to a reduction in employees of 41 workers per 100 stores for a
store with an average of 22 employees. For small stores, employment decreases by 2.7%,
which is equivalent to reducing 11 workers per 100 stores for a store with an average of 4
employees. For large stores, employment decreases by 1 worker per store for a store with
an average of 40 employees. Similar to sales results, the effect is diminished in counties
that are 50 or 100 miles of an FC.
Based on the results presented in the previous two subsections, it appears that after the
establishment of the e-commerce retailer’s FCs, traditional brick-and-mortar retail stores
in the focal county adjust to the decline in the sales both by reducing the number of hours
of work assigned to part-time and hourly workers and also by reducing employment levels.
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Table 2.11: Effect of FCs on Employment of Retail Stores
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the heteroge-
neous effect of FCs on the employment of retail establishments/stores based on the size of
stores. Panel A includes establishments in counties with FCs. Panel B (C) includes estab-
lishments in counties within 50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs. Column (1)
reports results for all stores, while Column (2)-Column (4) report results for terciles based
on sales one year before the establishment of FCs in the county or neighboring county.
All regressions include establishment, industry-year and state-year fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Log(1+Employment)
All Small Medium Large
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC -0.024∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009)
Observations 184,829 63,636 58,799 62,394
Adjusted R2 0.973 0.871 0.907 0.955
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.007 -0.003 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Observations 509,182 172,954 164,848 171,362
Adjusted R2 0.973 0.875 0.912 0.956
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.008∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 1,073,929 364,588 348,315 361,015
Adjusted R2 0.978 0.883 0.924 0.969
Establishment FE X X X X
Ind-Year FE X X X X
State-Year FE X X X X
95
Closures of Retail Stores
Next, we analyze whether the increase in competition and the consequent decline in store
sales after the establishment of the e-commerce retailer’s FCs can lead, in extreme cases,
to an increase in retail store closures.
In Tables 2.12 and 2.13, we attempt to understand whether the establishment of FCs
leads to store closures and how this effect varies with store size and age. Here we define
exit, our dependent variable, as a dummy equal to 1 if the establishment ceases to exist one
year before the end of the sample period, and 0 otherwise. Table 2.12, Panel A, Column (1)
reports results for all stores. We find that the exit rate increases by almost 3%. The average
exit rate in our sample is almost 13.6%. The effect is negatively correlated with the ex ante
size of the store, i.e., small stores are more likely to exit than large stores. This effect is
consistent for counties 50 miles or 100 miles from a FC.
We further test the role of a store’s age on exits, and we report the results in Table 2.13.
Here, we partition the All stores further into terciles, i.e., young, medium, and old based on
ex ante age. The average age in the bottom tercile is about eight years. We find that young
stores are more likely to close.
So, based on the analysis in Tables 2.12 and 2.13, it appears that there is an increase in
the exit rate of local brick-and-mortar retail stores after the establishment of the FCs of the
e-commerce retailer. This exit rate impact is more pronounced for young and small retail
stores, as they are likely to be more financially stressed and may not be able to survive the
decline in sales after the FCs are established in the focal county.
Entry of Retail Stores
In all of our previous analysis, we focus on the effect of the establishment of FCs on incum-
bent brick-and-mortar retail stores. But it is possible that entry into the local retail sector
is discouraged by the establishment of the FC, the consequent increase in competition, and
the decline in sales and closure of some of the incumbent brick-and-mortar retail stores. We
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Table 2.12: Retail Store Closures: Size Effect
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the hetero-
geneous effect of FCs on the exit rates of retail establishments/stores based on the size of
stores. Here, we define exit dummy, our dependent variable, as 1 if the establishment ceases
to exist one year before the end of the sample period, and 0 otherwise. Panel A includes es-
tablishments in counties with FCs. Panel B (C) includes establishments in counties within
50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs. Column (1) reports results for all stores,
while Column (2)-Column (4) report results for terciles based on sales one year before the
establishment of FCs in the county or neighboring county. All regressions include estab-
lishment, industry-year and state-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by county are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Exit
All Small Medium Large
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC 0.029∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 161,520 53,753 53,470 54,297
Adjusted R2 0.214 0.222 0.213 0.207
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC 0.023∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 446,770 148,440 148,708 149,604
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.207 0.201 0.200
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC 0.014∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Observations 973,208 322,744 324,191 326,261
Adjusted R2 0.204 0.207 0.199 0.204
Establishment FE X X X X
Ind-Year FE X X X X
State-Year FE X X X X
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Table 2.13: Retail Store Closures: Age Effect
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the hetero-
geneous effect of FCs on the exit rates of retail establishments/stores based on the age of
stores. Here, we define exit dummy, our dependent variable, as 1 if the establishment ceases
to exist one year before the end of the sample period, and 0 otherwise. Panel A includes es-
tablishments in counties with FCs. Panel B (C) includes establishments in counties within
50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs. Column (1) reports results for all
stores for which we observe the store’s age, while Column (2)-Column (4) report results
for terciles based on store’s age one year before the establishment of FCs in the county or
neighboring county. All regressions include establishment, industry-year, and state-year
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Exit
All Young Medium Old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC 0.032∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010)
Observations 75,162 26,080 25,093 23,984
Adjusted R2 0.204 0.217 0.199 0.185
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC 0.032∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 226,182 79,011 72,694 74,465
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.212 0.190 0.182
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC 0.016∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 508,929 179,539 165,739 163,630
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.211 0.196 0.191
Establishment FE X X X X
Ind-Year FE X X X X
State-Year FE X X X X
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analyze the impact of the establishment of the FC on entry into the local retail market in
Table 2.14. Column (1) of Panel A reports county-level results on the number of entrants.
We find that after the establishment of an FC in the affected county, the entry rate for small
stores is significantly reduced by 11.8%. This low entry rate effect is not just limited to
counties with FCs; it also persists in counties 50 or 100 miles from an FC.
Effect on Sales of Full-Service Restaurants
We have attempted to rule out the key competing alternate explanation for the pattern
we observe in our data: the possibility that our results are driven by some omitted local
economic conditions and not by the establishment of the e-commerce retailer’s FC in the
county. As a further test to reduce the concerns about this interpretation, we test whether
FCs have any effect on the sales of local full-service restaurants. If some omitted local
economic shock is positively correlated with the establishment of an FC in the affected
counties, we would expect that the sales of full-service restaurants (another important non-
tradable sector) also respond to this negative economic shock and experience a decrease in
the focal counties.
Table 2.15 reports the results for the effect of FCs on the sales of full-service restau-
rants. Panel A, column (1) reports difference-in-differences estimates for all full-service
restaurants. We do not find any negative effect on sales of full-service restaurants with the
establishment of FCs in the counties. Similar to the previous subsection, we partition the
data into terciles based on ex ante sales. We find that sales of small restaurants increase
in the focal counties, but we do not find any effect on sales for medium- or large-sized
restaurants nor any effect within 50 or 100 miles of FCs. These results indicate that it is
unlikely that an omitted local economic shock is responsible for the negative impact on the
sales of traditional brick-and-mortar retailers.
In summary, using detailed establishment level data from NETS, we find that after the
staggered establishment of the FCs of the e-commerce retailer, the geographically proxi-
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Table 2.14: Opening of Retail Stores
This table presents results of county-level panel regressions assessing the heterogeneous
effect of FCs on the entry rates of retail establishments/stores based on the size of stores.
Here, we define entry rate as the logged value of the number of entrants in a given county.
Panel A includes entrants in counties with FCs. Panel B (C) includes entrants in counties
within 50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs. Column (1) reports results for
all stores, while Column (2)-Column (4) report results for terciles based on the first-year
sales after the entry. All regressions include establishment, industry-year, and state-year
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Log(1+Entrants)
All Small Medium Large
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC -0.015 -0.118∗∗ 0.095 0.019
(0.040) (0.052) (0.083) (0.078)
Observations 180 180 180 180
Adjusted R2 0.989 0.974 0.981 0.968
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.088∗∗ -0.054 -0.043 -0.133∗∗
(0.039) (0.053) (0.073) (0.055)
Observations 2,205 2,205 2,205 2,205
Adjusted R2 0.966 0.937 0.933 0.934
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.138∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.070∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
Observations 5,690 5,690 5,690 5,690
Adjusted R2 0.954 0.919 0.916 0.913
Establishment FE X X X X
Ind-Year FE X X X X
State-Year FE X X X X
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Table 2.15: Placebo Tests: Sales of Full-Service Restaurants
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the hetero-
geneous effect of FCs on the sales of full-service restaurants (NAICS 722511) based on
the size of restaurants. Panel A includes establishments in counties with FCs. Panel B
(C) includes establishments in counties within 50 (100) miles of FCs but not in counties
with FCs. Column (1) reports results for all restaurants, while Column (2)-Column (4)
report results for terciles based on sales one year before the establishment of FCs in the
county or neighboring county. All regressions include establishment and state-year fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Log(1+Sales)
All Small Medium Large
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Counties with FCs
PostFC 0.002 0.012∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 110,043 36,097 40,546 33,400
Adjusted R2 0.979 0.895 0.856 0.944
Panel B: Counties within 50 Miles of FCs
PostFC 0.003 0.010 -0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Observations 311,132 100,077 115,726 95,329
Adjusted R2 0.980 0.892 0.806 0.956
Panel C: Counties within 100 Miles of FCs
PostFC -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Observations 616,376 198,337 227,175 190,859
Adjusted R2 0.978 0.879 0.822 0.949
Establishment FE X X X X
State-Year FE X X X X
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mate traditional brick-and-mortar retail stores experience a decline in sales, a decline in
employment, a decline in entry in the local retail sector, and an increase in closures among
the incumbent firms. The impact on store closures is more pronounced for young stores and
small stores, whereas the decline in sales is more pronounced for larger stores. In addition,
as a placebo, we find that the staggered establishment of the FCs of the e-commerce retailer
does not correlate with the sales of full-service restaurants. Overall, our results suggest that
the establishment of the e-commerce retailer’s FCs has a negative impact on the financial
health of the local traditional brick-and-mortar retail stores.
2.4.3 How Do FCs Affect Employment and Wage Growth? Evidence from BLS County-Industry
Data
Finally, to understand the aggregate effect at the county level, we use county-level QCEW
data on employment and total wages for each NAICS 2-digit sector. We estimate county-
industry specific quarterly employment growth and wage growth and report the results of
the analysis in Table 2.16. In Panel A, Column (1), we compare the effect of FCs on
the employment growth in retail (NAICS 44-45), transportation and warehouse (NAICS
48-49) and restaurants (NAICS 72). Here, we keep all the other industries and all US
counties to absorb the time-varying county-specific and industry-specific unobservables.
The interaction term Post FC × Retail identifies the effect of establishment of FCs on
the employment growth in the retail sector compared to all other sectors within the same
county.
We find that the establishment of an FC has a negative effect on the employment
growth in the retail sector. This is consistent with evidence using payroll data and NETS
establishment-level data. A 2.9% decline in employment growth implies a loss of 938 jobs
per county per quarter. While, on the other hand, the establishment of FCs do create 256
jobs in transportation and warehousing sector. Further, we find a mildly significant positive
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Table 2.16: Effect of FCs on Wages and Employment: County-Industry Evidence
This table presents results of county-industry level panel regressions assessing the aggre-
gate effect of FCs on employment growth and total wage growth. Retail (NAICS 44-45),
Warehouse(NAICS 48-49) and Restaurant (NAICS 72) dummies identifies respective
industries. All regressions include county-year-quarter and industry-year-quarter fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered by county are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Counties with FCs Counties within 50 Miles Counties within 100 Miles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panal A: Employment Growth
Post FC × Retail -0.029*** -0.005* -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Post FC × (Retail -0.025*** -0.005* -0.010***
+Warehouse) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Post FC × (Retail -0.033*** -0.008** -0.012***
+Warehouse+Restaurant) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Post FC × Warehouse 0.021*** 0.003 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Post FC × Restaurant 0.005* 0.005* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Obs. 1,178,848 1,122,988 1,056,669 1,178,848 1,122,988 1,056,669 1,178,848 1,122,988 1,056,669
Panal B: Total Wage Growth
Post FC × Retail -0.028*** -0.004 -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Post FC × (Retail -0.025*** -0.004 -0.008***
+Warehouse) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Post FC × (Retail -0.030*** -0.006* -0.010***
+Warehouse+Restaurant) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Post FC × Warehouse 0.017*** 0.006 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Post FC × Restaurant 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Obs. 1,179,588 1,123,728 1,057,409 1,179,588 1,123,728 1,057,409 1,179,588 1,123,728 1,057,409
County-YearQtr FE X X X X X X X X X
Ind-YearQtr FE X X X X X X X X X
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spillover effect in restaurants, which leads to 143 more jobs per county per quarter.14
In Column (2) and Column (3), we combine retail and warehouse, and retail, warehouse
and restaurants, respectively and estimate the growth rates again for combined sectors. The
aggregate employment growth effect is negative compared to all the other sectors within
the same county with FC. In Column(4)-Column(9), we include counties within 50 and 100
miles of FCs but not in counties with FCs. Note that the positive effect on transportation
and warehousing sector and restaurants disappears while the negative effect on the retail
sector in the far away counties diminishes but remains negative and statistically significant.
Panel B reports the results for total wage growth and we find consistent results.
Overall, the results using county-level QCEW data are largely supportive of our findings
using administrative employment data and NETS data.
2.5 Conclusion
The recent disruption in the retail sector is attributed to the rise of e-commerce. As of
2018Q3, e-commerce sales accounted for 9.1% of total retail sales in the U.S., compared
to 3.8% in 2010. We use the staggered rollout of a major e-commerce retailer’s FCs as a
proxy for local e-commerce presence. Using a payroll dataset for 2.6 million retail workers,
we find that the labor income of retail workers in counties with FCs, on average, decreases
by 2.4% after the establishment of FCs. Wages of hourly workers decrease significantly
by 2.5%, equivalent to $825. Most of the effect comes from a reduction in the number of
hours worked.
Further, using sales and employment data for 3.2 million stores, we find that retail stores
in counties with FCs experience a reduction in sales and employees. We find that for stores
in the top tercile based on sales one year before the FC, after the establishment of FCs in
their county, their sales decrease by almost 3.4%, which is equivalent to $200,389 per store.
14In our sample, i.e., during 2010-2016, an average county with fulfillment center employs 32,373 workers
in the retail sector, about 12,155 workers in transportation and warehousing, and nearly 28,589 workers in
restaurants and accommodation.
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For these stores, after the establishment of FCs in their county, their employment decreases
by almost 2.5%, which is equivalent to one worker per store for a store with an average
of 40 employees. Also, there is a decrease in entry and an increase in exits for stores in
the retail sector, with small and young retail stores exiting at a higher rate. We find that
the opening of FCs has no impact on the sales of a full-service restaurant, suggesting that
negative local economic shocks may not be driving our results.
Overall, our results highlight how the dramatic increase in e-commerce retail sales
can have adverse consequences for workers at traditional brick-and-mortar stores. At the
same time, our results should be interpreted carefully in light of the many benefits of e-
commerce. In this paper, we do not consider the impact of e-commerce on consumers, the
increase in employment by the e-commerce firm, or the e-commerce firm’s ecosystem and
the ancilliary benefits to the county. Further, we do not consider the long-term dynamics
of the labor market in the counties affected by the FCs nor do we consider the long-term
effects on the traditional brick-and-mortar retail workers who are affected by the establish-
ment of e-commerce FCs in the focal county. Given the limited scope of this paper, we
do not aim to quantify the aggregate effect of e-commerce on the retail sector. Our results
can only show that the growth of e-commerce has some adverse consequences for some
traditional brick-and-mortar retail workers, and they can provide one piece of evidence to
help fully quantify the impact of e-commerce.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SPEED OF INFORMATION AND THE SELL-SIDE RESEARCH
INDUSTRY
3.1 Introduction
Sell-side analysts play an important role as information providers in financial markets. For
the analyst and brokerage house, time is of utmost importance – the business model of sell-
side research is predicated on having the time to pitch clients on the information in their
recommendations.1
In recent years, the sell-side business model has been challenged by third-party finan-
cial technology firms that quickly leak research reports. Notably, Theflyonthewall.com
(FLY) quickly leaks a significant percentage of analysts’ recommendations before the mar-
ket open. A 2007 Wall Street Journal article citing Candace Browning, head of Global
Securities Research at Merrill Lynch, illustrates the issue. Browning describes a recom-
mendation upgrade by her firm that resulted in large stock price gains, but the firms’ clients
were not able to act quickly enough to profit from the recommendation. “What happened
was that within 60 seconds of releasing our opinion change, the same information was
being copied by a New Jersey-based digital financial news source.”
In this paper, we examine the importance of speed for the sell-side research industry
by examining the redistribution of recommendations by FLY. We focus on FLY for three
primary reasons. First, FLY was one of the first movers in redistributing analyst research
and they have a broad distribution network. Second, FLY was sued by three major brokers
and several of our empirical tests rely on key dates in the court case. Finally, FLY received
1For instance, brokers conduct daily morning meetings going over its best ideas and recommendation
changes from the night before. The sales staff will subsequently contact clients through messaging, calls, or
email to attract their attention to a recommendation hoping that the client will place a trade. See Barclay’s
Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com.
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substantial attention in the popular press, in legal commentary, and is mentioned anecdo-
tally in several academic studies (i.e., [82, 80, 3, 84]). Despite wide-spread attention, the
economic consequences of such third-party news aggregators are largely unknown.
Ex ante, it is not clear what impact speedy redistribution of analyst recommendations
has on the brokerage industry. Brokers invest heavily in their research departments to
provide their own paying clients access to research. If their research becomes a free good,
then this creates disincentives to produce it. However, if broker house clients have the
opportunity to act on the research first, and redistribution draws new attention and price
movement, then these third-party news aggregators may actually be beneficial to brokers.
In the context of [45], FLY could essentially allow a broker’s clients to trade against ‘dumb
money.’2
We have three main findings. First, FLY systematically leaks a meaningful number of
analyst recommendations. Over the 2009 to 2013 period, we find that 58.4% of the 83,950
recommendation revisions in Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database are leaked on FLY. The
median difference between FLY and I/B/E/S announcement times is only 27 minutes. [3]
demonstrate that there is delay between when I/B/E/S receives analyst recommendations
from brokers and when they are ‘activated’ and widely disseminated to third-party clients.
We show that FLY disseminates recommendation changes to its clients almost a full day
quicker, on average, compared to the Thomson Reuters’ activation time.
Second, we show that FLY speeds up the price adjustment process. After eliminating
confounding events, day 0 market reactions for leaked upgrades (downgrades) are 1.86%
(-2.06%) with subsequent price drift over days (+1, +4) of 0.11% (-0.50%). This compares
to corresponding non-leaked upgrades (downgrades) on day 0 of 0.33% (-0.48%) and drift
over days (+1, +4) of 0.77% (-1.05%). To further bolster our evidence, we focus on a subset
of recommendations where the I/B/E/S time stamp is released before the market open and
2In the context of the [45] model, as financial technology improves, the incentives to produce new in-
formation fall. In the case of FLY and other third-party news aggregators, traders may develop strategies to
profit from the recommendations that are distributed on these platforms with delay.
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FLY is released after 9:45 AM. This timing gap allows us to disentangle the market im-
pact of the recommendation from the subsequent FLY disclosure. Using 5-minute intraday
returns, we find an economically large and statistically significant 5-minute return in the
FLY release window. Specifically, we find that the 5-minute FLY return is approximately
1/3 (1/2) of the magnitude of the initial response to upgrades (downgrades). Thus, the re-
distribution of analyst recommendations to FLY subscribers, despite delayed by at least 15
minutes, has a large incremental impact on prices.
We next assess the influence of FLY on brokers’ ability to provide informational value
to their clients by examining the trade execution quality of recommending brokers. While
clients are not obligated to trade through the issuing broker, many do.3 Similar to [52], we
find evidence of improved trade execution quality for recommending brokers, but only for
non-leaked recommendations. Brokers do not improve execution quality for leaked rec-
ommendations. This provides compelling evidence that the increased speed of disclosure
eliminates benefits of trading through the issuing broker.
We use the court case of Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley against
Theflyonthewall.com to show that the increased speed of information disclosure has nega-
tively impacted the scope of the sell-side research industry. We analyze two key court dates
of the lawsuit. On March 18, 2010, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and
prohibited FLY from redistributing recommendations for the greater of 30 minutes after
the market open or 10:00am. We find that publicly-traded brokerage houses experienced
an abnormal return of 0.77% over the [0,+1]-window surrounding the court’s decision. On
June 20, 2011, however, the judgement of the lower court was reversed in the United States
Court of Appeals Second Circuit suggesting that FLY did not violate the misappropriation
doctrine. Upon this widely publicized announcement, we find that publicly-traded broker-
age houses experienced a statistically significant abnormal return of -1.33% over the [0,+1]
3[68] finds that analysts’ forecasts in general produce significant trading commissions for their broker.
Likewise, [67] finds analysts’ buy recommendations increase brokers’ trading volume in the recommended
firm whereas [69] finds that more optimistic and reputable analysts generate more trading commissions for
their firm.
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window.4 This translates into an aggregate wealth loss of nearly $11 billion for the sample
of publicly-traded brokerage firms. The results are stronger for brokers that have higher
leak rates and for brokers that derive a greater proportion of their revenues from commis-
sion business. Given that FLY’s leakage of recommendations affects the recommending
broker’s ability to add informational value to their clients, we examine the impact on the
scope of the industry. Around the June 20, 2011 reversal decision, we find a precipitous
drop in both the number of analysts employed by brokerage houses and the total number of
firms covered.
Overall, our evidence suggests that by increasing the speed by which recommendations
are distributed, FLY has negatively impacted the scope of the sell-side research industry.
While leaked recommendations facilitate price discovery, rapid price discovery makes it
harder for brokerage clients to take advantage of the gains created by their recommenda-
tions. These results are consistent with the theoretical models of [57, 41, 104] and con-
tribute to an emerging literature on the proliferation of big data in capital markets and
how financial technology impacts firms’ information environment ([56, 43, 44, 107]). Our
empirical results tie to [45]’s model, which suggests that financial technology boosts infor-
mation processing efficiency, but simultaneously reduces incentives to produce information
pertaining to fundamentals.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the literature on speed
in financial markets and describes the court case of FLY vs. several major brokers. 3.3
presents the data and provides empirical evidence on leakage rates, market responses to
recommendations, and broker execution quality. Section 3.4 analyzes the impact of the
court case. Section 3.5 presents concluding comments and discusses implications for the
sell-side research industry.
4For instance, see https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/wall-street-banks-lose-ruling-on-research/.
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3.2 Theflyonthewall and the Speed of Disclosure
3.2.1 Speed and Analysts in Financial Markets
The digital age has revolutionized financial markets. From high frequency trading to the
use of big data to crowdsourced financial technology platforms, the way in which investors
gather and process information has witnessed a remarkable change in just the past two
decades. Ultimately, the digital economy has reduced information acquisition costs and
increased speed, but the question of whether this has increased price efficiency is open for
debate ([45]). An emerging literature is focused on how financial technology and speed
has impacted price discovery from order flow ([24, 15, 47]). For instance, investors are
willing to pay considerable sums for real-time access to consumer sales data and/or satellite
imagery of retail firms parking lots ([48, 107]) or crowdsourced investment platforms ([70,
56]).
Speed is of critical importance for the business model of sell-side research. Brokers
rely on speed to get information to their clients so they have an opportunity to act before
non-clients free-ride on that information. [3] demonstrate the importance of speed for sell-
side research. They exploit ‘activation delay’–the delay in processing time between when
the recommendation is received in the I/B/E/S system (announcement time) and when it
is distributed and disseminated to clients on the platform (activation time). Delays are
associated with price inefficiencies: price reactions are muted and post-recommendation
drift is observable. The introduction of financial technology firms that redistribute analysts’
recommendations has the potential to increase speed to market participants. On one hand,
akin to [3] increased speed should facilitate price discovery. However, rapid disclosure
to non-clients potentially threatens the business model of sell-side research by creating
disincentives to produce information. In fact, several large brokers sued FLY for this very
reason. The lawsuit is discussed below.
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3.2.2 Lawsuit: Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley vs. Theflyonthewall.com
In June 2006, Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley sued Theflyonthewall
to prevent them from redistributing their recommendations. In the lawsuit, the brokers had
two claims. First, they claimed FLY violated copyright laws by taking excerpts directly
from their reports (this was easily settled). Second, and the most important and heavily
debated, they claimed FLY violated the hot news misappropriation doctrine. This tort pre-
vents the defendant from free-riding on time sensitive information.
The key issue in the case is the ability of the broker to communicate recommendations
to their clients with sufficient time for them to place a trade. If their recommendations are
redistributed before the market opens, the brokerage firms do not have sufficient time to
make their sales pitch to generate commissions.5 Note that while FLY was targeted in the
case, it is not the only news aggregator that redistributes research. As the court documents
illustrate, the outcome of the case would have major implications on other players with
similar business models.
“It bears noting that it does not matter to the Firms whether the unauthorized distribu-
tion is through a small internet company like Fly or through media giants like Bloomberg,
Thomson Reuters, or Dow Jones. The damage is caused not by the identity of the publisher,
but by the timely and systematic unauthorized redistribution of the Firms’ Recommenda-
tions, whatever the medium. To that end, through conference calls and face-to-face meet-
ings with mainstream media, the Firms have objected to the systematic publication of their
Recommendations. At least one mainstream publisher of financial news has represented
that it is watching this litigation against Fly closely and will adjust its practices based on
its evaluation of the outcome of this litigation. The Firms have also sent cease-and-desist
5For example, Sidoti & Company, a small boutique sell-side research company pulled their research from
the Bloomberg platform because they found the FLY would distribute their rating changes before the market
open, which is often sooner than they could convey this information to their own clients. “Sidoti’s fear
is that buy-side clients will value Sidoti’s research less, or they will be willing to pay less for it, because
their recommendations are available quite inexpensively over a service like the Fly.” http://www.integrity-
research.com/waiter-theres-a-fly-in-my-distribution-platfom/.
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letters to several of Fly’s competitors in the online newsfeed niche market.”
As we describe later, in March 2010, the District Court initially found in favor of the
plaintiffs. However, FLY quickly appealed and in June 2011, the decision was overturned.
We exploit this court- imposed variation to determine the wealth consequences of increased
speed on brokerage houses.6
3.3 Leaked Recommendations and Market Impact
3.3.1 Data Sources
We collect recommendation data from I/B/E/S from 2009 to 2013. We include only recom-
mendation upgrades and downgrades issued on U.S. firms and exclude recommendations
with an analyst code equal to zero. We assign each analyst into one of 24 GICS industry
groups based on the industry in which the analyst issued the largest fraction of his or her
recommendations. Several papers suggest that recommendations issued by all-star analysts
are significantly more informative than those issued by non-stars. Similar to [35], we obtain
all-star analyst data from Institutional Investor magazine.
We collect FLY data from LexisNexis from 2009 to 2013. We include only recommen-
dation upgrades and downgrades. For each observation, we capture the firm name and
ticker, time stamp, and the brokerage house issuing the recommendation. We merge this
data with our I/B/E/S sample.
Institutional trade data are obtained from Ancerno Solutions. This data source has
been used in a number of previous studies such as [52, 65, 66]. The data cover equity
transactions and include information on the stock traded, the direction of the trade (buy or
sell), the date of the transaction, the number of shares traded, the transaction price, and the
commission paid by the institution. We filter the Ancerno data to exclude non-U.S. stocks
6In overturning the verdict, the Court essentially ruled that recommendations were news and FLY was
free to report the news. As Judge Robert Sack wrote in the court’s opinions, “A firm’s ability to make
new–by issuing a recommendation is likely to affect the market price of a security–does not give rise
to a right for it to control who breaks that news and how.” The court documents can be found here:
https://www.eff.org/files/fotwopinion.pdf
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and transactions without information on either the broker or the stock symbol. We compile
data on the top 200 brokerage houses in terms of total dollar volume over the sample period.
These brokerage houses account for 98.5% of the total market share.
For our sample period, we find that the data from Ancerno captures 3.95% of trading
volume for the universe of CRSP listed stocks. This is similar to the findings in [66],
who find that the Ancerno data captures 4.68% of total market trading volume in 2010.
Appendix C.2 describes the key variables in our analysis.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of our recommendation sample from I/B/E/S along
with recommendations that were leaked on FLY. Of the 83,950 recommendation revisions
roughly half are upgrades and have an average announcement return of 2.3%. The corre-
sponding announcement return for downgrades is -2.5%. We find that 58.4% of recom-
mendations are leaked on FLY. [23] find that the majority of recommendations are released
during the pre-market. Conditional on FLY leaking the recommendation, 83.9% are re-
ported before the market opens. Consistent with prior studies, we find that approximately
20% of recommendations are confounded by other events.
[3] suggest that the activation time in I/B/E/S captures when the recommendation is
distributed widely to I/B/E/S clients. We analyze the difference between FLY and I/B/E/S
activation times relative to I/B/E/S announcement times. Similar to [3], Panel A of Ta-
ble 3.2 shows that there is considerable delay between I/B/E/S announcement times and
activation times. Not surprisingly, these differences are statistically significant each year.
Interestingly, the reporting delay on FLY has monotonically increased and more than dou-
bled (44 minutes to 98 minutes) throughout our 5-year sample. This is at least consistent
with the view that brokers’ efforts to plug leaks may have mitigated the speed in which
their recommendations end up on third-party platforms such as FLY. On the other hand,
I/B/E/S processing delay has declined over time.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for our sample of analyst recommendations over
the 2009 to 2013 period. # Recs is the number of recommendation revisions. % Upgrades
is the percentage of recommendation revisions that are upgrades. Upgrade (Downgrade)
return is the 2-day [0, 1] CAR around the revision announcement. % Disclosed on FLY is
the percentage of revisions that were leaked on Theflyonthewall.com. % FLY Recs released
pre-market is the percentage of Theflyonthewall.com recommendations that are released
before the market opens (i.e., 9:30am). % Recs Non-Confounded are the percentage of
recommendations that are not confounded by other news events. Analyst data are from
I/B/E/S and Theflyonthewall.com. Stock price data are from CRSP.
Year # Recs % Upgrades Upgrade Downgrade % Disclosed % FLY Recs % Recs
return return on FLY released Pre-market Non-Confounded
2009 18,809 49.03% 3.32% -3.39% 56.43% 82.98% 77.40%
2010 16,085 50.39% 2.10% -2.13% 61.04% 82.43% 80.55%
2011 17,997 48.78% 1.78% -1.97% 55.65% 84.08% 78.88%
2012 16,964 41.48% 1.77% -2.40% 55.99% 84.08% 79.32%
2013 14,095 42.66% 2.35% -2.54% 64.19% 85.98% 80.72%
Total 83,950 46.64% 2.30% -2.50% 58.36% 83.86% 79.27%
Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the distribution of time delay for FLY and I/B/E/S activation
times. Note that in 32% of cases FLY has a time stamp that precedes the I/B/E/S announce-
ment time stamp. This is consistent with the findings in [23] that the I/B/E/S announcement
time stamp is often delayed. FLY leaks approximately 26% recommendations within one
hour of the I/B/E/S announcement time. Thus, close to 60% of sample recommendations
either precede or occur within one hour of I/B/E/S announcement times. In comparison,
21% of sample recommendations are processed within one hour on the I/B/E/S platform.
The largest percentage of recommendations (25%) take more than 24 hours to be processed
and disseminated in I/B/E/S.
3.3.3 Which Recommendations Are Likely to Be leaked?
In this subsection, we examine the determinants of whether a recommendation is leaked
by FLY. We model the disclosure decision on FLY by including firm, bank, analyst, and
recommendation characteristics. We estimate both linear probability and logistic regression
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models in an effort to understand the determinants that FLY leaks a recommendation. The
linear probability model allows for the inclusion of fixed effects, which is likely important
in this context. We include analyst and day fixed effects. For the reader’s interest, we also
report results using the logistic model.
The dependent variable is equal to one if a recommendation is leaked on FLY and zero
otherwise. We include log market capitalization at time t-1 relative to the recommenda-
tion release date (SIZE) following [20], Tobin’s Q computed at the fiscal year end prior
to the recommendation (TOBIN Q) following [79], and the absolute value of past returns
([38]). Specifically, we use the abnormal return over the (-20,-1) window before the rec-
ommendation release date (RUNUP). We include a dummy variable to capture the recom-
mendation revision type (UPGRADE) and the magnitude of the revision change (REVI-
SION MAGNITUDE) based on I/B/E/Ss numerical scale. Following [100, 58] and others,
we capture if the analyst issuing the recommendation change is an all-star analyst in year
t based on Institutional Investor’s annual poll (ALL STAR), whether the brokerage house
is one of the banks named in the lawsuit (PLAINTIFF), log of the size of the brokerage
house based on the number of analysts employed (BROKER SIZE) following [36], a ne-
glected stock indicator (NEGLECTED) that takes the value one if the firm has less two
or fewer analysts covering the stock, and the natural logarithm of one plus the percentage
of shares held by institutional investors (INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP). Formally, our
model takes the form:
LEAK = β1SIZE + β2TOBIN Q+ β3RUNUP + β4UPGRADE
+ β5REV ISION MAGNITUDE + β6ALL STAR + β7PLAINTIFF
+ β8BROKER SIZE + β9NEGLECTED + β10INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
+ Analyst FE +Day FE + ε
(3.1)
Table 3.3 provides these results. Model 1 includes all firm, recommendation, and bro-
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kerage house characteristics, but no fixed effects. SIZE and TOBIN Q are statistically
significant indicating that the recommendations of smaller, growth firms are more likely to
be leaked. The coefficient on the recent stock price performance, RUNUP, is 0.09, which
implies that FLY is more likely to leak recommendations when there is more extreme stock
price performance before the recommendation date. The greater the revision magnitude,
the higher the probability that a recommendation will be leaked on FLY. Importantly, while
larger brokers appear to be leaked more frequently, plaintiff’s recommendations are sig-
nificantly more likely to be leaked. In economic terms, plaintiffs’ recommendations are
approximately 10% more likely to be leaked. Recommendations for neglected stocks are
less likely to be leaked.
Models 2-4 introduce analyst and day fixed effects. The results are similar across these
alternative specifications. In specification (4) with analyst and day fixed effects, all-star
analysts are 3% more likely to have their recommendations leaked by FLY. The coefficients
on PLAINTIFF and BROKER SIZE remain robust in these specifications. Specification
(5) reports estimates from a logit model. The results are similar to the linear probability
models reported in specifications (1) to (4).
3.3.4 Market Impact of Leaked Recommendations
In this section, we consider the market impact of leaked FLY recommendations. We use
standard market model methods to compute abnormal returns around recommendation re-
visions. The maximum estimation window is 255 days and ends 46 days before the rec-
ommendation release date. [81] and [23] acknowledge the need to control for confound-
ing events when analyzing recommendations because they often coincide with other news
events such as earnings announcements. We follow the criteria in [81] and eliminate rec-
ommendations occurring on earnings announcement days, days when multiple analysts
simultaneously issue recommendations on the same stock on the same day, and outlier
returns above/below the 5% tail.
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Panel A of Table 3.4 provides univariate results. For upgrades, pre-announcement re-
turns over (-20, -1) are negative, but are not significantly between recommendations leaked
on FLY and those that are not leaked. On day 0, however, we find large differences be-
tween leaked and non-leaked recommendations. For instance, leaked upgrades generate
an average market response of 1.86% compared to 0.33% for non-leaked upgrades. This
difference of almost 1.5% is highly significant. Interestingly, the Day +1 return for recom-
mendations not leaked on FLY generates a return of 0.64%, while leaked recommendations
display a corresponding return of 0.12%. The difference is also highly statistically signif-
icant. Most of the post-recommendation reaction is captured in day +1 as summing days
(+1, +4) reveals a similar pattern.
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Table 3.2: FLY Versus I/B/E/S Dissemination Delay
This table provides the delay in minutes relative to the I/B/E/S announcement times.
I/B/E/S Delay (FLY Delay) is the difference in minutes between the I/B/E/S activation
time stamp (FLY time stamp) relative to the I/B/E/S announcement time. Analyst data are
from I/B/E/S and Theflyonthewall.com. The sample includes only those observations for
which there is a FLY time stamp and I/B/E/S activation time stamp.
Panel A: Difference in Delay Between FLY and I/B/E/S
Year Fly Delay I/B/E/S Delay P-value diff
2009 44.83 1323.64 0.00
(11) (477) (0.00)
2010 64.92 1712.18 0.00
(19) (657) (0.00)
2011 72.25 1596.23 0.00
(21) (542) (0.00)
2012 84.04 1252.06 0.00
(34) (274) (0.00)
2013 97.52 1029.37 0.00
(64) (132) (0.00)
Overall 71.78 1389.55 0.00
(27) (419) (0.00)
Panel B: Delay Relative to I/B/E/S Announcement Time
Fly time I/B/E/S Activation time
Before I/B/E/S Announcement 32.27% 0.00%
0 to 1 hour 26.24% 21.09%
1 to 4 hours 17.34% 16.35%
4 to 8 hours 22.74% 15.24%
8 to 24 hours 1.41% 21.45%
Greater than 24 hours 0% 25.87%
Total 100.00% 100.00%
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Table 3.3: Probability That a Recommendation Gets Leaked
This table presents results from a linear probability model (Column 1-4) and a logistic
model (Column 5) where the dependent variable is binary and equal to one if a recom-
mendation gets leaked on Theflyonthewall.com and zero otherwise. See Appendix C.2 for
variable definitions. Analyst and day fixed effects are included in various models. Analyst
data are from I/B/E/S and Theflyonthewall.com. Stock price data are from CRSP. P-values
are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm Characteristics:
SIZE -0.03*** 0.00* -0.03*** -0.00 -0.11***
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00)
TOBIN Q 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
RUNUP 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.50***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rec Characteristics:
UPGRADE -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01** -0.00 -0.05***
(0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.39) (0.00)
REVISION MAGNITUDE 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.38***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Bank & Analyst Characteristics
ALL STAR -0.02** -0.01 0.01 0.03*** -0.09**
(0.04) (0.22) (0.17) (0.01) (0.04)
PLAINTIFF 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.47***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BROKER SIZE 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.09***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NEGLECTED -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.35***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.20***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Analyst FE X X
Day FE X X
Observations 76,187 75,483 76,124 75,418 76,187
Adj (Pseudo) R2 0.022 0.306 0.111 0.373 0.017
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Table 3.4: CARs Based on Leaked Versus Non-Leaked Recommendations
This table provides abnormal returns to recommendations based on whether recom-
mendation revisions are released on Theflyonthewall.com after removing confounding
events, which include recommendations occurring on earnings announcement days, days
when multiple analysts simultaneously issue recommendations on the same stocks, and
outlier returns above/below the 5% tail. Panel A provides recommendation CARs for all
non-counfounded observations and Panel B focuses on all-star analysts. Panel C provides
recommendations CARs after matching leaked and non-leaked recommendations by firm
characteristics used in Table 2 and analyst using coarsened exact matching (CEM). Panel D
provides recommendations CARs after matching leaked and non-leaked recommendations
on exact firm and analyst. See Appendix C.2 for variable definitions. Analyst data are from
I/B/E/S and Theflyonthewall.com. Stock price data are from CRSP. P-values are reported
in parentheses. *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
(-20, -1) 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 (+1,+4) (0,+4)
Panel A: Recommendation CARS
Upgrades:
Not Leaked -0.93%*** 0.33%*** 0.64%*** 0.05%*** 0.03% 0.04%* 0.77%*** 1.10%***
Leaked -0.82%*** 1.86%*** 0.12%*** 0.03%* 0.01% -0.05%*** 0.11%*** 1.97%***
p-value difference (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Downgrades:
Not Leaked 0.05% -0.48%*** -0.75%*** -0.19%*** -0.05%*** -0.05%** -1.05%*** -1.52%***
Leaked 0.48%*** -2.06%*** -0.23%*** -0.15%*** -0.05%*** -0.07%*** -0.50%*** -2.55%***
p-value difference (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.91) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B: Recommendation CARs for All-Star Analysts
Upgrades:
Not Leaked -0.93% 0.42%*** 1.47%*** 0.02 %-0.07% -0.11% 1.28%*** 1.70%***
Leaked -0.42% 2.30%*** 0.06% 0.00% -0.06% -0.05% -0.04% 2.27%***
p-value difference (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.94) (0.64) (0.00) (0.10)
Downgrades:
Not Leaked 0.29% -0.96%*** -1.86%*** -0.01% -0.05% 0.11% -1.86%*** -2.81%***
Leaked -1.11%** -2.58%*** -0.18%* -0.12% 0.08% -0.23%*** -0.46%*** -3.02%***
p-value difference (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.44) (0.01) (0.00) (0.53)
Panel C: Recommendation CARs After Exact Matching on Firm and Analyst
Upgrades:
Not Leaked -1.01%*** 0.39%*** 0.50%*** 0.17%*** 0.00% 0.03% 0.71%*** 1.11%***
Leaked -0.94%*** 1.68%*** 0.13%** 0.09%** -0.03% -0.10% 0.11% 1.79%***
p-value difference (0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.75) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
Downgrades:
Not Leaked -0.63%** -0.58%*** -0.76%*** -0.25%*** -0.07% -0.08% -1.14%*** -1.71%***
Leaked 0.31% -1.94%*** -0.32%*** -0.04% 0.00% -0.06% -0.41%*** -2.34%***
p-value difference (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00)
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We observe the same pattern when focusing on downgrades. A significant price drift
occurs for non-leaked downgrades. Downgrades leaked on FLY generate an initial Day 0
price reaction of -2.06% with a drift over the next four days of -0.50%. Downgrades that
are not leaked by FLY result in an announcement period return of -0.48% and a drift of -
1.05% over the next four days. Overall, these results suggest that leaked recommendations
appear to aid in price discovery. From the perspective of the brokerage industry, this evi-
dence is consistent with the claim that an increase in the speed of price discovery is likely
detrimental to their clients’ interests; faster price adjustments may prevent them from ben-
efiting from the stock price changes associated with the recommendations. These findings
are consistent with the results in [63] and [61] that information slowly diffuses into stock
prices, particularly when information is released to different parties with delay.
An alternative explanation for these market reaction results is that the FLY picks up
more important recommendations resulting in larger price reactions and rapid price discov-
ery. This is a legitimate concern as Table 3.3 shows that leaked recommendations are more
likely to come from more reputable brokers and all-star analysts. In Panel B, we report
results for all-star analysts. The results mirror the full sample evidence in both panels. For
instance, all-star upgrades and downgrades released on FLY have significantly larger mar-
ket reactions at time 0 compared to all-star recommendations not leaked on FLY. Leaked
recommendations have little corresponding post-recommendation drift whereas non-leaked
recommendations are associated with drift. In addition, the aggregate reaction over the (0,
+4)-day period are similar for recommendations leaked onFLY and the ones not leaked on
FLY, mitigating the concern that the immediate response to recommendations leaked on
FLY is due to their salient information.7 Thus, while systematic differences in what rec-
ommendations FLY chooses to leak is unlikely to explain the differences between leaked
versus non-leaked market reactions, some caution is warranted in interpreting the evidence
as such.
7We also find that the same pattern emerges for recommendations from reputable banks. We define top
brokers as those that are in the top 10% in terms of number of analysts employed in a given year.
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In Panel C, we compare the stock price reaction to leaked and non-leaked recommen-
dations after requiring an exact match on firm and analyst. For example, we compare the
market reaction to upgrade recommendations for analyst John S. at Goldman Sachs on
Walmart that was leaked on FLY to his upgrade on Walmart that wasnt leaked on FLY on
different dates. For both upgrades and downgrades, we see significantly larger Day 0 price
reaction for leaked recommendations. The price drift for recommendations not released
on FLY is significantly larger than those that are leaked. The economic magnitudes are
roughly similar across all specifications.
Despite matching on firm and analyst, we cannot be certain that FLY releases recom-
mendations from John S. that are more interesting and will deliver greater market returns.
Nonetheless, the result survives a number of matching controls that suggests leaked recom-
mendations on FLY facilitate price discovery. These results are consistent with the empiri-
cal findings in [107] and [56] that FinTech companies are improving price informativeness
by decreasing the costs of information acquisition.
3.3.5 Intraday Price Discovery Around FLY Announcements
In this section, we provide additional evidence that FLY announcements facilitate price
discovery. We focus on the subset of recommendations where the I/B/E/S time stamp pre-
cedes the market open (i.e., before 9:30am) and FLY releases the recommendation during
market hours (after the 9:30am open). We identify 823 upgrades and 988 downgrades that
meet this criteria.
Table 3.5, Panel A shows the distribution of this subset of recommendations. Condi-
tional on the FLY time stamp occurring after the market open, most occur very early in the
trading day. For instance, approximately 45% (46%) of upgrades (downgrades) are leaked
between 9:30 and 9:35, while 18.71% (15.89%) of upgrades (downgrades) are released
between 9:35 and 9:40.
Table 3.5 Panel B examines intraday returns surrounding recommendation releases on
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FLY. In order to disentangle the price effects of FLY from the initial price reaction to the
recommendation at the market open, we require that the FLY time stamp be after 9:45am.
This minimum 15-minute time gap should allow for a clean identification of any incremen-
tal impact from the FLY release. This particular test has the added benefit that it should
help ease selection concerns.
The overnight return (4pm to 9:30am) to I/B/E/S pre-market recommendation upgrades
(downgrades) is a statically significant 1.22% (-0.81%), both of which are similar in mag-
nitude to the overnight returns documented in [23]. The 9:30am to 9:35am return to rec-
ommendation upgrades is an insignificant 0.03%, while the corresponding return to down-
grades is a statistically significant -0.39%.
Five-minute returns around the FLY time stamp suggests that FLY indeed aids in the
price discovery process. Recommendation upgrades (downgrades) generate a statistically
significant return of 0.36% (-0.37%) in the five minute window containing the FLY time
stamp. These returns are large compared to the initial price reactions for upgrades and
downgrades (1/3 and 1/2 of the initial market reaction, respectively). There is minimal
drift over the five minute windows from +1 to +5 for both upgrades and downgrades. This
evidence suggests that FLY disclosure provides an incremental market reaction as the in-
formation becomes more broadly diffused to market participants.
As a final test of the price reaction to leaked recommendations, we focus on the stock
price reaction around the I/B/E/S activation date. As discussed previously, [3] suggest that
the activation time corresponds to when forecasts are widely distributed to I/B/E/S clients.
As in Table 3.4, we filter out confounded recommendations and require that the activation
date occur at least one trading day after the announcement of the recommendation. Sim-
ilar to [3], we observe a statistically significant stock price reaction on the activation date
for both recommendation upgrades and downgrades. Upgrades (downgrades) generate a
0.46% (-0.57%) abnormal return.
If FLY speeds up the price adjustment process, then we should see a smaller return
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on the activation date for leaked recommendations than for non-leaked recommendations.
We find that this is the case. For recommendation downgrades, leaked recommendations
generate a -0.21% return on the activation date versus -0.81% for non-leaked recommen-
dations. The difference is both economically and statistically significant. We find a similar
result for upgrades. Leaked upgrades generate a 0.12% return on the activation date, while
non-leaked upgrades generate a 0.70% return. Note that even for leaked recommendations,
the activation return is statistically significant suggesting that there is still incremental in-
formation in these recommendations.
3.3.6 Execution Quality
In this section, we explore whether the early release of recommendations of FLY impacts
the price improvement provided by brokerage houses. [52] examine institutional trading
around recommendation revisions and find that clients trading through the recommending
broker receive a price that is significantly better than trades through non-recommending
brokers. They argue that this is a particularly powerful test of the informational advan-
tage of being a client of the broker since trades routed through the broker, by definition,
identifies clients.
We replicate the analysis in [52] using our sample of recommendations. This analysis
is reported in Table 3.7. We require that more than 30 trades are executed on the recom-
mended stock day. Panel A reports the number of trades, price improvement relative to
the value-weighted average price (VWAP), price improvement relative to the close price,
average share and dollar volume, and the corresponding market share.
We find non-issuing and issuing brokers do not provide price improvement relative to
VWAP, but issuing brokers provide about 1.4 cents per share improvement from the close
price relative to non-issuing brokers (4.33 cents versus 2.91 cents).
While the above results are consistent with [52], they suggest that commissions and
price improvement surrounding recommendations has dropped significantly. For example,
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[52] also find significant price improvement relative to VWAP and Close of 4.4 cents and
10.2 cents, respectively. We find no price improvement relative to VWAP and our reported
price improvement relative to close is significantly smaller. This suggests that the value of
being a long-term client of a full-service broker has declined.
More importantly, in Panel B of Table 3.7, we compare the price improvement for the
sample of trades placed with the recommending broker for leaked versus non-leaked rec-
ommendations. In this case, we find significant price improvement for non-leaked recom-
mendations relative to leaked ones for both the VWAP and close price. The spread is 4.57
cents and 2.46 cents, respectively. Consistent with the market reaction results, brokers’
clients also benefit when recommendations are not leaked in terms of execution quality.
This is not the case for their leaked recommendations. This suggests that the increased dis-
closure speed by recommendations leaked on FLY hampers the ability of brokers to offer
price improvement.
In Panel C we perform coarsened exact matching on various characteristics related to
trade complexity. Specifically, we match on: share (dollar) volume of the trade; and share
(dollar) volume of the trade relative to the total day’s trading volume. The results are
robustbrokers can offer significantly more price improvement on non-leaked recommenda-
tions.
3.4 Impact of Court Case on Brokers and Analysts
In this section, we use the court case of Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stan-
ley against Theflyonthewall.com to examine the impact of the speed of information dissem-
ination on the sell-side research industry. We analyze two key court dates of the lawsuit.
On March 18, 2010, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and concluded that
FLY committed copyright infringement and misappropriation of hot news. In addition to
monetary penalties, a permanent injunction was issued prohibiting FLY from redistribut-
ing recommendations for the greater of 30 minutes after the market open or 10:00am. On
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June 20, 2011, however, the judgement of the lower court was reversed in the United States
Court of Appeals Second Circuit. Section 3.4.1 presents event study results for brokers
around key court dates. Section 3.4.2 investigates the impact on the scope of the research
industry.
3.4.1 Event Study
We begin our analysis of the impact of the court case to brokers by examining the market
reactions of banks around the initial lower court ruling and the subsequent Court of Appeals
ruling. We identify a sample of 28 publicly-traded brokerage houses that produce sell-side
research. We then employ standard event study methods and estimate equally-weighted ab-
normal returns for various windows. Like with recommendations, the maximum estimation
window is 255 days and ends 46 days before the recommendation release date. Following
[85], we compare announcement period returns to a control sample of Broker/Dealers (SIC
code 6211) that do not produce sell-side research. The results are presented in Table 3.8,
Panel A.
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Table 3.5: Intraday Returns Around FLY Announcements
This table focuses on the subset of recommendations where the I/B/E/S timestamp occurs
before the market open (9:30am) and the FLY time stamp is after the market open.
Intraday trade data is obtained from TAQ. We require that sample firms have sufficient
liquidity to calculate 5-minute returns. Panel A reports the timing of FLY announcements
that occur after the market opens. Panel B computes 5-minute returns surrounding the
recommendation announcement on FLY. We only include FLY announcements that occur
on or after 9:45, so that we can separately identify the I/B/E/S announcement effect and
FLY announcement effect. We report results separately for upgrades and downgrades.
*,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Distribution of FLY Announcements After the Market Opens
Time Window Upgrades Downgrades
9:30 to 9:35 44.71% 46.26%
9:35 to 9:40 18.71% 15.89%
9:40 to 9:45 6.93% 8.91%
9:45 to 9:50 4.25% 4.25%
9:50 to 9:55 1.82% 2.33%
9:55 to 10:00 1.58% 2.63%
10:00 to 4:00 22.00% 19.73%
# of observations 823 988
Panel B: Five Minute Returns Surrounding FLY Release Times
Time Window Upgrades Downgrades
4:30 to 9:30 1.22%*** -0.81%***
9:30 to 9:35 0.03% -0.39%***









Table 3.6: Announcement Period Returns Surrounding the I/B/E/S Activation Times
This table focuses on announcement period returns surrounding the I/B/E/S activation time,
when [3] argue the recommendation is distributed widely to I/B/E/S clients. We examine
abnormal returns on the activation date based on whether the recommendation revisions
are released on Theflyonthewall.com. We remove confounding events, which include rec-
ommendations occurring on earnings announcement days, days when multiple analysts si-
multaneously issue recommendations on the same stocks, and outlier returns above/below
the 5% tail. We also require that the recommendation announcement date and the activa-
tion date be different. We report results separately for upgrades and downgrades. *,**,***
indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.












Table 3.7: Price Improvement for Brokerage Houses Around Recommendation Releases
This table examines price improvement and brokerage commissions for recommendations
issued between 2009 and 2013. Institutional trade data are obtained from Ancerno for
the day the recommendation was released. We restrict the sample to recommendation days
with more than 30 trades. VWAP is the volume-weighted average price. Price Improvement
relative to Close (cents) is the execution price relative to the close on the day of trading.
We calculate price improvement using buy (sell) orders for upgrades (downgrades). Share
volume is the number of shares transacted per trade. Dollar volume is the transaction price
multiplied by share volume. Share volume market share is share volume divided by the
daily total volume. Dollar volume market share is dollar volume divided by the daily total
dollar volume. *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A. Issuing Versus Non-Issuing Brokerage House
Non-issuing Issuing Diff
# of trades 998,062 26,111
Price improvement relative to VWAP (cents) -1.35 -1.03 -0.32
Price improvement relative to Close (cents) 2.91 4.33 -1.42***
Share volume 4,577 5,460 -884***
Dollar volume ($) 152,683 167,925 -15,243**
Share volume (%) 0.08 0.12 -0.04***
Dollar volume (%) 0.08 0.12 -0.04***
Panel B: Issuing Brokerage House Price Improvement: Leaked vs. Not Leaked
Not leaked Leaked Diff
# of trades 4,821 21,290
Price improvement relative to VWAP (cents) 2.69 -1.88 4.57***
Price improvement relative to Close (cents) 6.34 3.88 2.46***
Share volume 5,487 5,454 33
Dollar volume ($) 165,296 168,520 -3,224
Share volume (%) 0.11 0.13 -0.02
Dollar volume (%) 0.11 0.12 0.01
Panel C: Issuing Brokerage House Price Improvement: Leaked vs. Not Leaked (CEM on
Volume, Dollar Volume, Share Volume Market Share, and Dollar Volume Market Share)
Not leaked Leaked Diff
# of trades 4,809 4,809
Price improvement relative to VWAP (cents) 2.73 -1.29 4.02***
Price improvement relative to Close (cents) 6.41 4.3 2.11**
Share volume 4,902 4,185 718**
Dollar volume ($) 142,351 127,806 14,545
Share volume (%) 0.10 0.10 0
Dollar volume (%) 0.10 0.10 0
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Table 3.8: Wealth Effects for Brokers Around Key Lawsuit Dates
This table shows market model abnormal returns around key dates in the Barclays, Inc.
v. Theflyonthewall.com lawsuit. Equal-weighted returns are presented. Dollar abnormal
returns are calculated by multiplying the brokerage houses market capitalization from day
-1 by the CAR over the [0,+1] window. Panel A presents average abnormal returns for the
full sample of publicly-traded brokerages. High leak rate corresponds to those brokerage
houses with above median leak rates in 2009. High commissions correspond to those bro-
kerage houses with above median ratios of commission revenue to total revenue in 2009.
Panel B presents results for individual brokerages. Stock price data are from CRSP. Infer-
ence is based on a bootstrapped p-value. *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Full Sample CARs
March 18, 2010 June 20, 2011
(0, +1) CAR %Positive (0, +1) CAR % Positive
All brokerage houses 0.77%* 71.43% -1.33%*** 28.57%
Control Sample 0.23% -0.26%
Difference 0.54% -1.07%**
High leak rate 1.14%** 85.71% -1.44%*** 21.43%
Low leak rate 0.40% 57.14% -1.21%*** 35.71%
Difference 0.74% -0.21%
High commissions 1.40%* 71.43% -1.51*** 21.43%
Low commissions 0.14% 71.43% -1.17*** 35.71%
Difference 1.26% -0.34
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Panel B: Individual Brokerages
March 18, 2010 June 20, 2011
Plaintiffs: Leak Rate 2009 CAR (0,+1) Value Created CAR(0,+1) Value Created
MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WIT 69.85% 0.30% 124.12 -2.38% -839.99
BARCLAYS PLC 82.80% 1.85% 1200.04 -1.44% -732.57
BANK OF AMERICA CORP 52.05% 1.14% 1972.5 -1.00% -1085.96
Other Brokerage Houses:
THOMAS WEISEL PARTNERS 39.72% 3.63% 4.58 NA NA
LADENBURG THALMANN FIN 71.74% 4.89% 8.37 -0.95% -2.19
RODMAN & RENSHAW CAP GRP 54.12% -2.41% -3.71 -2.98% -1.38
MERRIMAN CURHAN FORD 56.98% 7.10% 0.80 -2.21% -0.15
J M P GROUP INC 53.85% -2.20% -4.20 -0.45% -0.59
F B R CAPITAL MARKETS C 87.60% 2.16% 6.87 1.19% 2.61
OPPENHEIMER HOLDINGS IN 62.28% -0.81% -2.78 -2.67% -9.55
BGC PARTNERS 92.86% -4.37% -15.22 -2.05% -13.60
COWEN GROUP 46.43% 0.80% 3.31 0.67% 1.84
EVERCORE PARTNERS INC A 36.73% -2.56% -14.62 -3.44% -24.13
PIPER JAFFRAY COMPANIES 64.27% -1.72% -15.57 -3.26% -18.44
K B W INC 88.54% 1.46% 13.54 -4.86% -35.52
STIFEL FINANCIAL CORP 79.53% 1.78% 30.58 1.47% 27.55
ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN HOLDINGS 31.82% -1.13% -34.32 0.33% 6.58
LAZARD LTD A 88.35% 1.08% 37.01 0.87% 38.34
RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL 83.30% 2.06% 71.38 -0.19% -7.83
JEFFERIES GROUP INC NEW 36.18% -1.98% -91.76 -2.30% -97.31
SUNTRUST BANKS INC 85.62% 0.38% 53.14 -4.09% -574.38
DEUTSCHE BANK A G 41.16% 0.13% 61.31 0.30% 159.95
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP 63.02% 0.99% 658.46 0.05% 16.56
ROYAL BANK OF CANDA 76.06% 0.97% 816.70 -0.48% -363.38
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 47.67% 2.52% 2289.40 -2.37% -1681.41
CITIGROUP INC 30.57% 0.37% 421.14 0.27% 295.38
WELLS FARGO & CO 73.31% 3.10% 4905.57 -2.03% -2941.11
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 82.99% 2.02% 3523.03 -1.91% -3100.06
Focusing on the March 18, 2010 announcement date, the initial court verdict produces
a positive equally-weighted return of 0.77%. This announcement period return is signif-
icant at the 10% level, but not statistically different from the control sample’s return of
0.23%. When we examine brokers with a high leak rate (above the median), we find that
they experience significantly higher CARs compared to brokers with a low leak rate (i.e.,
1.14% versus 0.40%, respectively). However, the difference is not statistically significant.
We collect the proportion of revenue brokers derive from trading commissions from their
2009 10-K annual filings. Brokers with high commissions as a percent of revenue (based
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on medians) experience larger, announcement period returns than low commission firms.
However, the difference is again not statistically significant.
On the announcement date of the 2nd Court of Appeals reversal on June 20, 2011, banks
experience a statistically significant abnormal return of -1.33%. This return is statistically
different from zero and from a control sample of broker/dealers without research divisions
and economically meaningful.
Table 3.8 of Panel B reports abnormal returns by individual banks. The three plaintiffs
in the lawsuit are noticeably impacted by the court rulings. Bank of America, Morgan
Stanley, and Barclays experienced a cumulative dollar gain on the initial verdict of more
than $3 billion. Similarly, their market values fell by over $2.5 billion after the Appeal’s
court ruling. Panel B also highlights significant spillover effects. Brokerage houses not
directly involved in the lawsuit are also impacted by the court ruling. In aggregate, banks
lost close to $11 billion around the June 20th, 2011 decision.
We interpret the results from this section to indicate that the court rulings had an eco-
nomically meaningful impact on the sell-side analyst research industry. An alternative
explanation is that the market is predicting how regulators will treat firms operating in the
financial services industry in future dealings. However, we do not believe this is a valid ex-
planation. If the market’s reaction signaled a future unfavorable legal environment for the
financial services industry we would expect that broker-dealers without research divisions
would be equally impacted by the court case. As we demonstrate, this is not the case.8
8We also estimate a difference-in-difference regression where we examine dollar trading volume and
commissions in the 3- and 6-month period following the court case. These regressions are estimated at the
broker-month and include broker and month fixed effects. We find trading volume and commissions decline
by an economically and statistically significant amount, which is consistent with the view that brokers lost
trading revenue following the court’s verdict. We could also examine client-broker switching around the
court case. That is, we could identify clients of large brokers with research divisions before the court verdict
and examine if they significantly changed their routing of trades to discount brokers after the final verdict.
Unfortunately, Ancerno stopped providing client identifiers in 2010 so we are unable to perform this test.
132
3.4.2 Impact on the Scope of the Sell-Side Industry
In this section, we examine if the lawsuit also impacted the scope of the sell-side industry.
We follow an approach similar to [87], who examine how the analyst industry has evolved
through time. They find that having more analysts in an industry facilities information
flow and price discovery resulting in more efficient markets.9 They also find that following
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), the number of analysts in the industry has dropped,
consistent with the view that this regulation diminished the value of their services. While
the FLY case is fundamentally different than regulations specifically targeted at curbing
analyst behavior, we would expect that a natural reaction to the ruling would be a decline in
the number of analysts and the number of stocks that receive analyst coverage, particularly
by larger brokers. Consequently, a reduction in competition would ensue along with the
quality of the information environment.
To examine the impact of the court ruling on the scope of the industry, we generally
follow the framework of [87]. As a first step, we classify each analyst into one of 24
GICS industries. For each industry and each month, we define an entering analyst as an
analyst who issues her first recommendation or an analyst who issues a recommendation
after not doing so for a period of twelve months. An exiting analyst is one who issued
her last recommendation in the month or does not issue a recommendation over the next
twelve months. Changes in the number of analysts are calculated as the difference between
entering and exiting analysts. The total number of analysts employed in a given industry
during a particular month is simply the running total based on these changes and the prior
level. In sum, the output of the above process is the number of active analysts within an
industry-month.
To understand the determinants of the scope of the sell-side research industry, we es-
timate regressions similar to [87]. The sample period runs from 2009 to 2013. The de-
9[33] show that hedge funds increase information production around exogenous losses of analyst cov-
erage. In this sense, sophisticated investors act as a substitute in generating information and step in when
analysts drop out.
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pendent variables are the change in the number of stocks covered and the change in the
number of analysts in the industry each month. Included in the model are the monthly
portfolio median industry return (MEDIAN INDUSTRY RETURN); the monthly number
of IPOs in each industry (# OF IPOS); the number of monthly delistings in each industry
(# OF DELISTINGS); the monthly change in industry trading volume (∆ TRADING VOLUME);
and an indicator variable representing the 18-month period after the appellate court’s ruling
(POST 2ND COURT OF APPEALS RULING).10 Month fixed effects and industry fixed
effects are included in the regressions. Inference is based on robust standard errors. The
model takes the following form:
∆ ANALY STSt+1 = β1MEDIAN INDUSTRY RETURN + β2# OF IPOS
+ β3# OF DELISTINGS + β4∆ TRADING V OLUME
+ β5POST 2
ND COURT OF APPEALS RULING+Month FE + Industry FE + ε
(3.2)
Table 3.9 presents the results. We estimate the full sample of brokers and separately
estimate the effect for large brokers. Focusing on the ‘All Brokers’ ∆ ANALYSTS col-
umn, the coefficient on the post-ruling period is negative and significant. This is consistent
with the view that the brokerage industry reacted to the ruling by trimming the number of
analysts they employ. None of the other variables in the model are significant. [87] find
that the number of IPOs and change in trading volume are positively related to the size
of the analyst industry, but we do not. This is likely because our sample period is much
smaller than theirs (2009-2013), as our focus is to estimate the impact of the court ruling
as opposed to describe the evolution of the analyst industry.
In the second model, we estimate equation 2, but substitute the number of stocks cov-
ered as the dependent variable. We find that the number of stocks covered is negatively
10We obtain similar results if the indicator variable is defined using a 12- or 24-month period after the
appellate courts ruling.
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Table 3.9: Changes in Analyst Scope
This table presents regression results examining the scope of the analyst industry. The
time period is from 2009 to 2013 and the unit of observation is at the month-industry level.
The dependent variables are the monthly change in analysts and change in the number of
stocks covered within a GICS industry group. The median industry return is the median
monthly return in the industry group in month t. The number of IPOs and delistings are
the number of IPOs filed and firms delisted in month t, respectively. Change in trading
volume is the change in industry trading volume from month t-1 to t. The post 2nd Court
of Appeals ruling is an indicator variable for the 18-month time period after June 20,
2011. Industry fixed-effects are included to account for time invariant differences in
analyst following across industries. We also include 11 calendar month fixed effects (i.e.,
February, March, etc.), to account for seasonal differences in the scope of the sell-side
research industry. Large brokers are the 20 largest brokers by number of recommendations
issued over the 2009 to 2013 time period. P-values are reported in parentheses. *,**,***
indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
All Brokers Large Brokers
∆ ANALYSTSt+1 ∆ STOCKS COVEREDt+1 ∆ ANALYSTSt+1 ∆ STOCKS COVEREDt+1
MEDIAN INDUSTRY RETURN -0.01 -0.15*** -0.04** -0.14***
(0.77) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
# OF IPOS -0.00 2.74** 0.63 1.66*
(0.99) (0.03) (0.24) (0.09)
# OF DELISTINGS 0.25 -0.65* 0.02 -0.58*
(0.41) (0.09) (0.91) (0.07)
∆ TRADING VOLUME -0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.08
(0.93) (0.84) (0.84) (0.83)
POST 2ND COURT OF APPEALS RULING -0.64*** -0.70*** -0.40*** -1.06***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Month FE X X X X
Industry FE X X X X
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,508 1,508
Adj R2 0.54 0.15 0.35 0.09
related to the industry return and positively related to the number of IPOs in the industry.
The latter result is consistent with results in [87]. Most importantly, we find that the number
of stocks covered declines after the court ruling. We separate large brokers in the last two
models. In general, the results are similar. In terms of the number of analysts employed
and the number of stocks covered, both significantly decline after the appeals decision.
We also consider the impact of the court case on analyst effort. The previous results
suggest that brokers, particularly large brokers, reduce the number of analysts and stocks
they cover following the lawsuit. It is not clear however if the remaining analysts have
to increase their workload and pick up coverage on at least some of the firms that were
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dropped as a result of analyst departures.
We focus on analysts that were active in the year before/year after the June 20th, 2011
court verdict. We calculate five proxies for analyst effort: number of stocks covered;
number of recommendations issued; number of annual earnings forecasts issued; number
of quarterly earnings forecasts issued; and number of long-term growth forecasts issued.
These results are presented in table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Changes in Analyst Effort
This table examines changes in analyst effort in the year after the June 20th, 2011 court
verdict in favor of FLY. For analysts covering three or more stocks in the year prior to
the court verdict, we calculate five measures of effort: (1) number of stocks covered;
(2) number of recommendations issued; (3) number of annual earnings forecasts issued;
(4) number of quarterly earnings forecasts issued; and (5) number of long-term growth
forecasts issued. These measures are calculated at the analyst level. P-values from a paired
t-test are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
Effort Proxy Obs Pre Post Diff
Number of stocks covered 2,257 8.15 7.97 -0.18
(0.10)
Number of recommendations issued 2,257 26.77 26.84 0.07
(0.89)
Number of annual earnings forecasts issued 2,257 65.26 69.01 3.75***
(0.00)
Number of quarterly earnings forecasts issued 2,257 56.45 59.32 2.87***
(0.01)
Number of long-term growth forecasts issued 2,257 5.67 6.41 0.74***
(0.01)
We find no evidence that analysts increased the number of stocks covered in the year
after the June 20th, 2011 court ruling. There is also no evidence that analysts issued more
recommendations following the court ruling. We do find a statistically significant increase
in the number of annual, quarterly, and growth forecasts issued in the year following the
June 20th, 2011 court ruling. Thus, there is some evidence that analysts increased effort on
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generating earnings forecasts.
Collectively, the results from these tests indicate that the number of stocks receiving
coverage declines, but that the average analyst did not increase coverage following the
Appeals Court Ruling. We find some evidence that analysts increase their production of
earnings forecasts (annual, quarterly, and long-term growth forecasts), but do not produce
more recommendations.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the impact of an increase in the speed of recommendation dissem-
ination on the sell-side research industry. Our primary results are as follows. Leaking rec-
ommendations on FLY facilitates price discovery. Recommendation upgrades and down-
grades not leaked on FLY experience a statistically significant and economically meaning-
ful drift in the (+1,+4) window following the release of the recommendation. While FLY’s
leaking of recommendations improved price discovery, the practice had a negative impact
on the price improvement offered by brokerage houses to clients. Thus, we find direct ev-
idence that the ability of FLY to quickly disseminate recommendations has disrupted the
business model of sell-side research. Consistent with such disruption, we observe a de-
crease in the number of analysts employed and the number of stocks covered. An analysis
of announcement period returns surrounding the court case suggests that publicly traded
brokerage houses experienced an aggregate wealth loss in excess of $10 billion.
Our paper has important implications for the future of analyst research. The real eco-
nomic consequences from the speedy dissemination of analyst research are large. As noted,
in aggregate we estimate over $10 billion in market value is destroyed. This is likely a
lower bound on losses. Many brokerages are private entities, and consequently, we cannot
estimate the wealth impact of the court’s decision for these firms.
Given the speed with which recommendations are distributed by third party sources, we
expect either that brokers will continue to scale down their research divisions or devise a
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different platform to protect the speed advantage. Brokerage houses are likely to substitute
towards broker-hosted investor conferences as in [55] or engage in other concierge and
high-touch services for their clients as opposed to generating research reports. These types
of research services mitigate the speed issue as private meetings are not easily substituted.
The increasing speed of disclosure also impacts how much brokers can charge buy-side
clients. This is a key concern given the new Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID II) regulations that require the separation of analyst research from brokerage com-
missions for European firms. Coupling the devaluation of research with these new regula-
tions forcing the unbundling of commissions and research will undoubtedly have a major





APPENDIX FOR “IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL FLOWS ON INCUMBENT
FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM 70 MILLION WORKERS”
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53 - transportation and material moving
51 - production
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43 - office & administrative support
41 - sales & related
39 - personal care & service
37 - building & grounds cleaning & maintenance
35 - food preparation & service related
33 - protective service
31 - healthcare support
29 - healthcare practitioners & technical
27 - arts, design, entertainment, sports, & media
25 - education, training, & library
23 - legal
21 - community & social service
19 - life, physical, & social science
17 - architecture & engineering
15 - computer & mathematical
13 - business & financial operations
11 - management
Sample OES
Figure A.1: Occupation Distribution
The figure presents the occupation distribution of the work-level data in the sample and the
occupation distribution of the 2017 BLS OES data.
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Figure A.2: Industry Distribution
The figure presents the industry distribution of the work-level data in the sample and the
industry distribution of the June 2018 BLS data.
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Figure A.3: Distributional Effects of VC Investments on Wages of Incumbent Establish-
ments: Alternative Specification
The figure presents distribution effects of VC investments on wages of incumbent
establishments using Equation 1.2 by using log changes in wage percentiles (in percentage
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Figure A.4: Dynamic Effect of 2014 VC Boom
The figure presents the dynamic effect on wages of incumbent establishments around the
2014 VC boom.
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Table A.1: Effect of VC on the Wage Dispersion of Incumbent Establishments
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the effect of
VC investments on the wage dispersion using Equations 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. The dependent
variable is the dollar change in the gap between the 90th percentile of high-skilled
workers’ wages and the 10th percentile of low-skilled workers’ wages. VCPerCapita
(in thousands of dollars) is the dollar value of VC investments in a CZ scaled by
the population in 2000. The regressions include establishments in CZs that received
any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆(P90 HighSkilled - P10 LowSkilled)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCPerCapita 859*** 662*** 815*** 634*** 492***
(143) (162) (187) (164) (167)
Establishment FE X X X X X
Year FE X
Industry × Year FE X
State × Year FE X
Industry × State × Year FE X
Firm × Year FE X
Observations 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032
R-squared 0.112 0.150 0.113 0.217 0.448
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Table A.2: IV Estimation
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the effect
of VC investments on the wages of high-skilled workers at incumbent establishments
using the instrumental variable approach. The dependent variable is the dollar change
in the 90th percentile of high-skilled workers’ wages. VCPerCapita (in thousands of
dollars) is the dollar value of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population in 2000.
LP Return represents the distance-weighted portfolio returns of limited partners. Buyout
Fund represents the distance-weighted inflows to buyout funds. The regressions include
establishments in CZs that received any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard
errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆P90 HighSkilled 1st Stage ∆P90 HighSkilled 1st Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Observations 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032
R-squared 0.107 0.107
F-stat (excl instr.) 5.2 3.6
Establishment FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
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Table A.3: High Tech vs. Low Tech
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the differen-
tial effect of VC investments on wages of high-skilled workers at high-tech and low-tech
incumbent establishments using Equations 1.1 and 1.2. The dependent variable is the
dollar change in the 90th percentile of high-skilled workers’ wages. VCPerCapita (in
thousands of dollars) is the dollar value of VC investments in a CZ scaled by the population
in 2000. HighTech (LowTech) is a dummy variable indicating the establishment is in high-
tech (low-tech) industries. The regressions include establishments in CZs that received
any VC investments from 2009 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆P90 HighSkilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VCPerCapita × HighTech 2,202*** 1,460*** 2,074*** 1,067***
(268) (251) (290) (325)
VCPerCapita × LowTech 693*** 650*** 560* 743**
(229) (227) (292) (318)
Observations 337,032 337,032 337,032 337,032
R-squared 0.107 0.151 0.108 0.217
Establishment FE X X X X
Year FE X
Industry × Year FE X
State × Year FE X
Industry × State × Year FE X
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Table A.4: Heterogeneity in VC
This table presents results of establishment-level panel regressions assessing the effect of
different VC investments on wages of high-skilled workers at incumbent establishments
using Equation 1.2. The dependent variable is the dollar change in the 90th percentile
of high-skilled workers’ wages. Hightech VCPerCapita (Lowtech VCPerCapita) is the
dollar value of VC investments in high-tech (low-tech) industries of a CZ scaled by the
population in 2000. Early VCPerCapita (Late VCPerCapita) is the dollar value of VC
investments in early-stage (late-stage) startups of a CZ scaled by the population in 2000.
The regressions include establishments in CZs that received any VC investments from
2009 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***













Establishment FE X X
Industry × State × Year FE X X
147
Table A.5: Effect of VC Funding on Startup Wages
This table presents results of event studies assessing the effect of VC funding on startup
wages using Equation 1.7. A VC deal is an event. The dependent variable is the logarithm
of the average wage of foreign workers being requested by LCA. Post is equal to 1 after
the VC deal, and 0 otherwise. Treated is equal to 1 for startups receiving funding in the
VC deal, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) includes windows 3 months before and 3 months
after the events. Column (2) includes windows 6 months before and 6 months after the
events. Standard errors clustered by CZ are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate




Post × Treated -0.002 0.009**
(0.014) (0.004)
Event × Firm FE X X





APPENDIX FOR “THE DARK SIDE OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS?
IMPACT OF E-COMMERCE ON EMPLOYEES AT BRICK-AND-MORTAR
RETAILERS”
Table B.1: County Demographics
This table presents demographics statistics of 3,135 counties based on Census 2010.
Full Sample Counties Counties within Counties within
with FCs 50 Miles of FCs 100 Miles of FCs
N 3,135 50 445 1,141
Total Population 308,674,608 30,774,770 86,724,715 163,939,679
Population 98,460.80 615,495.40 194,887.00 143,680.70
Population Density 259.49 672.84 698.24 531.76
Retail Sales (in millions) 431.71 2,827.55 821.65 615.01
Retail Sales per Capita 3,552.72 4,623.48 3,692.95 3,679.81
Median Household Income 43,419.43 56,220.34 51,179.56 47,123.08
Unemployment Rate 9.36 9.64 10.17 10.27
Percent Age under 18 23.49 24.80 23.77 23.22
Percent Age over 65 15.93 12.16 14.08 15.31
Percent High School Graduate or Higher 82.51 85.84 83.04 82.31
Percent Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 18.73 27.52 21.74 19.73
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Table B.2: List of Retail Sectors
This table presents 6-digit NAICS industries that we include in our analysis.
NAICS Industry Name
441310 Automotive parts and accessories stores
441320 Tire dealers
442110 Furniture stores
442210 Floor covering stores
442291 Window treatment stores
442299 All other home furnishings stores
443141 Household appliance stores
443142 Electronics stores
444110 Home centers
444120 Paint and wallpaper stores
444130 Hardware stores
444190 Other building material dealers
444210 Outdoor power equipment stores
444220 Nursery, garden, and farm supply stores
446120 Cosmetic and beauty supply stores
446191 Food, health, supplement stores
446199 All other health and personal care stores
448110 Men’s clothing stores
448120 Women’s clothing stores
448130 Children’s and infants’ clothing stores
448140 Family clothing stores
448150 Clothing accessories stores
448190 Other clothing stores
448210 Shoe stores
448310 Jewelry stores
448320 Luggage and leather goods stores
451110 Sporting goods stores
451120 Hobby, toy, and game stores
451130 Sewing, needlework, and piece goods stores
451140 Musical instrument and supplies stores
451211 Book stores
451212 News dealers and newsstands
451220 Precorded tape, cd, and record stores
452111 Department stores, except discount
452112 Discount department stores
452910 Warehouse clubs and supercenters
452990 All other general merchandise stores
453110 Florists
453210 Office supplies and stationery stores
453220 Gift, novelty, and souvenir stores
453310 Used merchandise stores
453910 Pet and pet supplies stores
453920 Art dealers
453930 Manufactured, mobile, home dealers
453991 Tobacco stores
453998 Store retailers not specified elsewhere
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR “THE SPEED OF INFORMATION AND THE SELL-SIDE
RESEARCH INDUSTRY”
Table C.1: Timeline of Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley v. Theflyon-
thewall.com
This table shows key events in the lawsuit of Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan
Stanley against Theflyonthewall.com (Docket no. 10-1372-cv). The key dates where the
courts decisions were rendered are highlighted in bold. On March 18, 2010, the district
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs claim that FLY misappropriated hot news. On June 20,
2011, the appeals court reversed this decision.
Date Event
June 26,2006 Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley file suit against
Theflyonthewall.com alleging copyright infringement and “hot news”
misappropriation.
March 18th, 2010 Based on the plaintiffs “hot news” misappropriation claim, the dis-
trict court prohibits Theflyonthewall.com from disclosing recommen-
dations until 30 minutes after the opening of the NYSE or 10:00AM,
whichever is later. Plaintiffs were awarded statutory damages and at-
torney fees.
April 9th, 2010 Theflyonewall.com files an appeal.
May 7th, 2010 District court rejects Theflyonthewall.com’s motion to stay or modify
the injunction pending appeal.
May 19th, 2010 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted the
Theflyonthewall.com’s motion to stay the injunction.
June 20th, 2011 The judgment of the lower court is reversed by the United States Court
of Appeals Second Circuit.
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Table C.2: Variable Definitions
This table contains definitions for the key variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable Definition
SIZE Log firm market capitalization at time t-1 relative to the rec-
ommendation date.
TOBIN Q Firms market capitalization at scaled by replacement value at
the fiscal year end prior to the recommendation.
RUNUP The absolute value of stock price performance over days (-20,-
1) relative to the recommendation date.
UPGRADE (DOWNGRADE) A dummy variable equal to one if the recommendation is re-
vised upward (downward), zero otherwise.
REVISION MAGNITUDE The absolute value of the difference between the last numerical
recommendation rating and the current recommendation.
ALL STAR A dummy variable equal to one if the analyst is an Institutional
Investor all-star analyst in year t, zero otherwise.
PLAINTIFF A dummy variable equal to one if the broker sued Theflyon-
thewall.com (Barclays, Morgan Stanley or Bank of America),
zero otherwise.
BROKER SIZE The natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed by
the broker.
NEGLECTED An indicator that takes the value of one if two or fewer analysts
are covering the stock, zero otherwise.
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP The natural log of one plus the percentage of shares held by
institutional investors at the quarter end prior to the recommen-
dation.
VWAP Volume weighted price calculated from TAQ using trades be-
tween 9:30 and 4:00PM.
MEDIAN INDUSTRY RETURN The median return in industry i at time t.
# OF IPOS The number of IPOs filed in month t.
# OF DELISTINGS The number of firms that delist in month t.
∆ TRADING VOLUME The change in industry trading volume from month t-1 to t.
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